DOUBLE EDGED

Wairarapa Times-Age, 26 August 1941, Page 6

DOUBLE EDGED

STRATEGY OF GERMANS ATTACK ON RUSSIA. ALTERNATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION BOSTON, June 22. Adolf Hitler's long predicted attack on Soviet Russia is a shrewd double play intended to give German high strategy the advantage of two alternative courses of action, either one of which the Fuehrer can develop or abandon as events unfold in this new phase of world war, writes Joseph C. Harsch, in the “Christian Science Monitor." It is first and primarily a hedge , against a protracted war involving the , stupendous power of the United States. It is an attempt to protect himself against this by gaining abso- , lute control of the resources of European Russia which he had found him- , self unable to obtain by means short of war. It is, second, an effort to consolidate the basis for a peace offensive which Herr Hitler’s strategists have always wanted to keep in reserve as a means of bringing the war to a quick end if the going became too difficult. DISUNITY IS SOUGHT. Incidental to both of these two purposes behind the move, and involved in both of them, is the idea that by suddenly turning on Russia, Germany will be able to promote disunity and indecision both in Britain and the United States, In fact the first result Herr Hitler and his diplomatic strategists hope to achieve by the Russian move is a reduced tempo of intervention by the United States and with it a revival of the appeasement movement in Britain. But Berlin took far more than this possibility into its considerations in pressing Russia to the point where Josef Stalin macle the one decision he probably never expected to make during the course of this war—namely, to fight or surrender. The move proves that Britain has actually won a great military victory during the dark months of defeat in Greece, . Crete, and Ltbya. It proves that those German advances were too slow to assure Herr Hiller final victory over Britain before America could enter the war with effectiveness. SEES PROTRACTED WAR. By the attack on Russia, Herr Hitler recognises the possibility of a protracted war in which Britain will become increasingly stronger with war materials shipped from the American side of the Atlantic. He has had to abandon the hope of bringing his European conquests to a quick victory over Britain during this campaign season. Herr Hitler can face this prospect of a protracted war against Britain and America only if he can control the economic resources of Russia. He must be sure of Ukrainian wheat and Baku oil to keep his war machine supplied for the long term struggle. To face such a struggle without them would have left him ultimately at the mercy of Moscow. He.tried to obtain it through trade negotiations and a non-aggression pact. He failed and he was left with no recourse but to go after them with arms. In reaching his decision to attack Russia Herr Hitler was further moved by what seems to Berlin the opporI (unity involved in the move for launching a peace offensive in the west. The idea of basing such a peace offensive on a campaign against Russia was widely discussed in Berlin as far back as last September. The idea which the Wilhelmstrasse toyed with then, and continuously since, was that the entire European continent, including Russia, would provide a perfect platform from which Herr Hitler could announce his willingness to end hostilities with Britain. I

FUTURE TRUCE BASIS. Taking different possibilities into 'consideration they figured that the time might come when it would be to their advantage to obtain a truce during which they could consolidate the industrial machinery of the continent. They would, of course, tell Britain that Germany was satisfied with the continent and wanted nothing more. They estimated that if they had conquered Russia before launching this argument it would have a strong appeal to all conservative classes in England. If Britain fell for the bait and granted, a peace, the result would serve a double purpose. It would give Germany time to prepare for the next expansionist move and it would take > the heart out of the- growing resistance of the occupied countries to German dominance on the continent. They also figured that during such a lull in hostilities they could proceed with peaceful penetration of the United States and prepare the' Americas for the next “blitz.” Up until President Roosevelt’s reelection in November the Wilhelmstrasse merely toyed with this idea, because Herr Hitler's strategists continued until then to believe that they could conquer Britain before the United States became a material factor in the war. But when Roosevelt’s reelection and passage of the lend-lease bill brought American industrial strength into the battle the chances for a quick victory dwindled. The Balkan “blitz” was a last attempt to bring Britain down quickly. Germany won the military victories, but won them too slowly. And in the process Russia became an increasing danger on the flank. None of this should have surprised the Russians. Certainly the Russian Embassy in Berlin was well apprised of how the wind was blowing long

ago. The Russian Military Attache discussed it freely and intelligently in a group of neutral diplomatists and newspapermen, including the writer, in Berlin in October. At that time some of the foreign military experts there thought that the attack on Russia might begin during the winter. The Russian himself expressed the on inion that it would not come before spring of 1941, but agreed that German troop dispositions were ready even at that time. Germans were making no secret of the possibility during that period and diplomatic officials of the Wilhelmstrasse tried on' several occasions to sound me out on the possibility that the attack on Russia would undermine anti-German sentiment in the United States. Further, it has always been made perfectly clear in German economic discussions, both in private and in public print, that the Nazi High Command regarded European. Russia as an indispensable part of the German economic Lebensraum. If the German armies go through Russia quickly enough the peace offensive will almost certainly be the next major Berlin move. Preparatory steps are certain to begin at once with appeals to politically conservative elements in this country to regard Germany today as the crusader against Bolshevism. But if this fails Herr Hitler expects at least to emerge with an economic area under his control which will be sufficient to feed his war machine for years to come.