STORM OVER TUNIS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 1 April 1939, Page 11

STORM OVER TUNIS

SOME ITALIAN ASPIRATIONS’

AMBITIONS THWARTED.

IMPORTANCE OF FRENCH AREA

(Sisley Huddleston, in the "Christian Science Monitor.’’)

Those of us who have cruised in the Mediterranean with an eye for geographical diplomacy—oi' should we say diplomatic geography?—have become aware of the extreme importance of the strip of country known as Tunisia set in the middle of the African shores facing the Italian island of Sicily. For here is a comparatively narrow channel of that large salt lake —for, except that it communicates with the Atlantic Ocean by the Straits of Gibraltar. it is virtually a lake —known as the Mediterranean Sea. By the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora there is indeed another natural outlet, in the Black Sea; but the Black Sea itself ! s still further inland. A great French engineer, De Lesseps, constructed an eastern exit, the Suez Canal; but nothing would be easier than to close this, artificial waterway.

Italy divides the Mediterranean into an eastern and a western sea. and in the narrow passage it has fortified the little island of Pantellaria, which is said to be the island that Shakespeare had in mind when he wrote "The Tempest.” Just as England stands sentinel at Gibraltar, Italy hopes to stand sentinel here.

But the French occupation of Tunisia tends to thwart, the Italian ambition. If Italy commanded Tunisia, as well as Sicily, and had a submarine and airplane base at Pantellaria, it would certainly be mistress of the Mediterranean. But it does not command Tunisia. The French are in possession, and they have buflt the naval port of Bizerta which is in some sense the reply to Italian designs. These strategic considerations are perhaps vital. The British who regard the Mediterranean as an essential maritime route could not allow Tunisia to fall'into Italian hands, any more than they could allow Sicily to fall into French hands. The two Mediterranean Powers neutralise each other. It was in 1881 that the French invaded Tunisia, because the tribe of the Kroumirs came on cattle-raiding expeditions into Algeria, which was already French. They did not annex Tunisia. They did not add it I to the Empire. Strictly speaking, Tunisia doesnot "belong" to France today. The Bey is still the supreme ruler. But the French offered their “protection," and it was accepted. Fol’ the natives the Bey is supreme; but it is the French Resident-General who is in command. The Bey has all the advantages of a Monarch, and the French all the responsibilities. The Italians always held that the French had .“jumped their claim.” They refused to recognise the French Protectorate for 15 years—that is to say. uhtil 1896. Fol- there is no doubt that the earliest settlers (in modern times) were the Romans, and afterwards the Italians, and that this immigration has had its effect on the Berbers of Tunisia who have European affinities. Tunisia seemed to be the natural prolongation of Italy, and therefore, the Italians have always regretted feat they missed their opportunity.

It is, of course,, impossible to put back the clock of history, and .until recently French and Italians have lived side by side among v the Berbers, the Moors, the negroes, the Jews, and the nomadic Arabs, and have been quite content. They have indeed made a colony of their own, and portions of Tunisia strike even the hasty traveller as Italianised. One has the impression even today that the Italians outnumber the French. Yet the latest figures show that, in fact, the French are now more numerous that the Italians. The Italians dispute the figures, and in any case they urge that the French have naturalised original Italian settlers. This statistical dispute is really without interest; it remains true that the French have established their administration, and that Tunisia has prospered under their control. It is altogether unlikely—not to say impossible —that the French would in any circumstances consent to be ousted or that the British would allow them to be ousted. Since, however, it is the business of diplomacy—and of diplomatic writers —to find a modus vivCndi, it should be admitted at once that the Italians have a special place in Tunisia. Indeed they have hitherto enjoyed special privileges. They have been very largely autonomous. They have kept their nationality. It is true that the French can denounce the accords which date back to pre-French days —but no responsible person would contemplate such action. It is true that Benito Mussolini agreed with Pierre Laval to an eventual assimilation of Italians, and that he has since repudiated the bargain of 1935 on the ground that the French applied “sanctions” to Italy. It would seem that the whole question is reopened.

It can be settled without difficulty provided a friendly atmosphere is created. It cannot be settled by clamours and menaces of war. French and Italians have shown that they can live together; surely their rulers can agree on a definition of their status!