Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, MAY 3, 1941. THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 3 May 1941, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, MAY 3, 1941. THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT.

()NE of the observations made by Mr Churchill, in. his broadcast review of the war at the beginning of this week —an observation following on the statement that he made it a rule not to prophesy about battles yet to be fought out—was that: However he would venture to say that he would be very sorry to see the tasks of the combatants in the Middle East exchanged and General Wavell's army in the position of the German invaders. It may be supposed that no reason for modifying the emphatic opinion here expressed will be found by Air C hurchill, or others who speak- with authority, in the fact that Axis forces (consisting. it is said, chiefly of Italians) are now reported to be making a powerful attack on Tobruk, in the course of which they have penetrated some of the outer defences of that seaport fortress. Many of the factors involved in the present German-Italian attempt to invade Egypt —amongst them the strength of the forces Germany has been able to introduce into Tripoli and the extent to which she is likely to be able to reinforce them by air and sea—are not defined at all clearly. There is a lack, of definite information, too. about the strength in numbers and equipment, relatively to the enemy, of the British Imperial forces based on Egypt. In spite of these elements of obscurity, however, good reasons appear, for accepting -Mr Churchill s expressed preference for the situation of General AVaveil’s army. Public opinion in British and other countries no doubt has been influenced considerably by the dramatic changes of fortune witnessed in the Libyan campaign. After driving the enemy completely out of Cyrenaica, the Army of the Nile has in its turn been thrust hack inside the frontier of Egypt, save that it still holds Tobruk with a garrison isolated by land, but possessed of sea communications of which Britain, with her naval command of fhe Mediterranean, is able to make good use. It has to be considered, however, that the essential achievement of the Army of the Nile was not so much fhe occupation of enemy territory as the annihilation, in great part, of the Italian forces commanded by Marshal Graziani. That achievement stands, and any losses suffered by the British forces in their retreat through Libya constitute only an inconsiderable fraction of the losses earlier inflicted on the enemy. Indeed, the British losses are- in great part balanced by the captures of enemy prisoners made, in the present phase of fhe campaign, by the Tobruk garrison. Although it made brilliant use of its opportunities in smashing Graziani’s armies, the primary task of the Army of the Nile is, as it has been, to protect and safeguard Egypt and the Suez Canal. However formidable the present attack may be, the Germans labour obviously under some exceedingly heavy disadvantages. At the point they have reached, in the Solium area, they are still nearly 500 miles from the Nile Delta, ami they are dependent almost entirely on communications by a coastal road, stretching nearly a thousand miles behind them, and open over a great part of its length, as has been demonstrated dering the last few days, to devastating bombardment from the sea. Tobruk, also, is a very valuable asset in British hands, as a standing threat to the enemy’s vital communications. The coastal escarpment of Libya narrows at Tobruk and. so far at least as heavy transport is concerned, any attempt to avoid the fortress by a'detour is made exceedingly difficult. Some highly effective and damaging sorties have already been made by the garrison and it is not surprising that the enemy is now making a serious effort to remove this formidable threat to his flank and rear. At time of writing the Tobruk garrison is reported to he counter-attacking with effect. Good scope exists lor naval as well as air action in support, and if necessary for conveying reinforcements by sea. The victorious achievements of tin 1 Royal Air Force in North Africa are a most encouraging feature ol the situation as it stands. A great deal depends upon the enemy being prevented from making fully effective use of air liases in Cyrenaica and much has been and is being done by the R.A.F. to that end. In considering the position in North Africa, account of course lias to be taken of present and possible developments in other Mediterranean and African theatres. By permitting the transfer of forces and in other ways, the near approach now made to complete victory throughout East Africa is doing not a little to strengthen Britain’s hand in Egypt. Un the other side of the account. Nazi Germany may be hoping to open a new line of attack on'Egypt by attacking Turkey or by gaining control over the weak French administration in Syria. Efforts by the Germans to secure a foothold in French Morocco and Tunisia, irrespective of any attack that may be made on Gibraltar by way of Spain, must also be taken into consideration. There are a number of undeveloped possibilities, but as matters stand in North Africa, Britain, besides holding a valuable outpost at Tobruk, is in a position to assemble forces of increasing strength in strong defensive positions covering, with a wide margin, the Nile Della and the Suez Canal, and to make good use oi' both sea and air power. The full strength of the German-Italian mechanised thrust has perhaps yet to be made manifest, but as the campaign has meantime developed the z enemy is vitally dependent upon long and dangerously vulnerable communications.