PANZER TROOPS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 14 July 1941, Page 6

PANZER TROOPS

NAZI TANK DIVISIONS GENERAL DE GAULLE'S CONCEPTION. METHODS OF WARFARE. The Tank Division, as a unit, was General de Gaulle's idea, writes a special military correspondent of the London “Times.” France rejected it, Germany secretly adopted and enlarged upon it. So France fell. It was due to the panzer troops, tanks on the ground, Stukas above, that we lost Norway and Greece, and had to fall back from Libya. Now German panzer troops in full strength are being hurled against Russian positions from the Baltic to the Black Sea; and for the first time they are meeting massed forces of their own kind. On the efficiency of the rival machines, plus the strategic abilities of commanders and efficiency and courage of the crews, the outcome of the present battles will depend. It may be opportune at this time to examine, in the light of bitter experience and more complete knowledge, the real scope and organisation of the panzer division, the spearhead upon which the enemy has staked himself in battle.

Admittedly, it is not thought at G.H.Q. that the Germans have been able to land their heavier tanks in Libya. A considerable force of light machines has been assembled there, and when it comes to considering an invasion of Britain itself there is no doubt whatever that it is within the enemy’s ability to construct special craft for the landing of the heaviest tank he can build. SIX THOUSAND MACHINES. It is estimated that Germany now has 15 armoured divisions, which, putting the strength of a division at 400 tanks of mixed types, would nominally represent a first-line force of 6000 machines. She flung her total strength of 10 divisions into the Battle of France last spring, and went to war against Poland with four. These figures are eloquent. In tracing the development and strategy of the panzer division there is no need to go back to the sorry story of the lead that Britain lost from the time, many years ago, when experiments were first made on Salisbury

fiain witn tames operating witn closesupport aircraft. I Earlier German adventures on the Continent gave them the advantage of developing their armoured formations by a system of trial and error. They learned a great deal about maintenance and supply during the march into Austria, when many of their tanks broke down badly; the role of the divebomber had been deeply studied in Spain; and during the Polish campaign, from which they emerged by no means unscathed, it was found that the armour of the German tank did rfot resist the armour-piercing bullet, and the enemy therefore spent the winter in thickening it before unleasing the full fury of his blitzkrieg against the Low Countries. “CLOUDS” OF CYCLISTS. From the beginning the Germans discerned that the tank could not operate alone, that the co-operation of all arms in a self-contained unit was an indispensable factor in its future. So the panzer division was built up, each with its own squadron of supporting aircraft, which by the maintenance of a close wireless link could be summoned within a remarkably short period, and within the division are a brigade of lorry-borne infantry, a mechanised reconnaissance unit, which in the form of advance “clouds” of motor-cyclists played such a prominent part in France, a regiment of field artillery, an anti-tank battalion, a heavy machine-gun battalion, and an engineer battalion carrying bridging equipment, besides a thorough system of ordnance field workshops, with a light aid detachment attached to every tank battalion.

CORE OF THE SPEARHEAD. The core of this hurtling spearhead, which is not without a certain resemblance to a gangster’s bodyguard, is the tank brigade consisting of two regiments, each of two battalions of 100 light, medium, and heavy tanks. The whole organisation, swift and flexible, makes for a high degree of reconnaissance and hitting power under the hand of the foremost leader. The divisional commander and staff have their armoured command vehicle, similar to our own, and a highly developed system of communications is almost entirely by wireless. The most recent trend is to reduce the number of tanks in the division to about 300, which would partly explain the rapid expansion of divisions. The enemy, moreover, must have captured nearly as many tanks as he lost in the occupied countries. HEAVIES PREFERRED. One division from Prague, indeed, is equipped entirely with Czecho-Slovak tanks. The German light-medium tank, of which there are many, weighs between 18 and 20 tons, is very fast and carries a crew of three. It is armed with a 37mm. gun and two coupled machine-guns, and has armour of about 30mm.

The tendency is for the light tank to be discarded and to substitute a heavy tank for the medium. This heavy machine, really a cruiser, has a crew of five, a 75 gun, and two machineguns, and carries a good deal of ammunition. Its speed on the road is about 30 miles per hour. A good deal was heard during the Battle of France of a German juggernaut of between 70 and 100 tons, but the authorities have no evidence that the enemy used a tank heavier than 36 tons, although he probably has one now.