Non-Stop Attacks On Milne Bay

Taranaki Daily News, 29 August 1942, Page 3

Non-Stop Attacks On Milne Bay

Allied bombers plaster enemy in New Guinea. London, Aug. 27. The new Japanese landing on the south-east coast of New Guinea is meeting with strong Allied air attacks. Details of the land fighting are not yet available but it is known that Allied troops are at grips with the enemy. The Japanese may be trying to outflank the mountains that separate Port Moresby from their bases on the north coast. In the first day's operations in the new battle area Allied planes struck at the Japanese in non-stop relays, laying a continuoiis barrage on Japanese troop concentrations. invasion barges, stores and petrol dumps. "The Japanese attempt to take Milne Bay, New Guinea, cannot be divorced from the action in the Solomons, ' the Sydney Morning Herald war correspondent states. If our forces in the Solomons go on to other successes and the recapture of the whole gfoup Milne Bay would be useless to the Japanese and -any garrison they might establish tliere Would be cut off. On the other hand if they successfully countered our move in the Solomons possession of Milne Bay would ada tremendously to the strength of their grip in the South-west Pacific. Hard to Hold. However, it is by no means certain that the enemy will succeed in taking Milne Bay. Even' should they gain an initial success they will have difficulty in holding it without strong air protection. There are no topographical obstacles excepting lak'es and rivers between Milne Bay and Port Moresby along the southern New Guinea Coast. The scale on which land fighting is at present taking place at Milne Bay is not known, but it is expected here that the next 48 hours will decide whether the Japanese have sent a boy to do a man's job.

"Softening" Process. The general picture of the newest enemy expedition suggests that restricted forces in the landing at Milne Bay might be intended to "soften" the area for a larger invasion force at a later date. The threat to Port Moresby now emphasised would then become the grave difficulty of dislodging the Japanese once they landed, it is pointed out in the Sydney Telegraph, which says: "Invariably once they hit the cover of the jungle the Japanese are' difficult to root out. They have proved this in the Kokoda area. Their limpet-like regard for even minor gains makes them hard even for. a superior force to dislodge." The advantages of Milne Bay to the enemy are assessed as being: (1) A gain .in position for the Solomons struggle, which the Japanese must expect to grow in intensity. (2) To ensvu-e control of Torres Strait, discounting the protective value of Port Moresby to the Allies. (3) To place long-range enemy planes, both lahd-based and water craft, within close striking distance of the Australian mainland.

Saving "Face." "Face" is not the least important of Japan's reasons for seeking a quick naval decision in the Solomons and for fresh offensive moves, declares Major Feilding Eliot, New York Herald-Tribune military commentator, analysing Japan's motives for counter-attacking. He says: "Our successful attack on the ■■ Solomons undoubtedly has had a great effect on all Qriental people among whom the Japanese propaganda has been busy representing that the Japanese are invincibly superior to all westemers, Further, the Japanese needs iri other "theatres, such as a contemplated attack on Russia and India, may call for a quick reversal of the situation in the Solomons. "The Japanese may feel that our lodgment in the Solomons is obviously only the first step of an offensive directed against enemy bases in New Guinea and New Britain and we must be eliminated before they have a free hand for their major effort elsewhere. If the Japanese have decided to risk the whole or the major part of their fleet in an attempt to recover the lost ground in the Solomons their decision has been reached after carefully weighing all the factors."