Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1943. NORTH AFRICA AND BEYOND.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 11 January 1943, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1943. NORTH AFRICA AND BEYOND.

QVER a period, ‘a number of unduly pessimistic estimates by Allied commentators of the outlook in some ol: the war theatres (as well, of course, as a number that were too optimistic) have been discredited by subsequent events. At present, apparently good reasons appear for doubting whether valid grounds exist for the rather gloomy view of the position in North Africa taken by the London “Daily Mail.” in comments cabled at the end of last week.

It is obvious that the Allies are .faced still by a rather formidable total task in North Africa and that the magnitude of this task has been increased by the admitted failure of the attempt gallantly made by the British First Army, under the command of General Anderson, to rush the enemy defences of Tunis and Bizerta. The British commander took the risk of attempting to drive towards the Tunisian east coast at a time when his troops could not be given adequate local air support. It was evidently hoped that the enemy might be overwhelmed before he had time fully 'to organise and man the naturally strong defensive positions which exist particularly on the ap- . proaches to Bizerta.

Time and probably a good many lives would have been saved had the British effort succeeded. It failed, however, and the 'enemy, making full use of his air bases commanding the Mediterranean narrows between Sicily and Tunisia, has been able to add. on a more or less considerable scale to his forces in Eastern Tunisia. Present indications are that the enemy has laid his plans for a defensive stand in Libya, with Rommel’s forces, now retreating through Tripolitania. added to those of General Nehring. There is an absence of news, at present regarding the progress of an American column which was reported recently to be driving on Gabes (on the Tunisian coast well over 200 miles, as the crow flies, south of Tunis). Reaching their objective the Americans would cut the main communications linking the Axis armies i,n. Tunisia and in Tripolitania.

With some factors undetermined, the balance as between success and failure, advantage and disadvantage in North Africa seems still to turn heavily in favour of the Allies. In spite of difficulties arising from the tangle of French politics —difficulties heightened by elements of unsavoury intrigue—an unimpeded use of French African territory and bases has been secured more speedily than seemed possible when the Allied forces made their landings in Morocco and Algeria, and French military co-operation appears to be developing with good promise. 1

Against the admitted strength of the defences around Bizerta—Tunis is less advantageously placed from the standpoint of defence —•there'is suggestive evidence that the Allies are building up much stronger forces than the Axis Powers can hope to establish in Tunisia, even if Rommel, succeeds in effecting a junction with Nehring. For the time being, Allied offensive operations are hampered by wet weather and bogged ground—conditions that are expected to last still for some weeks —but they are making increasingly powerful air attacks from east and west on enemy bases in Tunisia and related-areas,

Some fears have been expressed that delays in North Africa, may prevent the Western'Allies co-operating as they should with the Russians in their splendidly successful winter offensive. Even at the stage it has meantime reached, however, the campaign in North Africa must be affecting greatly the disposition of enemy air and land forces. Hitler and his accomplices necessarily are alive to the fact that an Allied conquest of the southern shores of the Mediterranean, which the Axis cannot hope to do more than delay, will be a step only towards attack on Europe.

Moreover, it is dear that Allied offensive plans do not relate only to what Mr Churchill lias called the soft under-belly of Axis Europe—the southern shores of the continent from France to Macedonia. The point ha.Tbeen made that the Allied armies in North Africa, having achieved their full purpose there, could not at a moment’s notice proceed to an invasion, for instance, of Italy, with its 2,000 miles of exposed coastline. Great transport and other tasks of course would be involved in such an invasion. No secret is being made, however, of the fact that the Allies have other forces-iat./lisposal than those in North Africa, and other European objectives in mind than those an undisputed possession of North Africa will bring within reach.

In his address to Congress last week, for example, President Roosevelt said the United Nations were going to strike, and strike hard in Europe, though he could not tell his hearers whether blows were going to be struck in Norway, or through the Low Countries, or in France, or through Sardinia, or Italy, or through the Balkans, or through Poland. Germany and her vassals are under an immediate necessity of preparing to meet heavy attacks by land and air at any one of a great number of points around the confines of Europe. To that material extent the Russians are being helped now and it is not in doubt that they will get still more powerful help and support in the near future.