Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, AUGUST 5, 1940. WAR IN NORTHERN AFRICA.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 5 August 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, AUGUST 5, 1940. WAR IN NORTHERN AFRICA.

IT was reported briefly at the end of last week, and the news lias not been amplified at time of writing, that “a considerable force of Lilians is concentrated on the Libyan frontier, to which enemy forces have been gradually advancing. . 11 number of grounds, this announcement will hold attention. It is of special interest to New Zealanders because it has been made known of late that our First Echelon is included in the forces which have moved into the Western Desert region in which Egypt merges into Libya.

Hitherto action by Italian land forces in eastern Libya, and indeed throughout the African theatres to which it has been confined, has been on a small scale. So far as Libya, is concerned, it was reported recently that British troops dominated several hundred square miles of territory over the Italian frontier. The statement quoted above, tor what it is worth (and it is said to have been made with authority in London) suggests that the Italians intend to attempt a drive from Libya through the Egyptian coastal belt towards the Suez Canal,

On the facts in sight, this would be a somewhat unpromising venture, beset by formidable difficulties, but much no doubt will denend on developments in other areas around the seaboard of the Mediterranean and further afield. Very probably Mussolini is being’ pressed by bis Nazi allies to undertake some sort of military enterprise, for Italy, since she entered the war on .Line 16 last, has attempted and accomplished remarkably little on behalf of the Axis partnership.

While Italy still retained her non-belligerent status, there was a great deal of bold talk by her spokesmen about her ability to undertake a vigorous and damaging offensive against both France and Britain in the Mediterranean. It was claimed, for instance, that even with France in action, the Italians would be able to make Malta untenable and to close the Pantelleria bottleneck —the comparatively narrow space of sea between Sicily and the coast of Algeria—thus cutting across the Allied sea communications in the Mediterranean. Expectations were raised also of simultaneous attacks from Libya on Tunisia and on Egypt. Had Italy in fact been prepared to pursue a resolutely aggressive policy, she would have been assisted greatly by the collapse of France —an event of which the Italians of course were well assured before they entered the war.

With France still in the field, Italy would have been exposed to concerted attack by the Allied fleets, while French armies would have been posted to drive into her mainland territory in the north-west, and her great industrial areas in the north would have been dangerously open to Allied air attack. . How potent the last-mentioned factor might have been is indicated in reports that the bombing by the Allies on June 12’. of war industrial establishments in Turin not only resulted in serious material damage, but caused riots among Ihe civil population. By the collapse of France, Italy was to a great extent relieved of the fear of Allied attack on the most vital and vulnerable parts of her territory.

Tn spite oil the extent to which she has thus been favoured by the course of events, the junior partner in the Axis as yet has attempted little and has accomplished hardly anything. Britain continues to control the Mediterranean. The Italian fleet has fared badly in the limited extent to which it Ims ventured to emerge from its harbours of refuge and the- balance of results in air warfare and in frontier operations by land forces in different parts of Africa has turned heavily against Italy.

Many questions no doubt are still unresolved where the war in and around the Mediterranean is concerned. There are, for example, threats and. possibilities of an attack on Gibraltar, and it is perhaps not absolutely to be taken for granted that Jlussia will not concede Germany a right of way through the Balkans —a development that would impose on Britain the obligation of supporting Turkey and Greece.

There is no reason to doubt, however, that Britain, even while making provision for other possible eventualities, will be able to oppose an effective military barrier to an Italian invasion of Egypt from Libya. Before the outbreak of hostilities Mussolini claimed that reinforcements could be poured info Libya within 48 hours, but it seems altogether improbable that the enemy forces in Libya can be built up to any great degree under existing conditions of naval and ail' warfare in the Mediterranean.

Italy is staled to have in Libya at least two army corps, ■with a total strength of some 60,000 men, with tanks, artillery and a supporting air force. She has forces also in Eritrea and Abyssinia and in Italian Somaliland, but these forces are cut off entirely from Italy and have in hand the task of keeping' in subjection native populations by no means happy or contented under Italian rule, as well as of defending a. long coastline on the Red Sea amj further south. Eritrea and Libya are nine hundred miles apart and land approach from one to the other woidd have to be made by a much longer journey, through the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which is well and effectively garrisoned. Apart from the British forces in Egypt and in Palestine, account, has to be taken of the Kenya garrison, now being strongly reinforced from South Africa. While in the existing state of affairs Britain may have to retain at home forces which otherwise would be available for service in Africa and other Mediterranean regions, the Empire is in a position to convey reinforcements to these theatres from the Dominions and India, over sea routes under the absolute control of Ihe British Navy. It remains meantime to be seen how far the Italians are capable of underfak'ing a serious offensive effort from their base in Libya,