SIR STAFFORD NOTHCOTE ON THE POWER OF ENGLAND.

Thames Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2889, 20 May 1878, Page 2

SIR STAFFORD NOTHCOTE ON THE POWER OF ENGLAND.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his speech on Monday, spoke with just indignation of those Knglishmen who, in the course of the present war, hare been pointing out what they are pleased to call the " humiliated or the degraded position of Unglard." They' hare been saying that she has lost her old spirit, that she is pusillanimous, that she cares more for the profits of trade than for the national honour, and that she has lost what is termed her prestige. Sir Stafford flforthcote indignantly replies that, if she crocs not choose to draw the sword _on this occasion, it is not because she is weak, for she is as strong as she was, in the most brilliant periods of her history. We entirely agree with him; and nothing, we admit, could be more reprehensible than the unpatriotic calumnies which he rebuked. But by whom hare they been uttered P He seemed to think that the guilt lay with the opponents of the Government, the party which enthusiastically cheered last night the announcement of the administrative changes to be made throughout European Turkey. But there could not be a greater mistake. No taunts about the weakness or the humiliation of England hare come, from that great majority of the public which has strenuously resisted the incessant, insidious, and marrellously ingenious attempts to push this country into a war which would hare been as foolish as it would hare been immoral. No responsible member or organ of the. party in farourof neutrality has pretended tliat England could not strike with something like decisire effect, or that she is in any way humiliated. On the contrary, it is. the consciousness of the enormous national strength and endurance that has prompted the chief arguments in faror of neutrality. The power of a country for good may also be tho measure of its power for eril, and the most strenuous opponents of the Ministry would liuvo been loss emphatic if they had not known that any participa*

tion of England in this contest would, in all probability, have produced a goieral convulsion in Europe It is quite, true'that unpatriotic taunts havo been among the common-places of of discussion, during this unhappy war. But they have exclusively come from the supporters of the Government-; or, at least, from the party which desired to see a British army in the field. "We have been told hi all kinds of rhetoric that the power of Russia was on a level with her ambition. She was, we were invited to believe, pressing ou to ludia through the deserts of Central Asia, and gome day she would be seen at the gates of the Khvber Pass. The Russians would reac.i Constantinople in seven weeks after crossing the Danube, and then they would cut off our road to India. England was assumed to be so weak as tc be dependent for the safety of her empu-e on the existence of one of the weakest as well as worst administrative systems in the world. No foreign libeller of this country ever penned a more mendacious calumny than that it had to rely for safety on the continuance of arrangements in Turkey which are fated to perish of their own inherent badness. Curiously enough, lamentations over the aggressive power of Eussia were mixed with confident predictions that she was on the brink of some tra«endous military and financial disaster. She wasi to raise the seige of Plevna, her army was to fall to pieces from the want of tood, and she herself was to add bankruptcy to her many crimes. But all the while came the refrain that we English must step into the field if we would not give the world a spectacle of unparalleled - humiliation. Our preside in India would bo. gone for ever if Kara should fall. We must not allow the Russians to proceed far beyond the Balkans, on pain of being thought, cowardly and effete. When the Government steadily reused, to move a ship or a regiment after Armenia had been conquered, Plevna taken, and the Balkans pierced, England was pronounced +o have become ridiculous. Such outcries were merely the scarcely intelligible complaints of a party which, having set itself to defend a preposterously absurd policy, lost its self- ■ command under a blinding rain of facts. The great mass of the English people did not trouble themselves about the prestige of th"c nation, because they perfectly well knew how vast was its real strength, and how enthusiastically as well as easily that : strength would be put forth at the impulse of a iust cause. It is not true that the war has in the slightest degree impaired either our offensive or defensive power. Eussia has not increased her military reputation, although it would be foolish to deny the splendid bravery and endurance of her soldiers, or the considerable capacity displayed by some of her generals. Her aggressive capacity is somewhat below the first rank, and, if we are not alarmed by that of France or Germany, it would not be consistent with English sobriety of judgment to fear that of Eussia. As for the strength ot this country, it would be, the Chancellor of the Exchequer truly says, as great as it was in former times, and greater in proportion. That is not rhetorical phrase, but strictly • a statement of fact. When this country fought single-handed against the enormous military power of Napoleon 1., it began with a small and nnconsidered army. The continent made light of it. Napoleon, although he knew our capacity for defence, cou?d not bring himself to believe that we could put into the field any formidable body of troops. He did not estimate the strength of that endurance which comes partially from the character of the people, and par',ially from the enormous resources which have been piled up during centuries of comparative peace; That character is unchanged, and, in truth, we have only to look at the warlike spirit among a considerable part of the community to see how highly developed is the temper of pugnacity. Nor were the national resources ever so great as they are to-day. They are greater not merely absolutely, but relatively, than they were at the outset of the long French war. Ihe equipment of the army is superior ; the population ia more numerous and more, i contented ; the national wealth has grown enormously; and that carrying trade which is the basis of our maritime force exceeds anything dreamt of by past generations. It is a simple statement of fact to say that we could repeat the trials of the French war if we cared to make the same limitless sacrifices. But all those sacrifices sprang from the conviction that we were fighting a just cause. Had the country been divided as it is to-day, the resistance to the ambition of Napoleon would have ignomimously collapsed, and then indeed would England have been humiliated. At present by far the most intelligent and thoughtful part of the population has seen from the beginning of this contest that, whatever' might be the good qualities of the Turk, the dominion of the Porte could not remain unchanged. Turkey has for centuries been undergoing a process of mvariable change, one after another of her' outlying provinces receiving independence or large powers of local self-government. Some hope of improvement might have been cherished if such disintegration had been the result of the mischief caused by mere strong - handed, strong - willed tyranny. But, in truth, it is merely the sigi?of internal decay. There has in the proper sense of the term, been no government at all, for the simple reason that Turkey has not the elements of unity. Her growing populations go in one direction, her ruling caste stubbornly keeps in another. Eeligious fanaticism, pride of, race, old enmities, new ambition, and the instincts of selfpreservation have all been pulling the unhappy empire to pieces. No external military power could equal the effect of organic decay; and hence the determination of a large portion of the public that the might of England should not be wasted for an impossible purpose. Our security and honor must be independent of systems which are fated to disappear.—The Times.