BRITISH EFFORT

Wairarapa Times-Age, 29 April 1942, Page 4

BRITISH EFFORT

TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT WITH INDIA DEBATE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS OPENED BY SIR S. CRIPPS. DISAGREEMENT ONLY OVER DETAILS. (By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright) (Received This Day, 9.50 a.m.) LONDON, April 28. Sir Stafford Cripps, in opening a debate in the House of Commons, on his mission to India, said: “Unfortunately events brought disappointment, but no one in Britain need feel regretful that the Government proposals were put forward or need blame the Government or the British for the failure

to reach an agreement. “The moment was a .difficult one, as many things that might have been usefully discussed and negotiated in more peaceful times could not be dealt with because there was an overriding need to do everything in our power to carry cut our duty to defend India against a foreign invader,” Sir Stafford continued. “Owing to events in the Far Eastern theatre of war, accompanied by highly skilled, though grossly misleading, propaganda from Axis sources, an atmosphere of anti-British sentiment showed itself in certain sections' of Indian opinion. With the approach of self-government or Dominion status as a reality, the communal differences of view as to the form of government suitable for the future of India tended to become more definitely crystallised. It was a need for clarification of the situation and for consultation with Indian opinion in a favourable direction that impelled Britain to decide that some positive step must 'be taken quickly. Britain’s objective and hope was that she might use these very difficulties to bring together all the main leaders of Indian opinion for the double purpose of solving India’s future and reinforcing • her defence against the invader. “The future is inevitably linked with the present, and I am confident that no mere temporary arrangement could have been reached without some exposition of our future intentions. Had we attempted to : deal only with the present, we should immediately have been met with a demand for a clarification of the future. 1 was most anxious that there should be no suspicion that the Government was hand-picking those whom 1 1 saw, and consequently I asked the main organisations themselves to appoint those they wished to meet me. I believe that, on the fundamental ’SHtl’

vital points of self-government and self-determination, there was not a single case of disagreement. “I alone,” said Sir Stafford, ’’was responsible for what was put forward to the Indian leaders in amplification of the details of the draft declaration.” Referring to his talks with Colonel Johnsen (President Roosevelt’s representative) Sir Stafford said there was no question of any American intervention, but only of personal help from a very able American citizen. “I do not believe it was possible to find in the existing circumstances a fairer solution of the problem than the Government’s declaration,” he added. “There was a distinct division of opinion among the Indians on the question of defence, but practical unanimity that the mechanical conduct of war in India and the control of the fighting force must remain under a British Comman-der-in-Chief. Differences of opinion came when the responsibilities of the Government of India, apart from those of the British Government, were considered. It was impossible for the Government to go further with safety and no risks could be taken at such a mo-' ment as the present on so vital and immediate a matter as the defence of India.”

“APPARENT LIMITATIONS.” Discussing difficulties in the way of acceptance of the draft declaration, Sir Stafford Cripps said that although he thought the Congress leaders themselves appreciated that no restriction would be imposed on the power of the Indian Union in its future relationship to the other States of the British Commonwealth, they were afraid that their followers would attach undue importance to the apparent limitations included in the definition of Dominion status. The words had been accepted as making it perfectly clear that India could in fact leave the British Commonwealth of Nations should an Indian Government under the new constitution so decide.

PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE. Referring to the problem of defence, Sir Stafford said he took the view, in which the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief agreed, that it would be difficult for representative Indians of the Viceroy's Executive to rouse the peoples of India to their defence unless they could say with justice that at least some part cf that defence was the responsibility of representative Indians, and so of the Indian people. Various suggestions were made and several formulae were tried, until eventually that one was* worked out which became the final suggestion. Its object was quite simple —to allocate to the Commander-in-Chief, as war member of the Viceroy’s Executive, all those administrative functions in the Government of India vital to the efficient carrying on of the war, while at the same time leaving to representative Indians other functions of the defence members, together with several other important functions. He felt pretty sure that had the Congress leaders accepted the final draft declaration, they would have been able to rally their followers behind them.

INDIAN DIVISIONS. It was not on this that the final break came. Possession of the complete power asked for by Congress and not demanded by any other section in India would have left them in an impossible situation. He was confident that none of the minorities would have accepted such a position, least of all the Moslems. It was on that issue that the final break came, followed by rejection, as he expected, by the Moslem League, foi’ reasons the precise opposite of those stated by Congress, but all concerned with the future rather than the present. Sir Stafford said there was much to be placed on the credit side. Advantage had come from the evidence that Britain desired, to give India self-gov-ernment at the earliest practicable moment and wished her to determine the form it could take. The whole discussion had also served to bring to the front the determination of the Indian people to defend their own country. Many of the Indian leaders would do

their best to arouse the Indian peoples in their own defence, and he hoped that ,by co-operation in defence, they would be a step nearer to a solution of their problems. Mr L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, replying in the House of Commons debate, said the sending of Sir Stafford Cripps to India had marked in a peculiar degree the unity of outlook and policy with regard to India which had been reached by the Government, Parliament and public opinion.