INDIAN MILITARY POLICY.

Wairarapa Age, Volume XXXII, Issue 3131, 6 March 1909, Page 3

INDIAN MILITARY POLICY.

A London Military Correspondent, writing of Lord Kitchener's re-organ-isation of the Indian Army, says : The assumptions frequently made that these reforms implied a large increase in the Arm} and the allotment of the bulk of the expenditure to barracks are both incorrect. It was, indeed, found practicable to place in the field an army nearly double the strength that was previously considered possible, and this is the purpose which the completion of these reforms wili achieve; but the end was sought by improved utilisation of existing means after long and elaborate examination, and not by the creation of fresh forces. There is practically no difference worth speaking about between the numbers of cavalry regiments and battalions of infantry existing in 1902 and 1908. As to the artillery, there are actually fewer native batteries now existing than there were in 1902. Lord Kitchener found four field batteries of the Haidarabad contingent armed with obsolete six-pounder, j muzzleloading smoothbore gun 3, and he desired either to fit them out with a better gun or to abolish them. The' latter course was taken. Lord Kitchener also desired to add six more na- * tive mountain batteries to the 18 existing in India, ten of which were native, but hitheito only two of j the3e new native batteries have been j raised. Thus .the broad and prudent principle of retaining the artillery in the hands of Europeans has been maintained,. but neither in Lord Kichener's ti-ne nor before his arrival has this principle been elevated to the rank of an awe-inspir-ing fetish. As to the infantry, a few battalions of doubtful worth have disappeared, and others recruited from more martial races have taken their place. There has been a J slight increase in numbers, but sub- ! stantially the figures are unchanged, j The Reserve has been increased, but j its expansion to the figure demanded by the Commission of 1879 remains j an ideal for the future. i It may, of course, be said that the | signature of the Anglo-Russia Agree- ! men L , authorised a large reduction of the Indian Army. But, apart from the fully of relying upon paper guarantees, the Army in India was not, at the time this agreement was signed, nor is it now, in a situation I to defend India against Russia and ; to fulfil our engagemsnfcs to : Afghanistan for more than a few • months, after which lapse of time I large reinforcements fram home > were, and would be still, required. Moreover, the frontier tribes con- j tinue to obtain better riflas and more of them every year, a:d we ha- e only during the past year experienced the necessity for assembling a corn-j paratively considerable force in the | neighbourhood of Peshawar. The i Army in India remains for practical ; purposes at the standard renommei- : ded by the Peel Commission in , 1859—a standard which v a=i for in- j ternal security alone. ! Given the fidelity of the Indian ! Army and the preservation of the ■ main lines of railway, the Army in India is capable of suppressing a re- j bellion wherever it may occur. i Certainly, the Indian Army, and ' the Army in India as a whole, are not perfect compared with the high standard of organisation of the national armies of the Great Powers. We can scarcely hope, or even desire, j in the present temper of a section of j [ the people, that we should raide i I locally a great army on the pri: - ciple of short service and large reserves whereby alone a great arn y . can be created at a small cost. 'Trie i army in India," said John Lawrence, 'must always be largely composed of natives. It should not be our ol- '■ ject merely to make it a power!"'. 1 j machine formidable to our outside I j enem.es. We should, in the first in- j stance, aim at making it a thoroughly safe one." In a mercenary ' force the regiments must be contented or they cannot be safe, and even if the improvements mada and to be made in the condition of the sepoy burden somewhat the Budget of India, India can afford to pay, l for her financial position might well be the envy of any Power in the world. . . We must concluda

that the strategic railways on the • North West Frontier had nothing to \ do with the outbreak of the tribes; ] that, whether in the matter of these railways or in that of the reorganisation and redistribution the Army in ludia, the responsibility and control of his Majesty's Government have remained entire; that the Army in India has not been massed upon the frontier, but precisely the contrary; that the buik of the fresh expenditure incurred has been upon rifles, guns, ammunition, transport, p-jy, pensione, allowances, and other atrvices destined to inure se the mobilizsble effectives of the Army and to improve the condition of ths sepoy ; and finally, that the military policy of India is in safe hands and has been steadily directed to the attainment of a higher standard of efficiency, and to the better and more economical utilisation of existing forces.