NAZI WAR SUPPLIES

Wairarapa Times-Age, 28 September 1942, Page 4

NAZI WAR SUPPLIES

INEVITABLE SHORTAGE OF SEVERAL ESSENTIAL MATERIALS. SEEN BY SOVIET AUTHORITY. Before the war Germany imported about 400,000 tons of lubricants annually (Professor Eugene Varga wrote recently in “Soviet War News”). It is improbable that she was able to lay in any considerable supplies. The Nazi army is now experiencing an acute oil shortage. The examination of German trucks and tanks captured on the Soviet front has revealed that in many cases olive oil has been used in place of mineral oils. The former is incomparably more expensive, and cannot compare with mineral oil for quality. The amount of fuel used by the German army on the eastern front is estimated at a million tons monthly. The figure for all the other fronts amounts to 100,000 tons. Before the war Germany and the European countries occupied by her imported 15 million tons of oil products annually. Tn one year of war against the Soviet Union Germany will require more than 19 million tons of oil to cover her needs both at the front and in the rear.

Germany is in a position to produce about 9 to 9£ million tons of oil products yearly. This means that the remaining 10 million tons of fuel will have to be drawn from accumulated reserves. Copper and Rubber Famine. What is the position with regard to non-ferrous metals? Before the war Germany imported about 200,000 tons of copper, her own industry supplying 27,000 tons annually. Since more copper is used in war time than in peace, it is obvious that Germany’s supplies of this metal must be nearly exhausted. Much the same holds true of her nickel and tin supplies, all of which were imported from overseas. Another raw material of vital strategic importance is rubber. Before the war Germany imported about 80,000 tons of rubber annually from overseas. During the year preceding the war her rubber imports exceeded 100,000 tons. Germany was apparently laying in stocks for the war.

In peace time about 100,000 tons were needed to cover her annual requirements, artificial rubber, “buna” being used to supply part of the demand. Far more rubber is, of course, needed in war time. Tires wear out much more quickly at the front than on paved roads. Nor can Germany’s home-pro-duced artificial rubber always replace natural rubber.

At the beginning of the war Germany had no wool and cotton reserves. This is evident from the fact that her woollen imports just before the war were considerably lower than in 1929. Imports in 1929 totalled 169,000 tons; in 1933-38 they averaged only 130,000 tons annually. Cotton imports amounted to 426,000 tons in 1929, and averaged about 350,000 tons in 1933-38. It should be borne in mind that during this period uniforms and other articles of clothing were being produced for* an army of ten million men, and that more than double the amount of raw textiles are needed for soldiers’ uniforms than would suffice for civilian clothes.

NO LEATHER BOOTS FOR ARMY.

Imports of wool and cotton have practically stopped as a result of the blockade. Today Germany is suffering from an acute shortage of raw textiles, and the bulk of her textile mills have closed down owing to the absence of raw materials. There is a similar serious lack of raw material for leather footwear and particularly for leather soles. Before the war Germany had no leather reserves worth mentioning. Before long the Nazi army, like the German people, will find itself without leather footwear.

The considerable supplies of strategical raw materials which Hitler systematically accumulated before the war have been and are being swallowed up on the Soviet front. At the same time army requirements continue to grow. This factor is bound to hasten Hitler’s defeat in 1942.