SINGAPORE BASE

Taranaki Daily News, 26 September 1940, Page 7

SINGAPORE BASE

UNITED STATES' NEED LOOKING TO THE FUTURE PUHING BRAKE ON TOKIO New York, Sept. 1. In the tense strategic outlook confronting the United States Navy two dominant factors dwarf all others, writes Captain Frederick . Oliver, a former officer in the United States navy, in the Christian Science Monitor.

First is the almost absolute necessity for naval allies in the Pacific, should the United States ever expect to do more than hold the eeas nearest its shores. Without allies the United States cannot overbalance Japan's strategic advantages without making heavy sacrifices. Second is the question whether any ; allies will be available in the Pauflc. France already has disappeared as a factor powerful enough to tip the balance. And Britain is tied up in Europe. ^ As a result of latest events, the United States sees French islands being cut adrift from their former status; Japan *. becoming ever more imperative; and a situation developing that makes Singapore of prime importance to any curb on Japanese expansion in the Pacific. . Japan's Strength. Without allies, or without bases closer to the scene, the United States pitted against Japan would face a long and exhausting offensive war. Japan, intrenched behind its strategically located mandated islands, occupies a position oi great strength. Japan's initial strategy would be that of the "limited objective" in which the 1 Philippines and Guam.. and possibly other territory, such as the NetherlandS East Indies, would be seized. Japan could then take advantage of its ldeal geographic location to fight a defensiye war. This to be interspersed with suffi- ' cient raids on the, American fleet's vital llines of communication focusing on the } west coast, Hawaii, and the P anama Canal, to prevent the United States from concentrating its entire naval strength in projecting a campaign across the Pacific, To come to grips with Japan, the United States will have to cross the wide Pacific. Japan is 4500 miles from San Francisco and 3400 from Hawaii. This. deplorable situation arises from the fact that the United States has failed to take the elementary/ precaution of providing even second class- bases in the Far East for its fleet.

United States Naval Strategy. The entire naval strategy of the United States is based on the safety of the Panama Canal. The first class naval base which has been constructed at Pearl Harbour. Hawaii, affords control of the eastern Pacific, and security for the western coast of the United States and Alaska, but it cannot protect the Philippines or Guam, and as far as the western Pacific is concerned, is merely a jumping-off place for the fleet. Should the fleet manage to crawl unscathed across the Pacific, using as "stepping-stones" one hastily and inadequately equipped base after another, it will then have to pause until such time as a properly prepared base has been made available, because the security of the fleet is inextricably dependent upon having such a haven in the vicinity. Such a campaign is in marked contrast to the method that could be used were tlie United States allied with Britain. It is quite., a different matter fqr a fleet to batter its way across a great ocean to arrive at an anchorage- which must then, at an untoward expenditure of time and effort, . be converted into an operating base. and for the same fleet to arrive at a friendly port where needed facilities already exist. - j And what a haven Singapore wouid prove to be! Adequate repair. and supply facilities and huge dry docks repose in sheltered Seletar Harbour, protected by powerful fortifications. Britain has realised its ambition of having a Gibraltar in the Yar East by building one of the most thoroughly equipped naval bases in the world on the shore of Johore Strait. v Distance From Japan. Unless supported by an intermediate base, the 2500 miles separating Singapore from Japan precludes any serious threat by the Japanese navy on the British naval base. Upon arrival at Singapore, if not before, tlie United States fleet would b« augmented by naval units of its ally. This force would Operate against Japan from the south, where the latter's vital lines of communication could readily be assailed. These operations would be an entirely different matter from the arduous and risky operations that would have to be undertaken. by the United States acting alone, either via the bleak wastes and terrible weather of the Aleutian Islands, or in attempting to force a passage through the islands mandated to Japan. . . •' . j Japan is well aware of the serious situ- | ation in which it would be placed by an j alliance between the United States gnd Great Britain, and tlie possibility of such :a coalition for their mutual protection in ; tlie Far East is probably all that rei 5 trains Japan from immediately assuming the "protection" of the Netherlands East Indies. , And by the same token, the United States will do well to guavd its own inlcrests in that area by just such an uni derstanding. with Great Britain.