When Germany and France crossed swords and entered upon what is known as the Franco-Prussian war, the French -rather boastfully gave out that they would be in Berlin in a month. They reckoned without their host, and so did many others, for eren the highest authorities assumed that the battle ground would be principally on" German territory. Now that war has been commenced between Russia and Turkey many people hare jumped to the conclusion that the latter will be defeated, and that Constantinople will become'the prize of llussia. This opinion is not general, howerer, and so high an authority as The Times considers it highly improb-: able tliat Russia will attempt this, and also that if she does the other great powers will not permit it. In a lengthy review of Major Uusiell's " Russian Wars with
Turkey," the following passage occurs . — "On " the whole, then, an invasion of Turkey by the Danube is a critical movement* and we are far from satisfied that, though unaided, the Turks could ndteii§n now hold Constantinople against a Russian attack. Major Russell, however, does not dwell on what, in the existing state of Europe, is the most important element in this question; we shall say only a word on it. If Constantinople, and nothing else, was to be the object of Russia in a campaign, she would most as- j suredly fail in her purpose.; the Great Powers would not allow the Imperial City to be in her hauds, and. of all places, it is the most capable of a successful defence against Russian aggression. We have not space to comment on this; it i is only necessary to read the masterly chapter of Yon Moltke upon the subject, and, we should add, the improvements in modern ordnance would be here all in the ] defender's favour, in the case of a Power that should command the sea. To sum up the conclusions, therefore, that are suggested by this great question :—The military superiority of Russia is so vast as compared with Turkey, that in the eveni of a war between them the Porte, humanly speaking, must be worsted. To invade the Empire, however, even in its decay, especially by the * line of the Danube, the only way open for a real attack, is an operation of extreme difficulty 5 the jealousies of Europe, space, and climate would combine to check the assailant's progress; they would perhaps render it wholly nugatory. That Russia could conquer Turkey, even if she had no ally, appears, on the whole, to b# very doubtful; and it is far from certain, as affairs now stand, that Constantinople would fall before a Russian army, even were the
Turk its only defender. But if the city were threatened by Russia, the Great Powers would at once interfere; and their interference would, "beyond question, preserve the place from, any real danger, and probably send the invaderi behind the Balkans. In any case, there fore, a war with Turkey must, as far as we can. ace, be for the Czar a dangerous and unprofitable affair; and the grand prize which only would repay his efforts would assuredly.;never come into his hands. Peace, accordingly, even from her point of view, would seem to be Russia's true policy; the game of arms would not be worth the cost, in her own position and in that of Europe, and she will better promote even her own end? by waiting for what must happen; at last— the final dissolutionoosf s the Ottoman Power. This efent cannot be far distant'; the alliances which have sustained the decaying fabric are, we have seen, not founded in the nature, of things, or necessarily likely to be permanent; the independence of the tottering Power, as we have pointed "put, ,has been long a phrase, and forces are . now developing, themselves which must ultimately :cause the Turk ••in;'. Europe to be no -longer the holder of Empire.'' The above,.written before the War com.menced, indicated-that\so. long as; the Russians in their Aggressions ■ upon Turkey confined; themselves to carrying out their avowed object, namely, the amelioration of .the condition of the Christian population of Turkeyvand refrained from any act that could be regarded as menacing to bther powers, Great Britain's .policy would beif non-intervention. : The Government are still prepared to carry out that policy, as seen; by the news per cable. Russia may 'make the threatened reprisals .• on Egypt, but so long as the road to India remains untouched England;" preserves a strict neutrality. The dispatch of a squadron to. Port Said is a precautionary measure; The Suez Canal is the^ real road to India, and will have to bel protected, and if England should,be dragged into: war it: will probably not be alone, for what would involve her would involve other great Powers. . The policy of the Government; .seems to be popular, the clamour for war haying abated, as evidenced by the majority against Mr Gladstone'? motion.
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Thames Star, Volume VII, Issue 2607, 17 May 1877, Page 2
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823Untitled Thames Star, Volume VII, Issue 2607, 17 May 1877, Page 2
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