GERMAN AMBITIONS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 10 March 1939, Page 9

GERMAN AMBITIONS

THE DRIVE TO THE EAST PROBLEMS AND METHODS. THE SELF-DETERMINATION CRY. (By J. E. Williams in. the “Christian Science Monitor”). In an old comedy recently revived here with great success the hero, when asked whither bound replies, “nach Osten, nach Osten immer nach Osten." to the appreciative applause of the audience which interprets an other-' wise unpolitical reference as an indication of the new field of German foreign policy. Since the surrender —voluntarily or involuntarily, is immaterial for the moment —of Czechoslovakia by the western democracies at Munich, the feeling has grown among the general public here that Germany is now free to expand as she thinks fit and that Herr Hitler can realise territorial ideas laid down in “Mein Kampf.” These it should be remembered, are not so much National Socialist as ideas conceived by Germans long before the present regime here was contemplated. Today, the “Drang nach Osten” is more or less accepted abroad, doubts existing only as to the method and speed with which this drive will be carried through. This policy, it is clear, concerns territory, and races in which Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia and possibly Rumania and Soviet Russia are interested. Germany does not want to be inconvenienced by Memel since there are much bigger issues which it wishes to get settled—particularly the fulfillment of Hitler’s words: “When we talk of new lands in Europe we think first of Russia and its border states.” This raises immediately the problem of the Ukraine. That Germany considers the time,ripe for movement in that direction was clearly in the Vienna Award on November 2, 1938. The Reich does not oppose the PolishHungarian demand for a common frontier through the absorption of Ruthenia out of love for Czechoslovakia, but because it wished that part of Ruthenia which remained “autonomous” to serve as the centre of a political unit which would one day form a new Ukraine. A bureau for the registration of “stateless Ukrainians” was recently opened here. In pursuing this policy the National Socialists can also, claim that they have made yet another contribution to the settlement of Europe on the basis of the “self-determination” which they claim to have applied to Czechoslovakia. This new Ukrainian state it is assumed—Officially, nothing has been published here—will Include those parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania occupied by Ukrainians. When a German paper lately talked of CarpathoUkraine (Ruthenia) being a “spiritual centre of a nation of 45,000,000,” it is clear that Soviet Ukraine is also includded in the scheme. But probably this lattei 1 territory will be included only later—so much depends upon the strength of the Soviet regime and upon general European developments. The question naturally arises in this connection as to the future action of Poland, which is most vitally concerned because of its Ukrainian population in East Galicia. (Czechoslovakia’s loss of the “rump” Ruthenia would not be so serious and has long been foreseen in Prague). Polish reaction showed itself recently in the renewal of the Pol-ish-Russian declaration of friendship which the Warsaw Press interpreted as a warning to Germany. But Poland alone could do little against the new military strength of the Third Reich, and it is doubtful what other help it would secure. Could Poland rely upon help from the western democracies? What of the Franco-Polish Non-Aggression and of the Franco-Russian Pacts, the latter of which is only valid in case of “unprovoked aggression?” England is nbt expected to commit itself to a war over East Europe and Germany considers that in the recent Franco-German declaration it took an important step towards protecting the rear in case of war on its eastern frontiers. But here, in Berlin, it is thought most likely that the future settlement of East Europe according to Germany s desires can be effected without a resort to force. Propaganda, supported by strong military forces, is expected to succeed as it succeeded in the case of Czechoslovakia. If England and France could thus be brought to surrender, why not Poland and Russia? While abroad no doubt exists as to the Third Reich’s aims, it is clear that