BRITISH NAVY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 29 May 1940, Page 7

BRITISH NAVY

PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES BASIS OF MONROE DOCTRINE. KEEPING THE ATLANTIC SAFE. Most Americans realise today the decisive role which the British Navy has played in keeping the Atlantic safe for the Americas, states Livingston Hartley in the "Christian Science Monitor.” This role can be traced back to the time of the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine and America’s success during the rest of the nineteenth century in maintaining the doctrine without any adequate navy of its own. And. in recent years, to it can be ascribed the astonishing paradox that while Europe has been buildnig ever greater armaments and becoming progressively more dangerous, the United States has kept its battle fleet in the Pacific.

There is less understanding, however, of the conditions upon which Britain’s comprehensive control of the other side of the Atlantic has been founded. Tons and guns superior to those of any other European navy have, of course, been one essential foundation. But another, of comparable importance, has been the geographical location of the home bases from which British seapower has been exercised.

The British Isles shut Germany from the Atlantic in the North Sea and the Channel and cover the outlet of both Germany and Russia into this ocean from the Baltic. Their position also enables them to flank any trans-Atlantic advance from either the west coast of France or the Arctic bases of Russia. BOTTLES EUROPEAN SEAPOWER. Further south, Gibraltar closes the egress from the Mediterranean. Even if Gibraltar should fall, no fleet could proceed far westward from the Mediterranean without leaving its communications at the mercy of forces operating from the home bases of Britain. Thus the fleets of Continental Europe are unable to undertake any large-scale offensives on the Atlantic without British co-operation or acquiescence. The British Isles, with their unique situation and their predominant naval strength, cork the bottle of European seapower for the entire Atlantic area.

The value of the British Isles to the United States in terms of naval.protection is comparable with that of Hawaii. The Hawaiian base, supported by the United States battle fleet, protects the west coast of the Americas against anything more serious than “hit-and-run” raids, and safeguards that side of the northern Pacific against Asia. The British Isles, supported by their fleet, protect the east coast of the Americas even more comprehensively, and safeguard the whole of the north and south Atlantic against .Europe. Regarded in this light, the British Isles are the more valuable as a naval protection of the Americas. They also possess one obvious advantage from the American point of view, since the United States does not have to pay for their upkeep and the vast navy they support. IF DEFEATED. If the British emerge from ' this war victoriously and still able, to command the access of Europe to the Atlantic, their naval protection of the western hemisphere on this ocean is likely to continue in the years that lie ahead. It could only be terminated then if the British should join a continental coalition directed against the United States, a revolutionary reversal of their historic Atlantic policy against which the position of Canada provides a very solid guarantee. But if the British are decisively defeated, their naval protection of the western hemisphere will become a memory of the past. The forced abdication of Britain as the ruler of Europe’s waves would open to the navies of the continental European Powers a free access to the Atlantic they have not had since the day the Monroe Doctrine was pronounced. It is sometimes suggested that, in such circumstances, the Royal Navy could retire to Canada and seek subsequently to safeguard the Atlantic from there. But such an increase in Canadian strength would in no way compensate for what had been lost, since the value of the Royal Navy as a protection against Europe would be reduced to a fraction of what it has been by the loss of its uniquely situated base in the British Isles. For the future, the Monroe Doctrine would have to be maintained actively by the United States, aided only by such minor help as the LatinAmerican republics might be able to give and such assistance as the United States might be able to persuade Canada to provide.