THE “ARGUS” CASE.

Taranaki Daily News, 13 April 1921, Page 5

THE “ARGUS” CASE.

FORTUNE-TELLING ILLEGAL, AN IMPORTANT JUDGMENT, PREVIOUS DECISION UPSET. By Telegraph.—Press Association. Auckland, Last Night. The conviction of Charles L. Copeland, the father of “Argus,” for undertaking to tell fortunes, imposed some months ago by Mr. Poynton, S.M., was upheld by Mr. Justice Adams at the Supreme Court. Copeland’s appeal against the conviction was based on the ground that there was no intention to deceive.

His Honor said the magistrate’s opinion that an intention to deceive was not an ingredient of the offence charged was correct. His Honor’s decision, therefore, reversed the judgment by Mr. Justice Edwards, upon which the appellant relied. In his judgment, Mr. Justice Adams said that section 261 of the Crimes Act dealt with three separate classes of offences, and for the purpose of this appeal the section should be read ’■ “Everyone is liable to one year’s imprisonment with hard labor who undertakers to tell fortunes.” Treating the case as one of a first impression, and reading the section in that way, there would appear to be no difficulty. The word “undertakes” had no fraudulent or sinister meaning. Counsel for appellant had admitted that to succeed in his appeal he must show that an intent to deceive was an ingredient in the offence, and he relied upon the decision of Mr. Justice Edwards in McGrath v. Vine, that there must be such an intention. That was a strong decision in appellant’s favor. His Honor had considered it with the care due to all the decisions of that learned Judge, but he had been unable to follow it. The mischief intended to be remedied by the section in question, continued His Honor, was an injurious effect upon the mind of credulous persons by attempts to pierce the veil of the future by predictions not based upon ascertainable facts or according to reason, and that mischief was as great in the case of an honest deviner as in the case of a fraudulent charlatan. In His Honor’s opinion the offence of undertaking to tell fortunes was complete when a person, whether honestly believing in hia power to do so or intending to deceive, undertook to tell another person’s fortune. The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs (£lO 10s).