Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1939. RECOGNISING GENERAL FRANCO.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 16 February 1939, Page 6

Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1939. RECOGNISING GENERAL FRANCO.

QN Hie ground, stated by the London “Times,” that the cessation of bloodshed in Spain is the paramount need, there is a good deal to be said in favour-of- recognising the Franco Government-—a step Britain and France apparently are on the point of taking. This cannot, however, be regarded as anything better than making the best of a bad job. The observation of “The Times” that “the only visible master-builder (in Spain) is General Franco” carries with it a recognition that Spain at present is very badly off for master-builders. From the standpoint oTnational and international morality which is so largely disregarded in a realistic outlook on power politics, General Franco has no claim whatever to recognition by any self-respecting democracy. Where the use ol murderous violence against opponents is concerned, both sides in Spain appear to be open to heavy reproach. Certainly neither side is in that matter entirely free from blame. It is well established, however, that the Republican Government which has to a great extent been overthrown was constituted legally by a Parliament, elected by the Spanish people, while the pretensions of the Franco regime have never rested on any other basis Hum force, and that force largely foreign. Left to rely on purely Spanish support in his rebellion against the Spanish Government, General Franco almost certainly would have been defeated in comparatively short order. That he has been able instead to plunge his unhappy country into war for more than two years and a half, and now to make a close approach to decisive victory, is due very largely to the powerful help he has received Irom Italy and Germany. A certain amount of foreign help was received also by the Republican Government, but the almost entirely one-sided operation of the strangely named policy of non-intervention is not in doubt. Two of Mr Chamberlain’s leading contentions in support of the policy which is now, presumably, about to culminate in the recognition of a Franco Government have been that it is for the Spanish people to settle their own differences, and that the abandonment by Britain and France of non-intervention would have led to the extension of the Spanish conflict into a European war. The last-mentioned argument has been accepted widely as unanswerable, but its implications at least should be noted. AVhat was implied, obviously, was that Italy and Germany would make war against any Power or Powers seeking to help the Spanish Government as they were helping General Franco, and that it was better, in the circumstances, to allow events in Spain to take their course, Carried to its logical conclusion, this contention would imply that nations desiring peace should always submit to the threats of aggressors. That, at all events, is what Britain and France have done with respect to Spain. No good or promising outcome of the so-called civil war in Spain can be expected in these circumstances. If General Franco had-any real claim to the title of liberator which has been conceded to him, on obviously insufficient grounds, by some people and some newspapers in Britain, he would be content to aim at re-establishing peace and order in Spain and then'allowing the Spanish people to determine their own form of government. No one needs to be told that General Franco is extremely unlikely to do anything of the kind. The prospect raised is that he will'rule as a dictator, but a dictator subservient to Italy and Germany. Apart from its effect on Spain, the policy pursued by Britain and France, though it may have enabled them to avoid immediate war, manifestly has increased the dangers by which they are confronted. At the stage now reached, however, it is evidently desirable that the war in Spain should be ended as soon as possible. There doos not appear to bo the slightest hope that continued resistance by General Miaja’s forces to those of General Franco and his foreign allies can lead to anything else than further useless bloodshed and suffering. Il is possible that when peace has been restored, a genuinely national spirit may begin again to reassert itself in Spain. There is certainly no good purpose to be served by the prolongation of the war.