Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 1940. ITALY BADLY MISLED.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 4 June 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 1940. ITALY BADLY MISLED.

WHATEVER else it may imply, the increasingly menacing attitude of the Italian dictatorship towards the Allies obviously pays no regard to the true interests of Italy or those of the Italian people. Credited hitherto with the policy ot “waiting to jump in to help the upper dog,” Mussolini is now very generally suspected of intending to plunge his country into the war at an early date as the ally of Germany. WJ 1116 it is not to be denied that an additional strain would thus be imposed for the time being on the resources of the Allies it is sufficiently evident that this reckless action, should it. be taken, can be expected to produce, for Italy, nothing else t lan disaster. Even should the unthinkable happen, and Germany win the war, or contrive to avert a decisive Allied victory, no other prospect would be opened for Italy than that of accepting with slavish submission whatever treatment the Nazis cared to mete out to her.

Judging, however, by the utterances of his controlled propagandists, Mussolini prefers this fate for his country rather than that it should maintain a “non-belligerent” policy or give any measure of moral support to the nations that are fighting to re-establish liberty and justice in the world. The leadership thus exemplified is that of one conscious that he has.no place in the counsels of honest and fair-dealing men. Britain and France alike have made it clear that they are prepared to consider any legitimate aspirations or just complaints that Italy may have to advance. It no doubt accounts for the lack of response to this friendly attitude of the democracies that the actual aspirations of the Italian dictatorship are of a kind that will not bear open statement and examination in the light of day.

One of the most disappointing and menacing features of the existing situation is the absence of any indication of effective protest in Italy against the war policy of the dictatorship. It has been stated oh apparently good authority that the Vatican, the Crown and a large proportion of the people in Italy are strongly opposed to an active alliance with Germany. Not long ago one correspondent wrote that: —

The most extraordinary experience for an Englishman living in Italy today is to see his country vehemently abused by almost all the newspapers, and yet find himself surrounded by the friendliest people, who hate the idea of entering the war.

Apparently, however, these forces for peace are allowing themselves to be silenced and dominated by the engineered clamour of the dictatorship. Even the latest appeal by the Pope, as it is transmitted, is cast in rather feebly general terms, drawing no clear distinction between aggressors and those who are resisting aggression, between violators of international law and the laws of humanity and those who seek' to re-establish these laws. If any purposeful effort is being made to prevent Italy being added to the forces of aggression, no hint of the fact is being allowed to get past the Italian censorship.

There is no doubt, in any case, that war on the side o£ Germany would be for Italy, even at the most immediate view, a particularly desperate gamble. She has a position of considerable tactical strength from which to attack Allied communications in the Mediterranean, the more so since she is possessed of numerous submarines and aircraft, though many of these last are said to be old. As a naval power, however, Italy is outclassed heavily by the Allies and on her western frontier she is extremely vulnerable to sea and air attack. Iler principal industrial areas, situated in the north, are vulnerable to attack from France. Italy has at present something like a . million and a half men under arms and some 6,000,000 more in reserve, but her ability to use this great force effectively and to keep it supplied is open to considerable doubt.

Various possibilities are raised, amongst them that of an Italian attack on Yugoslavia though this might be. expected, not only to bring a number of Balkan States into the field, but to raise complications with Russia which might be even more serious from the standpoint of the Axis than from that of the Allies. There are suggestions, also, of Italian and German intrigue with Spain, but how far these suggestions should be taken seriously is at present a matter of conjecture.

With the Allies holding both ends of the Mediterranean, the broad position in any case is that the closing of that sea would cut off from Italy supplies of vital raw materials upon which she depends to an even greater degree than Germany. She would thus have to rely upon such reserves as she has accumulated together with anything she might be able to obtain from Germanv.

Perhaps the most plausible suggestion made with regard to Mussolini’s probable intention is that he hopes to combine with Germany in an overwhelming attack on France and thus to proceed by a short route to victory and triumph. The Allies of necessity must be prepared to cope with a combined attack of that character, as with other possible eventualities. It is reasonably certain, however, that if Italy does enter the war measures will be taken against her which may be expected definitely to limit her power to co-operate with Germany in an attack on France.