NAZI ARMY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 1 April 1940, Page 3

NAZI ARMY

— —4 ITS STRENGTH & WEAKNESS UNITED LEADERS. INABILITY TO STAND HARD I KNOCKS. The army is Germany's chief instru--1 mem and military experts are unaniI moils that the war cannot be ended until (hat army has been tried by Germany and beaten by the Allic-s i writes the London correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald"). Its weal: points appear to bo a possible inability to stand up under .-. long, persistent, and hard campaign, and the quality of its High Command. Allied military observers who had opportunities to be in touch with the German army until shortly before the outbreak of war. saw the results 01 Herr Hitler's determination to build up an army quickly. A study of army conditions during the six months since the outbreak of war has been more difficult. but the Allied General Staffs have a fairly good idea of the quality of the German army today. It is an untried army, except for the conquest of Poland, an operation which did not reveal any surprises in tactics or weapons; nor did it present great difficulties, especially as the Germans had carefully studied the Russo-Polish war of 1920 and had noted the Polish mistakes. Experts agree that the German army has suffered from lack of training and the lack of big exercises necessary for training staff officers. Only major operations can decide whether the Higher Command is equal to the task confronting it. Military exports are unanimous in the belief that the war cannot be ended until Germany' has used her army, which is-her principal instrument, and until, that army has been beaten. There has been considerable criticism of the army's inability to stand up to hard knocks. That doubt arises because of the newness of the army, coupled with Germany's disadvantage of being separated for many years from conscript training and from a steady building up of reserves. Thus the High Command, on Herr Hitler's urgent orders, adopted a system of intensive training designed to repair deficiencies.

HARDENING PROCESS. The army today works long hours, frequently from 4 a.m. until 4 p.rn.. with a break only for a meagre dinner from field, kitchens. The men are hardened by 35-mile route marches in. addition to numerous fatigues and heavy manual labour such as unloading trucks, handling heavy stores, and moving wagons and guns. It is known that there is much grumbling at the hardness of the training and the poor food, inasmuch as the troops, like the civilians, have long been subjected to endurance on a scale of feeding designed to secure bodily energy' with the minimum amount of nutriment. The blockade restrictions have induced the authorities to devise a dietary scale low enough to harden and sustain soldiers preparing for fighting on the Western Front, and yet calculated to preyenj further depressing reductions of food. The troops concentrated at present on the Belgian and Dutch borders, look weedy, but possess an abundance of stamina. An unknown factor is whether the troops will endure the rigorous winter training without an abnormal ratio of sickness. AMPLE EQUIPMENT. A competent observer has expressed the opinion that the troops arc fit for an exacting short campaign or for a long campaign, provided the operations are not continuous; otherwise they might "crack." It would be. unwise to give credence to rumours of any widespread discontent because propaganda and untruth have convinced the Gormans that they are fighting for their homos and liberty against the invading Allies.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Colonel-General Keitel, has expressed satisfaction at the men’s training, and considers the army superior to that of 1914. Admittedly their equipment is not always of the best materials, but there is ample equipment with plenty in reserve. A curious point is that the training consists of tests of courage, in which perilous tasks are undertaken in order to remove fear. There are also endurance tests such as going without food for three days. The young officers are good, but are less self-reliant than those of the Allies. Their demeanour is sound when troops are moving in masses, but they lack initiative when engaged in detached work. PARTLY MECHANISED. The German army is not mechanised according to Allied conceptions. Its bulk consists of infantry, in anticipation of a petrol shortage which might ; immobilise the army if it were com-, pellcd to depend for its mobility on foreign supplies. It is a "foot-slogging" army, plus support from armoured and mobile divisions. The main weakness expected to reveal itself is that the Hitler Command lacks outstanding leaders like Hindenburg, Ludendorff or Mackensen. There has been an absence of big work in training -which would produce commanding types. General von Reichenau is probably the best man. but he is the foremost mechanisation expert, and therefore has been rather side-tracked. Neither General von Blom nor the Commander-in-Chiof of the army General von Brauchitich. is a great leader. The removal of General von Blomberg. General von Fritsch and General Beck is severely felt: nevertheless. since the war the army’s prestige has been rising, and it is believed that none of the present generals is like- | ly to load a "lost cause" by revolting against the Nazy Party, which has providcd the army with all its needs.