Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, MAY 4, 1940. A DRAMATIC WITHDRAWAL.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 4 May 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, MAY 4, 1940. A DRAMATIC WITHDRAWAL.

JgLUNTLY and frankly, the British War Office has staled, in a communique, that: “Allied forces which have liven carrying out delaving operations south of Trondheim during the past few days have now, after repulsing many enemy attacks, been withdrawn in face of ever-increasing enemy strength.” Though some some high hopes that were entertained too lightly have thus gone up in smoke, it is incompatible with the spirit and traditions of the British nation that there should be any repining over this withdrawal, much less any weakening of the resolution with which the nation is prosecuting the war. The riding immediate though! must be one of gratitude that the gallant, forces upon whom fell the burden and perils of an extraordinarily difficult military adventure have been able to extricate themselves —it is hoped without loss —from a position now frankly admitted to have been untenable.

A daring and enterprising attempt by the Allies to capture Trondheim has failed, but there does not seem to be any doubt, that the forces engaged in this attempt have inflicted much greater losses on the enemy Ilian they have themselves suffered. Mention was made in one of yesterday’s cablegrams of ecstatic delight in the AVilhelmstrasse, but on the balance of the Norwegian campaign to date the Germans have in fact little enough to set against- the destruction, of a great part of their navy and the losses of every kind inflicted on them by Allied sea, air and. land forces. It presumably may be taken for granted, too, that with the early annihilation or capture of the small enemy garrison at Narvik, the Germans will be excluded safely from that vital port and from a great extent of Northern Norway. The failure to secure Narvik in itself entails the shattering of some of the principal hopes with which the Germans invaded Norway.

Tn his statement in the House of Commons, Mr Chamberlain dealt as openly with the position meantime reached in Norway as did the War Office in its communique. The British Prime'Minister was perhaps of necessity rather vague and inconclusive, however, in what he had to say at a longer and wider view about the strategy of the war. His observations on. the necessity of avoiding an unwise dispersion of Allied strength are not, obviously pertinent, since Southern Norway plainly represents to the enemy an important and valuable base from which to develop attacks. ,

Mr Chamberlain, we are told, drew a parallel between the evacuation of Andalsnes, accomplished without loss, and the “action of Sir John Moore at Corunna, which, though accompanied by heavy loss of life, including that of the commander, has taken its place among the classic examples of British military skill.” Moore’s title to fame rests upon his hold march into Northern Spain in which he risked his army and "deliberately invited the pursuit of immensely more powerful French forces, led by Napoleon, Soult and Ney, which otherwise would have been likely speedily to complete the conquest of Spain and Portugal. An invaluable breathing space was thus gained for the British forces in Portugal and for their Spanish and Portuguese allies. It must be hoped that the parallel Mr Chamberlain drew wlill be completed in Norway. This, of course, implies, what is no doubt true, that it is a sectional phase only of the campaign in Norway which has been completed with the withdrawal from Andalsnes and that adequate efforts to defeat the German invasion will be continued. Time and later events must determine whether, at- the. widest view, fully effective use has been made of the opportunities opened up by the extension of German aggression to Scandinavia and by the brilliantly successful action of the British Navy in the opening phase of the- campaign. It is a matter meantime of waiting for the fuller information on the whole subject which is promised early next week. FOREBODINGS IN SWEDEN. \yiTii many important questions open regarding the position in Scandinavia and Northern Europe, it is at least evident that, there is little enough merit, in the querulous and complaining criticism with which the British withdrawal from the area south of Trondheim has been greeted in Sweden. According to the Stockholm correspondent of “The Times,” Swedish political circles consider thaQ British prestige in the northern countries could hardly have received a more damaging’blow than that resulting from Mr Chamberlain’s statement. Swedish political sceptics are said also to consider that the withdrawal has proved that the- Allied attitude is half-hearted, and there is more to a similar effect.

Possibly there may be elements of Nazi propaganda as well as of genuine Swedish opinion in these complaints and criticisms. While it is hardly in doubt that tbi? Swedes are honestly determined to maintain. Ilieir neutrality and if necessary to defend their independence, it is familiar knowledge that Nazi intrigue and propaganda are well organised in Sweden and have had extended to them a somewhat extraordinary latitude.

An attempt, in any ease, to fasten blame on Britain and the Allies for the .misfortunes that have fallen on Norway is utterly unjust and cannot be sustained in light of the facts leading up to the situation that exists today. The plain truth is that the neutral nations adjacent to Germany—Norway and Sweden not least —have placed themselves beyond the reach of fully effective help. Sweden is still pursuing that policy, and should she presently share Norway’s fate, as she very possibly may, she will have herself chiefly to thank.

In the course of the statement which is now being criticised so bitterly in Sweden, Mr Chamberlain said that while Allied forces had been prepared to. go to the assistance of Norway, there was no question of their landing in that country unless they were asked to do so by the Norwegian Government oi’ Norwegian neutrality had been violated. Mr Chamberlain said also that in invading Norway the Germans had attacked an unsuspecting and almost unarmed people. He added: —

We had been aware for many months that the Germans were accumulating transports and troops in Baltic ports and that these troops were being practised in embarkation and disembarkation. It was evident that some act of aggression was in contemplation, but these forces were equally available for attack upon Finland. Sweden, Norway, Holland or this country (Britain), and it was impossible to tell beforehand where the blow would fall.

With this knowledge shared by the Allied and neutral nations, it may be asked whether it was consistent with common sense that the Norwegians should be, as Mr Chamberlain called them, an unsuspecting people. Exercising ordinary intelligence, Norway and other neutrals surely would have recognised the strong probability that, they might be attacked by Germany, and would have recognised also that they had a common and imperatively urgent interest in making all possible preparations to resist that attack should if be made. Had they exercised reasonable vigilance in their own defence, the Norwegians almost certainly -would have been able to retain strong and secure bases at which Allied forces could have landed Io assist, them. General slackness in Norway and a failure to establish safeguards againsl internal treachery have made the rescue and redempt ion of the country by the Allies vastly more difficult than it need have been. The same factors have increased greatly the danger that Sweden in turn may be made a victim of Nazi aggression. 'fhe Swedish politicians who are now filling the air ‘with complaints might more profitably reflect upon the e.xlenf to which the policy of their own country and that of other neutral Slates lias played into the hands of Nazi Germany and made it difficult for the Allies to render effective help against aggression.