Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1939. AGGRESSION IN THE BALTIC.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 23 October 1939, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1939. AGGRESSION IN THE BALTIC.

ALTHOUGH the conference at Stockholm of the rulers 01. the Scandinavian countries and Finland dispersed without making any public reference to Finland’s position Russia, a spokesman of the Finnish boreign Oflict h. . • said that the situation is not very much changed, Hl „ < • “after the conference Finland felt morally strengthened 1 is reported also that Sweden and N°rway are massmi ) on their north-eastern frontiers, ‘ in order to P r(tut t neutrality and assure the Finns that their promises ol suppoit mean more than—words.”

■ In spite of some generally optimistic statements that hate figured in recent news, and of the assurances offeree y f . Kalinin, on behalf of the Soviet, to President Koosexelt, the situation obviously holds ominous possibilities. Ihe lepoitei movement of Swedish and Norwegian troops, does not suggest that any very hopeful view is taken in the Scandinavian countries The kings of Norway, Sweden and Denmark are said Io have urged moderation on Finland, but, as an American correspondent in Stockholm observed the other day. these nileis must realise that even for themselves it would be a serious uiatter to accept Russian control of the Finnish port 01. Ilango, oi the Aaland Islands. This statement appears to err on the side o moderation. Russian military and naval domination o Umland would not only make an end of the independence of that country, but would carry an obvious threat Io the independence oi its Scandinavian neighbours.

With the return of the Finnish delegation to Moscow, the position and outlook may be defined speedily Everything depends, of course, on the nature of the demands. the Soviet is making on Finland and on the lengths to which it. is prepared to go in enforcing these demands. With moderation on both sides, an adjustment, should be possible, but the danger appeals that the Russian dictatorship may be intent on reducing inland, and at an ultimate view her Scandinavian neighbours, to a state of subordination comparable at least to that now imposed on the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

A year ago Finland took up with Sweden the question of refortifying the Aaland Islands, which were neutralised under an international convention to which Russia was not a party• Although Germany, one of the signatories to lhe convention, objected, a Bill was introduced into the Finnish Parliament providing that j,he three lower islands of the Aaland gioup should be fortified. Vigorous protests by Russia induced Sweden to withdraw her approval of the fortification proposals but the Finns, feeling themselves menaced by Russia, insisted on proceeding with the scheme.

If Russia is now intent on seizing military control of the Aaland Islands and of ports on the Finnish mainland, war may become inevitable and it seems very probable that the Scandinavian countries would be involved with Finland. If a compromise is practicable, it would no doubt be. on the lines that the Aaland Islands should remain unfortified and that Russia should abandon any attempt to establish bases on lhe Finnish mainland.

The essential question raised is whether Russia can be induced to adopt a policy of moderation under which Finland will preserve her independence. There is an obvious daiigei that the Soviet instead may be determined to proceed with the scheme of expansion in the Baltic in which it has already made considerable headway. In establishing military and naval control over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Russia has not only completed a military barrier against Germany—a barrier stretching across Europe from the Balkans to the Baltic but has strengthened enormously her naval position on the Baltic Sea. It has been said that any Great Power controlling the ports of the Baltic States from Tallinn to Libau, as Russia now does, is well on the way to control the Baltic. With the Aaland Islands in. their hands, Russia would control all but the southern part of the Baltic and would completely dominate Sweden as well as Finland.

It materially affects the'present position and outlook that in her schemes ol’ naval expansion Russia is not merely turning to account opportunities raised, by her pact with Germany, but is developing plans which have been in hand for some time past. In January of last year, M. Stalin began to turn Leningrad into a first-class naval base. A beginning was made on the construction of shipyards for the building and repairing of the largest capital ships and an. immediate start was made on three new battleships, each of 35,000 tons, with 10 inch guns. Later M. Kalinin announced publicly that the Soviet, intended io take its place with the world’s great naval Bowers. At the beginning of 1938 the Soviet Centra! Executive Committee set up a new Naval Ministry and it was announced that a l.acilicFleet and a Northern Fleet were to be constituted as distinct units, in addition to Ihe existing Baltic and Black Sea fleets.

Much as it .claims attention in itself, the menace now raised to Finland and to the Scandinavian countries is a detail only in naval and other developments which are of concern to all Europe, and not least to Great Britain. As the military correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald observed recently: “The acquiescence of Finland in the Soviet’s plans would allow an unbroken Russian wall Irom Stockholm Io the Black Sea, the largest single political line in Europe. It would be one of the axes dominating European affairs and, quite obviously, if Stalin so desired, it could hem in Hitler on the east.” Russia apparently is intent, on establishing herscll in. a position that would enable her to exert upon her western neighbours a naval and military pressure that not very long ago would have been regarded as unthinkable.