THE MOTOR CYCLE FATALITY.

Wairarapa Age, Volume XXX, Issue 8514, 20 August 1907, Page 5

THE MOTOR CYCLE FATALITY.

A MANSLAUGHTER CHARGE,

JUDGE'S SUMMING-UP,

The evidence called in the case at Christchurch charging Win. B. R. Moorhouse with manslaughter a sequel to the death of a child through being run into by accused's motor cycle on New Brighton Beach— went, to show that at the time of the acci- [ dent accused was travelling about 50 miles an hour. The motor cycle possessed no brake, and no bell orhorn. Moorhouse did ail he could tostop. He swerved his machine, which; involved a considerable personal risk to himself, and dug his feet into the sand. Had he not swerved in his attempt to avoid the boy he would have cleared him. The father of the boy said the accused was much distressed over*the matter. Witness had no reason to complain of the accused's conduct since. In summing up (says the Press)

Mr Justice Chapman said that the responsibility imposed upon a person for manslaughter was laid down in a section of the Criminal Code, which provided that every person who had in his charge, or under his control, anything whatever whether animals or inanimate—and that would includeany high speed machine—or who worked and made, or maintained anything which in the absence of precaution or care, might endanger human life, was under a lsgal duty to take reasonable precautions against, and use reasonable care to avoid, such dangers and was criminally responsible for the consequence of omitting without lawful excuse, to perform such duty. The duty imposed by the section was not to take the utmost precautions to avoid danger,, but to take reasonable care to avoid such danger. The question the jury would have to consider in the case was whether the young man had taken reasonable precautions against danger, and had used reasonable care, or inverting those expressions, whether his conduct was so unreasonable and so palpably negligent that they were obliged' to say he had not complied with the duty as laid down by the section of the Code. In order to arrive at a conclusion on that question they had to consider the whole of the circumstances that were in evidence. When a person drove a high speed machine, such as a motor cycle, l.e was bound to take such reasonable care to avoid causing the death of another person as was appropriate to the circumstances, and the test in the present case for their consideration would be whether the youth had been so neglectful of his duty as laid down in the Code as to bring hinivself within what was forbidden by law. The British law allowed a considerable liberty of judgment, and it vvas perfectly correct to say that the law did not punish a person for an error of judgment, although the;e might be an error of judgment so gross as to suggest, or even prove, that a real judgment had not been exercised. But for an error of judgment in the proper sense leading to disaster the kxv did not inflict punishment, and ihe jury would have in the case to distinguish between a piece of gro:s negligence resulting in a death and an error of judgment. .

The jury, after a long retirement, brought in a verdict of not guilty, the following rider being added:— "That in' the opinion of this juiy motor bicycles should not be propelled along the New Brighton Beach within three miles of the pier at a greater speed than twelve miles per hour."

His Honour said he would see that the rider was forwarded to the proper quarter.