FINDING TARGETS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 29 January 1943, Page 4

FINDING TARGETS

OPERATIONS OF R.A.F. HINTS AND CLUES. EXAMPLES OF INTELLIGENCE WORK. When the newspapers report a heavy raid by our bombers on an industrial town in Germany—let us call it Mitteldorf—there is some special reason why, with all the Reich to choose from, this particular area has been singled out for attack at this time, writes a correspondent of the London “Times.” The origin of the operation may date many months back, when the “Mitteldorfer Zeitung" contained an unobtrusive paragraph about a speech made at a dinner by the head of a small local engineering works. While his speech gave no concrete details, it indicated that the firm had just done a good stroke of business. A few weeks later the .chance sight of a letter in a South American office revealed that the K.U.G. Company, of Cologne, regretted their inability to discharge an order for precision instruments. This is a point worth noting, for Germany had made strenuous efforts to supply her South American customers, so that the order must have been turned down for some good reason. Then another germane fact is noticed ,K.U.G., though not linked directly, is recorded as hav- 1 ing sometimes in the past sub-con-tracted to S.U.V., of Mitteldorf. The file is consulted: the newspaper cutting hinting at S.U.V.’s expansion is found, the evidence is beginning to accumulate. FROM SMALL BEGINNING. More is found by roundabout means. A German business man has been in Switzerland trying to persuade skilled watchmakers to take jobs in Germany. He comes from Mitteldorf. From . a neutral source it is learned that trains are being held up outside Mitteldorf while heavy goods traffic is shunted on to the branch line. A reconnaissance aircraft is sent over to. photograph the Mitteldorf area. The pictures are fitted together into a mosaic, enlarged, scanned by experts through special lenses, and the lay-out of a camouflaged factory is discovered. Further photographs are secured and are sent to engineering experts, who suggest that a specialised high-grade-com-ponent is being manufactured there. Soon afterwards an enemy minelaying aircraft crashes on a mudbank in an English estuary, and when it is salved markings show that certain components were made at Mittledorf. The dossier is'now complete; the raid follows.

h The information from which the pice ture of what was happening at Mittela dorf was built up was part of a vastt e flow of hints,' facts, and details. Each 3 significant point was probably embedf ded in a mass of useless and perhaps f even misleading material. Collection e of information is comparatively easy; 1 interpretation is a different matter. This consists largely of bringing together in correct groups a number of facts which seem at first to have no common factor. Of a thousand items reviewed dnly two or three may prove relevant. To track them down through systematic indexing is itself no mean feat: to give them a precise value when they have been found is even more difficult. When the intelligence officer has decided that his. case is proved he makes his recommendation; it is then ' for the Air Staff to act as they think . fit. These are merely examples of intel- ’ ligence work. The main function of ’ intelligence is to discover the enemy’s j strategical plans; but, besides, the In- ’ telligence Staff must attempt to assess r the strength of the enemy’s internal economic system; what his production of guns, aircraft, tanks, and ammunition may be; the depth of .his reserves, the extent to which his fighting strength can be maintained. An estimate must also* be made of the enemy’s stores of food and raw materials; and the morale of the civilian population, must be gauged. Shipping, road trans- J port, locomotives, and- rolling stock' must be assessed not only numerically but in terms of probable efficiency. Without a knowledge of all these factors it is impossible to draw up a strategical or economic plan do defeat the enemy, nor can our own forces be disposed to the best advantage. THE ONLY WEAPON. The strategical aspect of intelligence is of the utmost importance. The Air Force is at present the only weapon ■ which enables us to penetrate 1 into the heart of Germany. It is not enough for ' the enemy to be hit hard and often; he must be hit in the right place, and the task of the intelligence is to discover his solar plexus and to advise how his defences can be evaded with the minimum cost. During the heavy air raids on Britain during 1940 and 1941 we obtained first-hand information about what bombing can and cannot accomplish, and the lessons learnt are being turned to good account against Germany. We now know not only the weak spots in the enemy’s economic structure, but, perhaps equally important, which of these our bombers' can tackle. Targets which, from an economic standpoint, should be destroyed are often unsuitable for bombing but we have learnt how to select one fit for hitting and worth destroying. Rostock provides a good example. It was a thrivng industrial centre, advertised as such by the Germans themselves in a long article in their illustrated press, published shortly before the R.A.F. attacks took place. Being on the seaboard of the Baltic, Rostock was easy to ■ find; strategically a successful attack would cripple a pont used by the Ger- ; mans in their war against the Russ- . ians and would dislocate an entire section of the enemy aircraft industry. Clearly a desirable target from every , point of view, Rostock was selected, and the task was well and truly carried , out by our bombers. , PILGRIM’S PROGRESS. But once a target has been selected j pilots must be advised how best to ; avoid the enemy’s defences, searchlight ; flak, or night fighters. On his return i from a raid on Germany each pilot is 1 asked for details of what he has seen i and done, so that the information may ( be sifted and analysed. In this way a picture of the enemy’s defence system t is gradually built up. Decoy targets, I dummy fires, and dummy towns are j carefully plotted, and bomber crews t are briefed to avoid traps designed to c destroy or mislead them. A pilot’s jour- i ney is like a pilgrim’s progress, but, t unlike Christian, he is warned of the s pitfalls before he sets out on his jour- c ney. In the same way R.A.F. fighter p pilots must be kept fully informed of c the enemy’s aircraft developments, v When any new type comes into service I n

details must be circulated without a moment’s delay. Every fighter pilot must know the performance and manoeuvrability of aircraft, and, if possible, what tactics the enemy is likely to employ in its use. If the British pilot is to be engaged in low-level attacks he must know where the ground defences are and how to avoid them. The Intelligence staff builds up this picture from photographic recon-, naissance, from pilot’s own reports, and other sources of informatibn. With vast forces deployed throughout the world, accurate and speedy information is essenial if comprehensive 1 plans are to be drawn up. On the Intelligence Staff of the R.A.F. lies the duty of evaluating and disseminating in an accurate and compressed form the gatherings from every conceivable source, and placing them before the commanding officers for ready use in planning. The widespread disposition of R.A.F, squadrons throughout the world is a sufficient indication of the magnitude of the task,