GERMANY & ITALY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 22 July 1938, Page 7

GERMANY & ITALY

RACIAL AND EXPANSIONIST POLICIES. OBSERVATIONS ON EUROPEAN SITUATION. Germany, said Mr A. E. Hely, tutororganiser of the W.E.A. in the course of his address in Masterton this week on “Italy and the Mediterranean,” held the key- to the present European situation and hence to an 1 understanding of British and French policy. There were two main aspects to the Nazi policy, the first racial, to include all Germans within one state or Reich, which if enforced either in Czecho-Slovakia or in Poland, must lead to war, and secondly, expansionist, in a drive to the East and the domination of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. This expansionist plan, said Mr Hely, did not immediately threaten England or France, except in so far as German aggression might involve her either with Czecho-Slovakia or with Russia and so involve France. England could not afford a hostile power to dominate the Channel ports and rather than so be involved with France had directed her policy towards weaning France away from her commitments in East Europe. The German drive to the East had materially affected Italian interests. Italy, like Germany, desired to pursue a racial policy and desired more markets, sources of raw material, and areas for capital investment.

Ever since she achieved nationhood, said Mr Hely, Italian policy had been directed towards the domination of the Mediterranean, and economic control of the Balkans. On the latter she had been forced into a compromise with Germany, and had somewhat unwillingly had to agree to German annexation of Austria and increasing control in the Balkans, in return for freedom of action! in the Mediterranean and in Spain. In the Spanish situation Italy came into more direct contact with France. It was vital to France that a friendly power should hold Spain as an unfriendly power would immobilise several French divisions on the Pyrenees frontier. There was documentary evidence of Italian support for the Spanish rebels long before the revolt began, but it appeared that Italy did not realise how long the civil 'war would be protracted. Now Mussolini found it difficult to withdraw from Spain witnout seriously (damaging Italian prestige and even risking an anti-Fascist reaction in Italy. A European war on a small scale was being waged in Spain, and if the plight of the Spanish Government became too desperate, the war- might develop on a larger scale, as it seemed certain that Mussolini would rather risk national suicide than give up Italian dreams of Mediterannean supremacy.