Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1938. A TIME TO GO WARILY.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 29 December 1938, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1938. A TIME TO GO WARILY.

APPARENTLY there is no thought as yet of cancelling or postponing the visit about to be made to Rome by Mr Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, but there are some obvious grounds at least for doubting whether this friendly approach to Italy can be justified in the present state of European affairs. The weightiest argument in favour of an abandonment of the visit is that Italy is playing at present a deliberately provocative part, not only in her officially inspired agitation against France, but in her continued active participation in the so-called civil war in Spain.

In that country Italian troops are declared to be heading the attack in the winter offensive the insurgent forces have launched in Catalonia. It was admitted recently by the British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr R. A. Butler) that further Italian aid had been sent to General Franco. In adding that he would not like it to be thought that this aid “amounted to much more than replacements,” Mr Butler was begging the question. What Parliament and the people in Britain were led to expect as an outcome of the ratification of an agreement with Italy was at least a. progressive reduction of the Italian forces in Spain. Not so very Jong ago, Mr Chamberlain was affirming that a. settlement in Spain must precede the implementation of the agreement with Italy.

With this record 'where Spain is concerned, Italy does not appear to be any better entitled to friendly approaches when account is taken of her current and recent policy towards France. In fairness it must be noted that there has been some entirely unwarranted speculation regarding Italy’s actions and intentions. For example a report transmitted yesterday from Paris that Italian troops had crossed the frontier of French Somaliland was promptly denied in. French official circles. .Other unfounded allegations have gained publicity, only to be exposed and discredited, but the established and undisputed facts of Italy’s policy are in themselves bad enough.

Officially, as affairs stand, Italy lias made no demand for any colonial or other territory from France, but there never lias been an occasion on which the word “officially” carried less weight or meaning. The so-called spontaneous demand for Tunis —the former Carthaginian territory which was conquered by ancient Rome—raised in the Italian Chamber of Deputies on November 30 last, obviously had been carefully prepared beforehand. Signor Mussolini and his Government are wholly responsible for that opening outburst and for the anti-French demonstrations in various territories that have followed, as well its for the virulent campaign against France that is still being conducted in the strictly controlled Italian Press.

What exactly the Duee and his colleagues hoped to gain by these, tactics is not clear. One ingenious suggestion that has been advanced is that Signor Mussolini is not really concerned meantime over Tunisia, .Jibuti, Savoy, or Corsica, but is stirring up discord over these territories in the hope of gaining concessions relating, perhaps, to Spain, Abyssinia, or the Suez Canal.

It is, of course, known that the Italian, dictatorship, though it still whoops loyally for the .Berlin-Rome axis, is by no means satisfied with the working results of the alliance with Germany. Italy has co-operated with Germany in tactics which have enabled that, country to extend and. enlarge her power and influence enormously in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead of profiting, Italy has the mortification, of seeing German troops established on the Brenner Pass—a, discomfiture and danger which Mussolini once threatened to avert at. the cost of war if necessary. It has been said with truth, too, that the German trade drive into South-Eastern Curope is not less disconcerting to llalv than it is to Britain and France.

Mnssolini's present tactics perhaps may bo accounted for by a determination, or at all events an eager desire, somehow to get something out of his partnership with. Germany, lie cannot, however, be at all pleased with the result of these tactics to date. The principal outcome of the demands he has undoubtedly promoted, though not officially, for Tunis and other French territory has been an uncompromising declaration by France that she will not, cede an inch of colonial soil and a joint declaration by Britain and France of the solidarity of their Entente and of their common and uncoinprising opposition to any demand of the kind. In spile of the clamour that continues in the Italian Press, with some .seconding in the equally controlled and obedient Nazi organs, it may lie supposed that the firm and united stand of the Entente Powers Jias had its effect on both Italy and Germany.

Looking at all the facts in. sight, it is not easy to see on what grounds Mr Chamberlain and Lord Halifax are to talk of peace and friendship in their meetings with Signor Mussolini. The British .Ministers obviously can do nothing else than emphasise the complete identity of British and French views where Italy’s demands for French colonial or oilier territory are concerned. If they are to represent faithfully the weight of British opinion and to uphold consistently their own past declarations on the subject, Air ('hamberlain and. his colleague must also press for an Italian withdrawal from.\Spain. It has been suggested that some concession to Italy where control of Ihe Suez Canal is concerned may be warranted bul with affairs taking their present course in Europe, the suggestion obviously is extremely open to question. There is much to be said for the view expressed by 31. Leon Blum, in Ills recent noteworthy address to the French Socialist Congress—in effect, that any present concession to the totalitarian States iv-onld serve only to intensify the dangers of war and to enlarge the resources of dictatorships intent on war.