STORY OF DAKAR
TOLD FRANKLY BY BRITISH PRIME MINISTER NAVAL OVERSIGHT ADMITTED. IN ALLOWING FRENCH SHIPS TO GET THROUGH. CALL FOR REDOUBLED EFFORT. (British Official Wireless.) (Received This Day. 11.10 a.m.) RUGBY. October 8. In his statement in the House of Commons, Mr Churchill dealt fully with the Dakar incident. He explained that this operation was primarily French. “Although we were ready to give it a measure of support which might in certain circumstances have been decisive,” he said, “we were no more anxious than General De Gaulle to get involved in a lengthy and sanguinary contest with the Vichy French. “That General De Gaulle was right in believing that a majority in Dakar were favourable to the Free Frenchmen I have no doubt,” Mr Churchill continued; “indeed I think his judgment has been found extremely surefooted and our opinion of him has been enhanced by everything we have seen of his conduct in circumstances peculiarly perplexing and difficult. The British Government has no intention whatever of abandoning General De Gaulle's cause until it is merged, as merged it will be, in the large cause of France.” Dealing with the arrival at Dakar of French warships carrying Vichy partisans, evidently of most bitter types, which transformed the situation in the most unfavourable manner, Mr Churchill said these partisans were sent out to overawe the population and see to the efficient manning of the powerful shore batteries. He made it clear that the policy which the British Government had been pursuing towards the Vichy French warships was not to interfere with them unless they appeared to be proceeding to an enemy-controlled port, but obviously, while General De Gaulle’s enterprise was proceeding, it was especially important to prevent any of them reaching Dakar. Mr Churchill frankly disclosed to the House that by a series of accidents and some errors, which had been made the subject of disciplinary action or were now the subject of formal inquiry, neither the First Sea Lord nor Cabinet was informed of the approach of these ships to the Straits of Gibraltar until it was too late to prevent them passing through. Orders were instantly given to halt them at Casablanca, or if that failed, to prevent them approaching Dakar. Although every effort was made to execute these orders, they failed. The Vichy cruisers were, however, prevented from carrying out their purpose of attacking the Free French colony of Duala, and, of the four French vessels concerned, two succeeded in regaining Dakar. Two others were overtaken by British cruisers and were induced to return to Casablanca without' any actual violence. Two French submarines which attacked the British fleet were sunk, the crew of one happily being saved. Two of the French destroyers vzere set on fire. One of the French cruisers was heavily hit and the battle-cruiser Richlieu suffered further heavy damage and casualties. On the British side, one capital ship and one large cruiser suffered damage—damage which, the Premier said, would require considerable attention. The Prime Minister commented: “What an irony of fate it is that this fine French fleet Admiral Darlan shaped for so many years to fight in tile common cause against German aggression should now be the principal obstacle to the liberation of France and her Empire from the German yoke, and should be employed by her German and Italian masters, whose policies contemplate not merely the defeat and humiliation of France, but her final destruction as a great nation.” Touching on the possibility of a declaration of war by the Vichy Government imposed by Germany and Italy, Mr Churchill observed: “Whatever happens, it is the tide and not a mere eddy” of events which will dominate the French people. Nothing can prevent the increasing abhorrence with which they will regard their German conquerors, or the growth of the newborn hope that Britain , will be victorious or that British victory will carry with it the deliverance and restoration of France and her captured people. That is all, I think, it is useful to say at the present time about Dakar or relations with Vichy, except this: We must be very careful not to let a failure of that kind weaken or hamper our efforts to take positive action and regain the initiative. On the contrary, we must improve and redouble our efforts.”
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Wairarapa Times-Age, 9 October 1940, Page 6
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718STORY OF DAKAR Wairarapa Times-Age, 9 October 1940, Page 6
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