LORD SALISBURY'S RUSSIAN POLICY.

Thames Star, Volume XVII, Issue 5177, 20 August 1885, Page 3

LORD SALISBURY'S RUSSIAN POLICY.

The Marquis of Salisbury followed up his statement' to the Hackney meeting, that no prudent man^vould have dreamed of conducting a campaign against Russia in the wilds of central Asia, by a speech in the House of Lords (May 12) fully ex> plaining his Indian policy and that of his friends. To Russian treaties they would pay no more attention than to the wind. Apart from other reasons, war dissolves all treaties. But they would put India in a state of defence to meet Russia, reviving the scientific frontier of Lord Beaconsfield. To the adoption of this scheme the Gladstone Government had come et last, the Earl of Kimberley, the Secretary of State for India, having pre*. viously informed the House that the best military authorities were being consulted as to the fortification of a line of defence, and that £5,000,QC0 had already been •Hotted for military roads and for the Qnettah railway, which, in its tnger and its reTersal of the Beaconsfield policy, the Ministry had abandoned. The Marquis of Salisbury cordially approved of this decision. His only regret was that Mr Gladstone should bave disallowed the Quettah-Candahar frontier in the first instance, and gone far beyond it—on paper—afterwards, retreating when faced by the foe with the same rapidity that he had advanced. The defence of Herat by British troops seems to the noble lord neither advisable nor feasible. Quettah, the Khojah Pass, andCandahar should be the strong places of the frontier works. All that is possible to do to conciliate the Ameer, Lord Salisbury says, should be doße, but us for making England respons ible for any of the excesses which his wild Afghan tribes may commit upon his western or Russian frontier, the noble lord frankly says he would do nothing of the sort. A Russian advance, and consequently a Russian war, he regards as inetitable, and he would simply prepare to meet it in the best possible manner. The great point (says the Marquis) is to say little but to work hard, and, above all, to throw every energy into the construction of the necessary military railways. To attempt to fight an army with only camels and beasts of burden behind it, as Mr Gladstone would have had to do order to drive the Russians from Penj-deh, is, according to the new Premier, to court the disaster in Afghanistan we met with on the Nile. The railway is the key to the situation. Given the" proper fortresses, with easy communication with their base, and Russia will hesitate to place herself within striking distance; and when she does advance, England con strike with effect, and India will be de« fended with the least possible risk. Two points have to be borne in mind : First, when we fight our first battle with Russia, we ought to win. Secondly, the battlefield should not be tbe plains of India, in the midst of an inflammable population. The two conditions are satisfied by fortifying the passes on their Afghan side, and by perfecting the communications. This is neither a sensational nor a •'jißgo" policy, but it is one which well befits a strong nation. It is not bounce, but business. Englishmen everywhere can understand and endorse that they were not to be disturbed by false alarms, and that when tbe bugle-call does sound, it will find all ready.— Argus.