PACT WITH GERMANY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 2 October 1939, Page 5

PACT WITH GERMANY

RATIFIED BY COUNCIL OF SOWS ATTITUDE OF RUSSIAN PEOPLE CORRESPONDENT’S INTERESTING SURVEY. HARD BARGAIN DRIVE BY STALIN. By Telegraph—Press Association —Copyright. LONDON, September 30. The Supreme Council of Soviet today ratified the Russian-German Pact, stales a message from Moscow. The newspaper “Pravda” urging peace in western Europe, says that Russia and Germany will make an effort to end the hostilities and, if necessary, will draw in other friendly Powers to make a. similar cl--fort. The Soviet Press attempts to absolve Germany from war guilt.

A dispatch to the "New York Times” from G. E. R. Gedye in Moscow states that though the wording of the communiques has produced an intense war psychosis and alarm, despondency and confusion among the Russian public, the more sophisticated foreigners are inclined to be very calm.

The pact seems on paper to be a concession to Germany in exchange for a Soviet free hand in the Baltic States. Even if she paid a further price by withdrawing from the advanced line in Poland to the new reduced territory, the advantages to the Soviet would be both political and military, minimising the risk of an attack from East Prussia and retaining the homogenous population of co-racial Russians severed only since 1920 and leaving Germany almost the entire Polish population. Gedye adds that for Herr Hitler there is already a considerable collection of newly subjugated, rebellious and revengeful subjects, with the indignant Poles contiguous to the Czechoslovaks, who are contiguous to the Austrians, and all are united by the bond of Catholicism. M Stalin may consider he is well rid. of a hotbed qf future revolts. Neutral observers’ chief impression of the new pact is its astonishing confession of Nazi weakness and distrust of Germany’s ability to face a long war. AN ALLIANCE DOUBTED. It is possible, but most doubtful, that Herr von Ribbentrop has received an assurance that the ominous consultation clause means a full military alliance. the value of which would be doubtful. Russia’s submarine fleet has not been proved. It might smuggle a few submarines to the North Sea and also to the Mediterranean, but that, apart from giving supplies to the extent of the limited available resources, is believed to be the total possible efforts, coupled, perhaps, with a stirring up of Afghanistan against India. Certainly intervention for the-Nazis is abhorrent to the majority of the Russians and a strain on their loyalty. All Russia has achieved, apparently, is an encouragement of Germany, whose plunging deeper into the war to her ultimate destruction seems to be the only clearly discernible aim of the Soviet. The whole course of the events connected with the Turkish Foreign Minister’s visit to Moscow contradicts the theory that the Russian-German accord is perfect, and confirms the theory that Herr von Ribbentrop had gone to Moscow to lay in a German veto to Russian schemes in Central Europe and the Balkans. The theory that there is real Russian-German accord is daily becoming more difficult to maintain, despite the high-sounding treaties and banquets. One or both, if not both, of the Soviet's promises to Germany is empty. If the Soviet makes a military alliance with Germany and goes to war against the Allies she is thereby prohibited from supplying materials because of her own needs and the transport difficulties. POSITION OF TURKEY. The Russian-Turkish difficulties can only be conjectured, Gedye adds. Certainly Russia is endeavouring to neutralise the Dardanelles, but it is uncertain what is offered to Turkey for this. Possibly the Soviet is prepared to guarantee the security of the Balkans provided she is allowed to retake Bessarabia, to which racial claims can be advanced. Herr von Ribbentrop may have objected to the plan or added demands on behalf of Germany alarming the Turks more than the original proposition. Turkey’s fear is that an increase in Russian and German influence in the Black Sea and Balkans may permanently affect her relations with both Powers. Turkey’s invitation to Britain and France suggests that Turkey and the Balkan bloc may be prepared to resist the proposals. An equally useful indication of the unreality of the Russian-German accord is seen in M Molotov’s care that Estonia surrendered before he received Herr von Ribbentrop, who was confronted with a fait accompli. Latvian anxieties at present are allayed owing to the fact that there are no demands from the Soviet no allegations of mystery submarines on the Latvian coast, and no criticisms in the Soviet Press of Latvian economic conditions such as arc appearing about Finland. Latvians construe the clause in the Estonian pact referring to defence against a great Power attacking across Latvia as reinsurance against Germany.