Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY. FEBRUARY 20, 1941. PRESSURE ON VICHY.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 20 February 1941, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY. FEBRUARY 20, 1941. PRESSURE ON VICHY.

T?1?O.M a situation obscure in many of its details, it emetges clearly that there is no relaxation of the Nazi pressure on the Vichy Government in an effort to enforce demands, it is believed, for .the transfer to Germany of the far from unimportant remnants of the French Fleet and of naval and ait bases in North Africa. The reported arrival of German missions in the French African colonies, ostensibly to deal with economic affairs, is a sinister development. The real aim of these missions no doubt will be to induce the French authorities in Africa to submit to Nazi domination, but it need not yet be taken lot granted that they will achieve their purpose. The best feature of the situation as it stands of course is that the Nazis, knowing well what they want, and eager to reach out for it. have not yet dared to do so. For many weeks, with the support of a handful of French traitors, they have been threatening to overthrow the \ ichy Government d it does not extend “full collaboration ’ to Germany, by completing the betrayal of France, but the most important change that has taken place at Vichy since this era of threats opened has been the ignominious expulsion from the Cabinet of its principal Nazi supporter. Pierre Laval. It is true that Marshal Petain has since been constrained, under Nazi pressure, to otter to take Laval hack again, but the offer was made on terms which Laval and the Nazis refused to accept. Why have the Nazis not carried out their threats against the Vichy Government.’ There must be some weighty reason for their abstention from destroying a Government which stands in their way and which is. in itself, completely at their mercy. Obviously, too, that reason is not to be found in any scruples or tender feelings on the part of the Nazis, since they are entirely devoid of scruples of any kind. The only convincing explanation of their failure to act is that they are. or have been thus far. afraid to act. Though they may arise in part from an unwillingness to provoke the active antagonism ol virtually the whole French nation—an antagonism not to be despised even with mainland France under the Nazi heel—the apprehensions on account of which the Nazis have refrained thus far from taking strong measures against the Vichy Government no doubt relate chiefly to North Africa. As the military correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald” wrote recently:—

While Hitler would be in a position to make a bold bid for Mediterranean dominance if he could force Vichy to accept his demands regarding North Africa and the French Fleet, his plans would be ruined by a renewal of the fight by the French in North Africa. If the strategical gains are great to the victor, the forfeits to be paid in case of failure are even greater.

The principal prize Io which Hitler aspires in the .Mediterranean is the great French naval base of Bizerta. fronting, on the north coast of Tunisia, the Pantelleria gap. in which the .Mediterranean is reduced to a width of little more than a hundred miles between Sicily and Africa. Had the .Nazis been able to .secure Bizerta a month or two ago, they would have been well placed to cut British sea communications through the .Mediterranean and lo hinder the land offensive in which the Army of the .Nile has completed the conquest of Cyrenaioa. In the words of the writer quoted abov.e: —

Assuming that Hitler could obtain control of Bizerta, there is no doubt that the gravest, possible challenge to British communications would be presented. Joint operations from the Gulf of Tunis and the Sicilian ports and airfields, with supplementary activity from the tiny Italian island of Pantelleria, could undoubtedly do much to close the Straits (the Sicilian Channel) and divide the Mediterranean into two distinct parts.

Failing lo secure Bizertfi, the Nazis attempted Io help Italy by means of bomber attacks from Sicilian bases, but tin 1 outcome, from the Axis point of view, was anything but enconrauing. As tin* First Lord of the Admiraltv' (Mr Alexander) has observed in a broadcast. German dive-bombers, on their first appearance in the Mediterranean, inflicted considerable damage on warships escorting a convoy, bin the envoy got through intact. Subsequent attacks on the aircraft-carrier Illustrious at Malta were a failin') l . In these operations and in attacks by British aircraft on Sicilian aerodromes, the Germans lost s<mie ninety bombers in the course of a day or two. Even with ('yrenaica lost to Italy, the Nazis no doubt are as eager as ever to obtain Bizerta and the French Fleet if they can Particularly with a great extension of operations in tin* Balkans in imminent prospect. Mediterranean (•oniniunieations remain supremely importam. Hitler and his fellow gangsters undoubtedly will make every possible elfori lo secure ihe .submission of the Vichy Government to their will. They art 1 .faced always by ihe danger, however, that if they impose too much pressure .Marshal Petain may order General Weyyand to take up arms in .North Africa, or General Weyoand may do that on his own account.

Full rmicon fippenrs here for ihe icniporixiiig which has •rone hand in hand with the i'liriotis Nazi threats against the Petain administration. Il', instmid nf the Nazis securing llizeri.i. the p'rench .North African colonies entered ihe war against Germany, tin* dooni of the Axis in the .Mediterranean would lie scaled. The defence ami use of llrilisli Jtnd allied <<omninnieations would at once be simplified greatly. As one detail only, fhe .position oj the Italian remnant in Tripoli would be made hopeless. Malta, 100. which has withstood gallantly over .’lOO air raids, and lo appearance is prepared to withstand any number more, might well become a spearhead of attack. Tin l Nazis have exeidhuit reasons for being afraid to put final and extreme pressure on the Viehv Government. AN EXCHANGE OE MINISTERS. ] N .'innoiinciiig that the I'nitcd States and New Zealand < 0 verfiinents have decided to ex<diaii'je Ministers, the Prime Mitiister (Mr b’raseri said the arrangements now proposed (io not denote any departure fr<>m ihe principle <<f diplomatic unity of the Commonwealth The; . merely another step m the system of consultative co-operation which exists amongst al! the Governmesits of the British Commonwealth. Trne as they are. these observations may In- expected to puzzle and mystify some foreign onlookers. It (nay be asked, for in .stance, why. if there is no departure from llie diplomatic uhiiy of Hn- (’ommonwealth, il is noeessar,’- or '•’wn desirable ilia’ this conn iry and oilier I himi nions slondd ;q>m nt t heir ow n M i nist e;-s !o the I’niled States, thus pn»vidilla for direct and indnid la! conlacl willi the American (io', eri>m>-i)l. tin the surface, the position is illogical and pai'.'idox ieal, Inil o, ton. (he eoßsh’nlion of th'- l‘>ri'i'h Empire in its i.a.-il scope , t ml eHee!. No con stitution has ever been more loosely drawn apart from com mon a I If - :.'ta nee '<> the ( rown tlo-re ts vsrtna.'fy no lormal font of ativ kind Inti i! is also to !><■ ci.iiiued that no coii'edor.it uni d‘ an! otioiiloils (•o.'nin’.iiiit tes has ■■',(■>■ been knit more eiose'|;.n are ihe partner St;it.-s o! th - i’.riftsh (’onsmott w.-a it I Tie , !'(‘ ar" manv questions ol de’ad, some ot ihmn hwddv mpor’.iul. di v.lticii Neu Zea!.iu<! may a<!\anta von '!i"aa’" discussion With tin* I ni’c.i S'.-p.-s, Im - <m >■ : .. r >,, ~ p eVereis" of ■ mi■■ pern!<• ('! initiative Id ,'m n oi'iier lhan weaken ’h" ’:••> which unite ns ;jm M-nie-i.a:.! ii<d ' i) the •■' kef Ili'inirHoiis.