Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1940. THE SOVIET=NAZI TRUCE.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 28 November 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1940. THE SOVIET=NAZI TRUCE.

« — MUCH even of what at a superficial view is most surprising in the existing relationship between Soviet Russia and Nan Germany finds.its reasonably full explanation m thei leadrn. aims of the two dictatorships and the circumstances by h e thev are at present faced. The pact of non-aggression in vhich the’v are meantime linked is on the face of it a tempoiait arrangement, though for the moment it suits the Purposes o both parties admirably. The Soviet obviously, if is afraid of Germany’s military power. The Nazi c ’ is influenced strongly by the classic German tear of yi on a o T eat scale on two fronts. The last-mentioned aspect of the position,.it is true, has its elements ol uncertainty. Iheie is not much doubt that apprehensions that Germany,, fading things, might undertake an invasion of the Ukraine, 01 of some other parts of Russian territory, has its important bearing on current Soviet policy. At laro’e, however, it is plain enough that the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression pact is a temporary arrangement of mutual convenience—an arrangement from which eachi party hopes a later stage to depart with advantage. As Mr Edmund Stevens wrote" recently in the “Christian Science Mondor, despite many points of structural resemblance m their systems there is ultimately no room for the Soviets and the Nazis on the same continent and both are aware 01. this. Germany’s goal (he added) is frankly the political and economic domination of a unifled and Nazified Europe, of winch he Ukrainian breadbasket and other rich resources now in Soviet hands are indispensable elements. All this is already cleaily set I”?i”« Hitler’s book “Meta Kempt.” the P.W™ 1 ™ set forth in which has hitherto been followed in bioad outline. , The Russians’ programme is to take advantage of other nations conflicts with each other, hoping that a long war will ultimately exhaust all of the others, leaving. Russia the most powerful. Each party is anxious for the time being to avoid conflict with the other, but both are pushing ahead with extended military preparations only to be accounted for by the assumption that conflict between them is merely postponed. Since the present war began, too, the Soviet and the Nazi dictatorship have been jockeying actively for advantage along their common frontier from the Baltic Io the Black Sea. In its details, over the war period, this competition for immediate plunder and advantage has varied interestingly. In Hie early stages of the war, Russia acted with every ance of bold decision in her occupation of Eastern Poland. The attack on Finland exposed the rather poor quality ol the Red Army, but in eventually imposing a conqueror’s terms on that valiant, little country and in her seizure of the Baltic States, Russia strengthened herself considerably against Germany. Although, however, Russia certainly is not less vitally concerned in the Black Sea region and adjacent areas than in the Baltic, she has little enough to congratulate herself upon thus far where her competition with the Nazis in South-Eastern Europe is concerned. The weakening of Soviet policy in the critical months in which Germany has in effect extended her frontier io the Black Sea and strengthened her grip on the northern Balkans—developments rather ineffectively balanced by the Russian seizure of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina —is perhaps accounted for chiefly by the swift defeat of France. As an indication, or supposed indication of Germany’s striking power, that event, it. may be believed, caused astonishment and dismay in Moscow. It is said that for a time the members of the Soviet oligarchy believed that the war would soon be over. That belie! and the anticipation it connoted that Russia might soon have to reckon with a Germany by no means enfeebled may go far to account for the rather spiritless acceptance by the Soviet of the extension of Nazi control to the Balkans and the Black Sea. At a surface view, Russia has yielded a great deal to the Nazi dictatorship on the approaches to the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, but her present, diplomatic activities in Bulgaria, which no doubt are paralleled in Yugoslavia, combine with some other evidence to suggest, that her submission may have been less complete than had been supposed. It is not to be suggested that there is any prospect of Russia co-operating with Britain and her Allies in South-Eastern Europe or anywhere else. No doubt the Soviet leaders would be well pleased to see both sides in the present, war reduced to weakness and exhaustion. It may be taken for granted, however, not only that Stalin and his colleagues desire least, ol al! to be 1011. confronted by a victorious Germany, but that it is only under pressure of present necessity and fear that they have made concessions to Germany where vital Russian interests like access to the Mediterranean are concerned. As affairs are now shaping in the Mediterranean and in South-Eastern Europe it seems possible that (he Russian Government may take a stronger stand in defence ol its own interests than it lias ventured Io take in recent months, if only in encouraging the Balkan States to resist Axis pressure. Anything more than that it would be unwise to hope for where Russia is concerned.