The Waikato Argus [PUBLISHED DAILY.] THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 1901.

Waikato Argus, Volume X, Issue 914, 28 March 1901, Page 2

The Waikato Argus [PUBLISHED DAILY.] THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 1901.

The papers by the last 'Frisco mail place us in possession of copious extracts from the despatches of the generals bearing on the early days of the war. General White has been blamed for his occupation of Ladysmith. He gives in his despatch dated 28th March, 1900, the following explanation of his reasons for taking up that position :—" It may be well to state shortly the reasons which governed my choice of this position. Ladysmith is the most important town in Northern Natal, and there was reason to believe that the enemy attached very great, and perhaps undue, importance to obtaining possession of it. it was suspected then, and the suspicion has since been confirmed, that the occupation of that town by the Boer forces had been decided upon by the disloyal Dutch oE both colonies as a signal for a general rising, as, in fact, a material guarantee that the forces of the combined Republics was really capable of dealing with any force the British Empire was able to place in the field against them. Our withdrawal, therefore, would have brought about an insurrection so widespread as to have very materially increased our difficulties. Strategically the town was important as being the junction of the railways which enter Natal from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and until the Republics could get possession of that junction these necessarily divergent lines of supply and communication prevented their enjoying to the full the advantages of combined action. Tactically the place was already partially prepared for defence, and offered us natural positions of some strength, parameter which must be occupied was very great for the number of troops available, yet it afforded the possibility of maintaining a protracted defence against superior numbers. On the other hand, the mere fact of a retirement behind the Tugela would have had a moral effect at least equal to a serious defeat, and would have involved the abandonment to the enemy of a large town full of an English population and of a mass of stores and munitions of war which had been collected there before my arrival in South Africa, and had since In en increased. The line of the Tugela, from the Urakenhurg to the Utillalo river, is some SO miles long, and in a dry season, such as last November, can be crossed on foot almost anywhere. Against an enemy with more than double my numbers and three times nvy mobility I could not hope to maintain such a line and any attempt to prevent their turning my flanks could only have resulted in such a weakening of my centre as would have led to its being pierced. Once my flank was turned on the line of the river the enemy would have been nearer Maritzberg than 1 should have been and a rapid withdrawal by rail for the defence of the capital would have been inevitable."

General White has been severely criticised for his occupation of Lndysaritb, but his defence of himself in this respect appears to be logical. He rightly estimated that he; could make a prolonged defence of the position, and the siege of the town kept a large force of the enemy from doing mischief in other directions before the arrival of reinforcements from England. It is true that the relief of this garrison cost General Duller many lives and much arduous work ; but it must be remembered that General White was greatly outnumbered, and after results clearly demonstrate that he could not have defended a front of SO miles against an active and overwhelming force. It must also be remembered that the position was in a degree selected for him previous to his arrival in the country, by the accumulation of stores and munitions of war in the town. It would be well for the British nation if they could claim that General White's occupation of Lndysmith was one of the worst blunders of the campaign. The despatches clearly demonstrate that the serious blunders were not made in the held, but by those on whom rested the responsibility of seeing that the armies were properly equipped. The despatches arc so voluminous that it would be futile to attempt a review of them. Lord Uoberts calls attention to the fact that the area to be operated in exceeded that of Germany, Austria, and France, and that, in the absence of the grasping of this fact, it is impossible to estimate the difficulties the generals have to contend with ; but this applies equally to the authorities. The despatches nevertheless are gratifying reading ; throughout they point "to the fact that the British Army cuinpaies aa a lighting

machine most favourably with that of any other Power. The despatches tell of splendid courage, of dogged tenacity, and of invincible fortitude. Our soldiers have done everything which could be expected from them. But it is disheartening to read that those splendid qualities in the troops have been greatly neutralised by want of foresight and organising ability on the part of those whose business it was to utilize their fighting qualities to the utmost. Lord Roberts tells us that be found when he arrived in the country that the Army Corps organization had been broken up, and even the formation of divisions and brigades differed materially from what had been originally intended. He a'ids no organised Transport Corps existed, some thousands of mules had been colfectiui and a number of ox and mule waggons had been purchased, but what is known as the regimental system had been adopted." Again, General Hunter complains that the maps were a positive danger and 'i delusion, and that our gunners were not at fault, but our guns." A spasmodic effort is to be made to prevent such blunders in the future, but if British history is to repeat itself we shall find ourselves in much the same position as at the commencement of this war, and the duty will again fall to the lot of our soldiers by dogged courage to neutralize the-blunders of the men at headquarters with only a small modicum of brains and still less industry.