SERIES OF CRISES

Wairarapa Times-Age, 11 February 1943, Page 4

SERIES OF CRISES

IN GERMAN SUPREME COMMAND FACTOR MAKING FOR DEFEAT. HITLER AND HIS POLITICAL GENERALS. The fundamental lack of unity which has long existed between various factions dominating the German Supreme Command, a London correspondent, Mr Robert Powell, wrote recently in the “Christian Science Monitor,” is one of the most important factors to which history will probably ascribe Adolf Hitler’s final defeat. The myth that absolute unity of military control existed in Germany must have been exploded long ago, Mr Powell continued, in view of Hitler’s many dismissals of high ranking officers—first before the war actually started, and then of their removal whenever they either failed to fulfil an earlier promise or disagreed on mat-, ters of policy with the Fuehrer.

Not one crisis but a series of crises are the history of the German Supreme Command. It is extraordinary that, so many triumphs could have been achieved in the face of so many major disagreements. Organisation of the Reich’s armed forces leaves little to be desired from the technical viewpoint since there is. co-operation among themselves of the three services—military, naval and air —in the supreme command of the armed forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht). OKW Final Arbiter, Hitler as supreme war lord, is at the head with Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel as his deputy and ' Gen. Alfred Jodi as Chief of the General Staff. This body, the OKW as it is generally known in Germany, is final arbiter in all issues involving all the services. As subdivisions of this are the Army Command, with Hitler in charge since Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch disappeared and General Zeitzler as his Chief of General Staff succeeding General Franz Halder; the Navy under Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and Schulte-Moen ting as Chief of the Naval Staff; and the Luftwaffe under Field Marshal Wilhelm Goering with Teschonnek as his Chief of Air Staff. To these three services, all theoretically operating from one central coordinating point, has been added a fourth —the armed SS (Black Shirts) under Henrich Himmler. This section has long been growing in strength and enough has already been written about it so that it is only necessary to add here that Hitler’s recognition of this special arm of the service was the culmination of a policy which wavered for long as to whether Nazi Party formations or military forces should dominate, first decided in favour of the Army as opposed to the SA (Brown Shirts) but which now has long favoured Herr Himler’s control of the Army by threats and penetration.

SEAT OF THE TROUBLE.

This struggle betvzeen military and political generals, for that is what it really is, may be said to have started with Herr Goering’s appointment as Field Marshal of the Air Forge over the heads of longer standing regular officers —he is in fact Germany’s senior field marshal under Hitler today. Marshal Goering’s appointment was bitterly resented in the forces and a clash was avoided by victories over Austria and Czechoslovakia before September 3, 1939. Since then there have been othei’ clashes between these two sections and many between Hitler and his field marshals regarding military strategy, notably on the Russian front where issues as to whether Moscow or Stalingrad should be attacked and in what strength, what shall be the German Army’s defensive winter line in Russia and other questions, have led to dismisals of outstanding military experts. Add to this fact that military leaders such as General Werner von Fritsche and General Walther von Reichenau have been killed, and it is clear that Hitler has lost some outstanding leaders.

CAPABLE MARSHALS AT HAND.

Simultaneously it would be foolish to' ignore the fact that he still has a number of good marshals such as Gunther von Kluge, Siegmund Wilhelm List, and Gerd von Runstedt, and Generals Erwin Rommel, Heinz Guderian, etc., capable of fine strategy. But unfortunately for Hitler, the German Army today lacks a head, and there are few politically suitable candidates to be found. Men such as General Halder, to whom military strategy has been a major study, are thrown out for ‘persons like General Zeitzler, who neither enjoys the confidence of older generals nor his himself the military knowledge or experii ence. General Zeitzler is merely Herr Himmler’s nominee to a General Staff position. (General Zeitzler’s name does not appear in any standard German military reference books). Political generals must have victories or their supporters must know the (reason why. Hence the failure to take Stalingrad and to end the war this fall has been a severe blow to Hitler. This accounts for German ‘propaganda representing Marshal Rommel in almost the same mythical way as Hitler has been represented, as a legendary figure, personification of Nazi revolution and bulletproof daredevil endowed with a sixth and even a seventh sense in military matters. COMING TEST. Marshal Rommel has had to take the place which Hitlei’ should have taken had the war on the Eastern Front been finished. With the new turn of events in North Africa and possible later military developments on the European mainland will come the greatest tests of Hitler’s ability to combine both political and military leadership in his own hands. Gone now are the days when the Fuehrer could be pictured as a great student of books on military strategy. He has had opportunity to apply the marvellous conceptions Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels attributes to him. Unlike Wilhelm 11, he will not be able to say his generals were responsible for what he did, since Hitler repeatedly maintains he made them, not vice versa. What these present : generals can accomplish when the i fighting is equally matched or against better equipped foes remains to be seen. Hitherto, except for Russia, they have measured their strength against weaker enemies and they have yet to ' prove themselves in defeat. '■

Hitler’s acceptance' of a system of political generals has also had an im-

portant effect upon Germany which is of great significance for the post-war period. His “democratisation” of military commands on the basis of the political outlook has given a more serious blow to the Juflker class than would any foreign Power.. The Junkers will find it hard to maintain the tradition of considering themselves leaders of the German nation against politicians, especially as they co-oper-ated so willingly with Hitler to build up the armed forces he later used against Europe. The German General. Staff crisis is but the working out of a political totalitarian system and its further consequences will be those of similar events in other nations’ history as the Nazi defeat becomes more obvious.