RETROSPECT OF 1877.

Thames Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2812, 18 February 1878, Page 2

RETROSPECT OF 1877.

. (fbom the home XMvra, January 3.)

INTnoiUCTOEY —THE EABTEBN QUESTION.

Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since at llie close of the j'ear the European prospect was so dark* as in these latter days of 1877. At home, indeed, we have peace if not plenty ; and in our foreign dependencies we have no reason for alarm. A rising at the Cape which threatened to become dangerous has been effectually put down ; the dimensions of the troubles on the north-western frontier of our Indian Empire aro not formidable. The weather which December has brought, the heavy fog-laden atmosphere, the leaden skies, the chill and depressing rains, may be thought to be in sinister accord with the political state of Europe. In England there is much socially to fill us with misairings as to what the winter that has now begun may- hare in store for us. Commerce is paralysed; trade is stagnant ; industries of all kinds are in a condition closely bordering on collapse. Strikes abound, the quarreling between employer and employed are directly increasing the cost of production, and are thus emptying the home and filling the foreign market. But these troubles, heavy as they are, might have been borne with comparative equanimity were it possible to cast our eyes across the silver streak, and to gaze upon a horizon illuminated by the tranquil glov of peace. The Turks and the liussians ay seem well-nigh to have exhausted themselves; there may be signs that the conflict which continues to rage in south-eastern Kurope and Asia Minor has spent its chief fury. But when we ask what are the terms on which the struggle can be concluded, there is little to make us anticipate the immediate future with satisfaction or hope. The programme of Russia has become more openly ambitious as the war has proceeded, and at the present moment there is a very general conviction, as in England so throughout the Continent, that the Czar will not make peace before he has "rectified" the Eastern frontier of his Empire by the annexation of Armenia, secured an abrogation of, or a complete change in, the Jaws which now exclude Russian ships of war from the Mediterranean, and virtually denuded Turkey of her European provinces. EUBOPEAN DIPLOMACY.

It is not to be supposed that all this, or even a considerable portion of it, can be accomplished without imminent danger to the European equilibrium. The Eastern Question may develope into the European Question, and that contingency of which we hare heard so much throughout the whole year may be realised, and British interests may be seriously affected. The year opened with much talk of the accord between the German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian Empires, better known as the Triple Alliance. War broke but, and the Triple Alliance was said to be a phrase and a phantom. Since then there has been reason to consider that it is a potent reality* It is now quite clear that between Russia and Germany there exists a definite understand* iug; that in this understanding Austria participates; that Italy wiil follow the lead of Germany; and that France will not interfere to spoil the arrangement.' There is an uneasy feeling that European diplomacy has been more active than usual during the past twelve months, and not less unscrupulous. We barn heard rumours of the willingness of Belgium to consent to place herself under the protectorate of Germany; we hare been told of negotiations between England and Austria, for the purpose of alliance, and of their failure; we have been reminded more than once that we hare incurred no small burden of responsibility by rejecting the proposals which Prince Bismarck made to us early in the present year—that England should occupy Crete and annex Egypt. The time lor these offers, it is added, has now gone by, and England will have to settle her future difficulties as well as may be. On these matters it is' not necessary to speculate. A few weeks mus'; decide whether British interests are j«>;»ardised at any vital point, and the announcement that Parliament will meet . i* the dispatch of business on Jan. 1 is an assurance that whatever Her Majesty's Ministers may do will be done with the full knowledge and consent of the people and their representatives. . THE CONFEBBKCJB BEFOSX THE WAR.

When the year opened, the Conference, whoso failure was seized bo readily by Russia as giving her a casus belli against Turkey, had commenced its sittings at Constantinople. On Monday, Jam 1, the demands of Europe were formally presented to the representatives of the Porte, and the Turkish Plenipotentiaries stated their counter proposals, and took their stand upon the new Constitution. For the next two or three weeks a succession jof accounts reached us of hopeless discords at the Conference, both between the emissaries of Europe . and the representatires of the Sultan, and of the continued reduction of the irreducible minima. The Porto refused to hear of the institution of an International Commission for establishing reforms in the distubed provinces, of a foreign occupation to guarantee such reforms, interference of the Powers in the appointment of Governors, of the cession of territory to Servia and Montenegro. General Ignutieff and the French and Italian delegates on this declared the Conference at an end. Proceedings were resumed. The idea of a foreign occupation was abancloned; and a Consular Commission replaced the International Commission. This demand, which was virtually a return to the Andrassy Note, was still.further reduced Europe agreed to be content if the Porte would allow to be exercised a general supervision over the work of reform in the Turkish provinces, and would also permit it to nominate, or exercise some veto upon the nomination by the Sultan's Government of, the first appointed governors of the provinces. This was also refused, and on January 26 the Conference broke up. Then ensued a period of anxiety and suspense, which lasted for more than two months. As a supplement to flic Andrassy Note, the Berlin Memorandum, and as a proof that the labour of the European delegates had not been wholly without result, Bussia proposed a Protocol, in which the proceedings that had recently come to a dose at Constantinople were passed jn Review, and a general line of action indicated for tbe future: The English: Foreign Secretary, and the Bussian and Italian Ambassadors, speaking in the names of their respective Powers, reaffirmed their interest in the settlement of the disturbances in European Turkey, declared that they would watch the execution of the reforms provided' by the

Turkish Constitution, and that, if the result was not satisfactory, they would consider it their dutjr to meet together again and concert ulterior measures. Further, Lord Derby stipulated that the Protocol should be null and void, unless reciprocal disarmament on the part of Turkey and Russia followed. Count Schouvaloff made it a condition that Turkey should send a special envoy to Jfussia to treat of disarmament, and added that, if anything like the Bulgarian massacres were to occur, Russian demobilisation would at once stop. Count Menabrea merely stated that Italy would be bound by the Protocol only so long as the other Powers acknowledged its obligations. It was only after some ten weeks had been spent in diplomatic negotiations, a prominent feature in which was General Ignatieff's visit to Lord Salisbury at Hatfield, that the terms on which the Protocol was signed were settled. Compromise and concession, both on the part of Russia and England, alone rendered the signature of the document possible. Finally, Rustia agreed to an understanding that she would demobilise at once; and to the insertion jn the Protocol of a clause that unless dembbili- . saliou followed the document should be null and void. On the other hand, ; England waived the point on which she had prefiously insisted, that the conclusion of peace between the Porte and Montenegro should be an antecedent condition of signature. Europe was not long left left in doubt at to the reception which •„■ awaited the Protocol, the sole visible outcome of the deliberations of Europe at the Constantinople Conference, at the,, hands of the Porte. The Government of the Sultan rejected it with indignation, stigmatised the clauses referring to possible ulterior measures as an act of " intimidation calculated to deprive its acts of any merit of spontaneity," and having referred to the principle of noninterference, as set forth in the Treaty of Paris, declared that the "Protocol was destitute ot all equity," and that " strong in tho justice of her cause, and trusting in her God, Turkey had determined to ignore what had been decided without her and against her." What followed may? be > briefly summarised. On the 24th of' April, the formal declaration of war was made by the Czar,' concluding with the words, "To-day, invoking God's blessing on our brave armies, we order them across the frontier." Then came a circular addressed by Safvet Pasha to the European Powers, in which attention was drawn to the danger to Europe of'the impending conflict-—" of which the Sublime Porte =- can justly repudiate the.entire responsibility "—as a Proclamation from the Sultan. The struggle between Tsirk and Tartar, Mussulman and Muscovite, had begun. .■> - ;; , BTBIHGXH OF BULIiHUKIf TS AT SBC&4BA-

I . TIOH OF WAB. , . Although her diplomacy long threatened an appeal to arms, Bussia was not fully prepared for war when she declared it. The mobilisation of troops in the sooth had commenced towards the end of 1876, but the spring saw only four corps in the first Hue fit to take the field; the three in the second line were still incomplete; and the Whole army was more inefficient,.and numerically weaker than had.been'sup* posed. Not more than 150,000 men, in round numbers, actually crossed the Danube—a' force scarcely equal-to the accomplishment of the ends in view. Tile strategical plan was simple, and; not without merit. Adrianople, as the first-' " objective," the capital as the second, were its obvious aims. The shortest and most direct route through Varna and bj the sear coast was forbidden by the Turkish supremacy afloat, and the best, and, indeed, the only alternative, was an advance, from Bucharest as a base upon Simnitza and Sistova, thence, via Tiroova to the Balkans and across them by the/ Sbipka Pass. As collateral operations an * army in the Dobrudscha. was to cover the left flank of the .advance, while a strong force masked the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, and a second, reduced Nicopoli and protected the right. The Czar himself accompanied his legions into the field, and numerous grand dukes held important posts, the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Czar's brother-in-law, being commander •in ■ chief. J Of the Turkish strength, and of their dispositions for defence, little was known. A field army under Abdul Kerim was in existence somewhere between the four great fort* resses,. and a force of new levies was supposed to be at Widdin, but the line of the Danube was not held in any strength, nor that of the Balkans; nor were there any reserves in hand. Everything indicated that swift and vigorous action would secure an easy triumph over the supine and incapable Turks. ' :V FBBLZMIKASY TACTICS. '

But dilatoriness from the outlet characterised the Bussian movements. The delays, inevitable, in the absence of carefnl previous organisation, were increased by the lateness, of the season. Boadt con«; tinued impassable, and the swollen waters of the Danube did not subside till long after the usual date. Moreover, as much, was expected from the Army of the Do- ' brudscha. it was deemed expedient to give, Zimmermann, who commanded it, a fair start. Not til) the end of June was the Bussian army safely transported across the great river, and they still halted and hesitated, even when in full strength upon the Bulgarian soil. Zimmermann, from sheer weakness, was unable to carry out bis instructions; the Cesarewitch slowly sat down to besiege Bustchuk; no bold forward movement was made to the south j no rapid rcconuaisances we're puebed to cast or west.. At length, qpon July Q, Gourko's cavalry reached Tirnova, whence, with what was at once the first- and 1 the most brilliant exploit of the war, he dashed up to the Balkans and seized the Shipka Pass. After much delay Krudener was next detached to occupy Nicopoli, and gained it not a minute too soon. For now the Turki began to show signs of life, and a mys- l terious army moved suddenly and unexpectedly from the direction of Widdin and towards the Vid. Osman Pasha, iti

able leader, was just too late at Nicopoli, but he seized Plevna, and held it in strength. His position directly threajeqed the Bussjan line of communication's, and an attack- was hastily and imperfectly , organised to drive him out, which signally failed. This, their first serious encounter terminating in a serious reverse, seemed for the moment to paralyse the Busijan plan of campaign. 4 half-despairing Ukase called up vast reinforcement, apif , till these'could arrive cautious counieli prevailed. TOBJCI9H PItATOBIWBSS UKDEB SUCCBM,

Now, in their turn, the Turks iuflared the golden opportunity to slip by. If the Jiuasians hid been Urdy inoffenee, the Turks were yet more negligent of

the advantages offered by their first success. Osmau Pasha, by rapid pursuit, might have struck a second, and perhaps a decisive blow, but ho was satisfied to stand fast and render his entrenchments impregnable. With cnlpable, although gallant temerity, Suleiman Pasha, who had hurried to Adrianople with an army destined to check Gourko's advance, shattered his forces fruitlessly in vain attempts to retako tho bhipka, while it was obvious that his weight, thrown into tho scale either with Plevna on the left, or with Mehemet AH on the right, would have permitted movements which would certainly have compelled Gourko to retreat, and which might hove ended tho campaign. Tho army of the Quadrilateral had done nothing; Abdul Kerim, its first commander, from apathy or incompetence, had remained inactive, and his successor, Mehemet Ali, although credited with more enterprise, showed a strange disinclination to tako tho field. Meanwhile the: Russian reinforcements began to arrive, and at length, upon tho Emperor's name day, Sept. 11, a second desperate onslaught was inudc on Plevna. With murderous prodigality the Russian columns were hurled against tho Turkish redoubts only to fall back decimated and unsuccessful. Only on one flank General Skobeleff carried a portion of the works; but he .was also expelled, and this second attack bad failed more completely than the first. Both sides fought with undeniable gallantry, but the soldierlike qualities of tho Turkish troops were most conspicuous.

J* THE STAND AT PLEVHA. ■ TcSeben, the hero of Sevastopol,"was summoned to advise after this reverse'■; and the Russians, recognising the formidable strength of Plevna, resolved to reduce by investment what they hud been unable to carry by story. This, a.necessarily slow process, consumed much time* The uninterrupted influx of fresh troops enabled tho Russian Comraander-in-Chief to draw closer and closer tho encircling line, and the energy of Gourko, to whom was entrusted a large moveable force, gradually secured point after point, and rendered the isolation of Plevna more and more complete. Yet, in the early stages of the: seige, several convoys reached Osman Pasha, and the gallant garrison held out to the last. Various efforts, for the most part half-hearted, and all unsuccessful, were made to succoiir Osmau Pasha. The army of the Jantra, latterly under Suleiman Pasha, had indre; than once assumed the offensive against the Cesarewitch without substantial reault, while Mehemet AH, at or about Sofia, had endeavored to collect an army to co-operate with the garrison of Plevna in the event of a sortie in force. While, the latter hesitated, the gallant Osman, who for five months had kept in check; the flower of the Russians army, and wlio had successfully resisted both bombard*; meat and assault, was compelled,' by failing supplies, to decide whether.he would yield, or attempt to break through the ring of iron which enclosed him;.! With characteristic bravery he chose thelatter course.; and on Sunday, December 9, he made a bold effort to force his way through the investing lines. He failed ' r indeed success, except with the assistance of the Turkish armies without, was an impossibility. Assailed from the Eussian entrenchments in front, attacked in the rear by far superior forces, and himself wounded, Ghazi Osman Pasha was compelled to surrender, i

THB WINTEB CAMPAIGN

Eight well has he done his duty. 'A:few more such heroes, and Turkey might not have been in her present unfortunate position. The stubbornness and tenacity with which he has held his ground, and by threatening their line of communication, prevented the Russian advance into Rpumelia, gave Turkey time for a su-1 preme effort, which she failed to turn to account. But, on the other hand, it may be the task of the future military historian to decide whether Osman did well to lioger. withiu his lines so long after the Russians had resolved to substitute iuvestment for open attack. The Russian plan of operations following the fall of Plevna is now made plain, leaving the Servians to dispose of Widdin and Nisch, one strong Russian army will move upon the Balkans by Sofia, a second by the Sbipka and Trojan Passes, while a third, tinder the command of Todleben, undertakes the reduction of the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. The Turks, on the other hand, still show a bold front. Having abandoned the line of the Balkans, and withdrawn every available man from Bulgaria, Adrianople is made the centre of the new line of defence. It is" strongly held by formidable works, heavily armed, and hither have been directed the levies which the Porte has summoned to the field. Meanwhile, the severest winter on record for fifty years has come to check offensive movement. Ice on the Danube threatens the Russian bridges, the snow lies upon the ground, several feet deep, and the suffering in both camps in the Russian especially, is intense. *?*•»•

To'be continued.