Thank you for correcting the text in this article. Your corrections improve Papers Past searches for everyone. See the latest corrections.

This article contains searchable text which was automatically generated and may contain errors. Join the community and correct any errors you spot to help us improve Papers Past.

Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image

BRILLIANT STORY

OF THE BOMBER COMMAND TOLD IN AIR MINISTRY BOOKLET. NEW LIGHT ON CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE. (British Official Wireless.) (Received This Day, 11.35 a.m.) RUGBY, October 6. In the famous pamphlet “The Battle of Britain,” the story of the Fighter Command and the defeat of the Lufawaffe were vividly desscribed. In “The Bomber Command,” issued today by the Air Ministry, the no less brilliant story of the activities of R.A.F. bombers is told. The account covers every aspect of the work of the Bomber Command, from the moment when, an hour after war was declared, a Blenheim took off from Wyton to

see what the German Fleet was doing, to July this year. In a section relating to the Battle of France, the booklet reveals tragic differences of opinion between the British and French authorities. At the outset, the Comite de Guerre ruled that, because casualties might be caused to the civilian population, bombing attacks on enemy concentrations in Germany were not to be made unless the Germans launched them on the Allies. The German attack opened in force on May 10. The Allied Commander-in-Chief still refused to allow objectives in Germany or German troops on the move in their own country to be bombed, It was not until the afternoon of May 10 that an advance air striking force bombed German troop columns advancing through Luxembourg, and not until next day that attacks were made on enemy troops and lines of communication by R.A.F. medium and heavy bombing forces. It was under these circumstances that R.A.F. bombers so heroically attacked and harassed the enemy's advance. Their boldness was shown by the sacrifice of 35 battle bombers out of 67 in one engagement. Further difficulties which they faced are also emphasised —namely the living screen of refugees which shielded the enemy's advance.

ATTACK BLOCKED BY FRANCE. Another extraordinary misunderstanding with the French characterised the first attack by bombers on Italy. When her entry into the war seemed inevitable, a force was to be on the,Salon Aerodrome, not far from Marseilles. On June 10, orders for a raid on Milan were received by the commander of d force of Wellingtons stationed there. The commander of the Zone des Operations Ariens des Alpes forbade the execution of the orders received from British Air Headquarters, maintaining that they were contrary to the desires of the French Government. The British officer commanding, in view of the very definite nature of his instructions, disregarded protests from the French authorities and continued to make preparations to carry out the raid. About half an hour after midnight, the Wellingtons were taxiing into positions for the take-off when a number of French military lorries were suddenly driven on to the aerodrome and so disposed as to make any take-off imoossible.

The French officer in charge of them informed the British commander that he had been instructed at all costs to prevent the British bombers from taking the air. To avoid an open clash, the raid was cancelled.

COWARDICE IN ITALY. But Italy was to have her raids all the same, and some of the results are set out in the booklet for the first time. When Turin was attacked, the population rushed for their scanty and illconstructed shelters, only to find them packed with the crews of anti-aircraft guns and searchlights, appointed to provide for their defence. A number of their officers were subsequently shot for cowardice. By the end of August there was a real panic in Genoa. Some signs of panic were observed during the first raid on Naples. INVASION PREVENTED. One of the greatest achievements of the Bomber Command was in helping to prevent an invasion of Britain. In due course no less than 3,000 self-pro-pelled barges, of a carrying capacity of a million tons, with another fourmillion tons of shipping were assembled at invasion ports, which sustained over five hundred attacks. How many men were killed or drowned and how many boats were wrecked cannot be calculate but the fact remains that no invasion took place.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WAITA19411007.2.59

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Wairarapa Times-Age, 7 October 1941, Page 6

Word count
Tapeke kupu
673

BRILLIANT STORY Wairarapa Times-Age, 7 October 1941, Page 6

BRILLIANT STORY Wairarapa Times-Age, 7 October 1941, Page 6

Help

Log in or create a Papers Past website account

Use your Papers Past website account to correct newspaper text.

By creating and using this account you agree to our terms of use.

Log in with RealMe®

If you’ve used a RealMe login somewhere else, you can use it here too. If you don’t already have a username and password, just click Log in and you can choose to create one.


Log in again to continue your work

Your session has expired.

Log in again with RealMe®


Alert