Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 16, 1938. AGREEMENT WITH ITALY.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 16 April 1938, Page 6

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 16, 1938. AGREEMENT WITH ITALY.

Admittedly, however, there is another influential group in Washington which sees in the Chamberlain eonvens'ations with Italy “the most constructive and hopeful development of the past decade.” A high State Department official was quoted recently by a Washington correspondent of the “Christian Science Monitor” as expressing an opinion, that the frequently forecasted outbreak of a new major war in Europe had been averted certainly for a year, and perhaps altogether, ft remains to await the outcome of Mr Chain’berlain’s policy.

fpiME must determine- the value of the agreement into which Great Britain, is entering with Italy. Some obvious grounds appear for holding that a very high price is being paid for the privilege of cultivating Italian friendship. Britain took a leading part in the effort made by the League of Nations to repel the lawless attack made by Italy on Abyssinia. A later proposal to promote a a compromise—the Hoare-Laval plan—under which a substantial part of the territory of Abyssinia would have been placed under Italian control, led to an outburst of objection in Britain and in other European countries which forced the resignation of the then British Foreign Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare.' Now Britain is to recognise . the conquest of Abyssinia by Italy. From the British standpoint, a retrospective survey of the facts is rather humiliating. That humiliation would have been deepened had the agreement provided for the cession j to Britain oi Abyssinian territory—the Lake Tsana region including the” source of the Nile—but an parly report that this cession had been arranged is denied. As its terms are outlined, the agreement gives shape to a broad and far-reaching understanding between Britain and Italy regarding naval and other affairs throughout the Mediterranean and Bed seas and their adjacent territories, including Spain and the Spanish islands. The practical value of such' an understanding, if it is honestly observed, may be very, great indeed, but more faith might have been entertained'in its stability had account not had to be taken of the policy Italy has pursued towards Abyssinia and Spain. The conclusion of/ an agreement with Italy is a comparatively early and limited step in the British Prime Minister’s policy of appeasement- in Europe—a policy which must be assumed to look to a further considerable revision of some of thos'e parts of the Treaty of -Versailles that still remain in force. It is by its total effect on the course of events in Europe, and even on that of world affairs, that Mr Chamberlain’s policy ultimately will be tested’and judged. Should it prove to be the prelude to an extension of peaceful, understanding throughout Europe, and not least between Germany and other nations, the agreement with Italy may come ultimately to be classed as an act of wise statesmanship. It would be somewhat optimistic, however, to pronounce a verdict of that kind in anticipation and advance. Particularly’ from the point of view of the British Pacific Dominions, the issues raised are far from relating only to Europe. For this country and others, for instance, the” probable effects of British foreign policy on opinion in the United States, and the extent to which understanding and what co-operation is poss’ible with that country are assisted or impeded, are of the highest importance. It gives, perhaps, some ground for comfort that informed American opinion appears to be divided on the present, trend of British foreign policy very much as it is in the United Kingdom and in other Empire countries. If has been reported on apparently dependable authority that the reaction of the dominant group in the American State Department —that headed by the Secretary of State, Mr Cordell Hull —to the resignation of Mr Anthony Eden and the opening of the Chamberlain approach to Italy was one of disappointment and disillusionment. The feeling of this group was that moral principles were being sacrificed to expediency “and that as a. result the day when international morality Avill assert itself against lawlessness had again been postponed to the advantage of the aggressor nations.”