FOCH AND HIS VICTORY.

Taranaki Daily News, 29 January 1921, Page 10

FOCH AND HIS VICTORY.

‘MAKE THE PEACE YOU WANT.”

VAIN APPEALS TO THE “TIGER.” HOW HAIG SECURED UNITY OF COMMAND. Marshal Foch has at last broken silence, and in an interview given by M. Jules Sauerwein, the Paris Matin, on November 8, has described in detail the part he played in and before the armistice, and during the Peace Conference. The facts are of such capital interest and have so important a bearing on the sequel to the Peace Conference as to merit textual quotation. Marshal Foch said:— “An armistice is a temporary laying down of arms, a cessation of hostilities which has the discussion of peace as its object by putting the Governments that have agreed to it in such a position that, they can impose the peace they have decided on. Cid the armistice that I signed on November 11, 1918, accomplish this object? Yes, because on June 28 after seven months’ negotiations, Germany accepted all the conditions of the Allies. I told the Premier, M. Clemenceau: ‘Here is my armistice. You can now make what peace you wish. I am in a position to impose it.’ If the peace was not a good one, is that my fault? I have done my work, and it is for the politicians and the heads of Government to do theirs. “I had been thinking of peace for a long time. As early as September, 1918, I wrote to M. Clemenceau, and said to him: ‘We are drawing near the end of the war. Send me a representative of the Foreign Office to inform me of the peace conditions which you are preparing in order that our armies can occupy all the regions that will serve as a guarantee for the execution of the treaty you will be making.’ M. Clemenceau answered: ‘That does not concern you.’”

HISTORIC TRAIN MEETING. At this stage of his narrative M. Sauerwein points out that in speaking of Mr. Clemenceau, Marshal Foch shows no bitterness, but merely states the facts. In reply to a question as to the exact conditions of the armistice, the Marshal continued:— “I must admit that when I saw Erzberger and the two others, accompanied by a naval officer whose name I forget, come into the railway wagon*l had a feeling of emotion, j said to myself: ‘That is the German Empire. Well, as it is coming to me I shall treat is as it merits. It is beaten. I shall be firm, cold, but without animosity or brutality.’ For the fact is that they were really thoroughly beaten. I reached Rethondes on the evening of November 1, and my train was placed on a siding. The next day a train backed in slowly — the German train. A board was passed between the two trains, as it was very muddy. A moment latier Weygand came in and told me that the German plenipotentiaries were there. “Erzberger was the first to come forward, and in a rather indistinct, voice presented the others to me. A translation was made, and I said to them: ‘Gentlemen, have you your papers? We will examine their validity.’ They showed me papers signed ‘Max von Baden-’ We considered them satisfactory. I turned to Erzberger, and said to him: ‘What- do you want from me?’ ‘We have come,’ he replied, ‘to learn the conditions on which you will grant an armistice.’ In the neighboring car. where I had my office, we sat down. Admiral ,Wemyss was on my right, Weygand on my left, and Erzberger, between Oberdorff and Winterfeldt, in front of me. Weygand read out the conditions, that were translated as they went along. I Watched them collapse under the blow. Winterfeldt was very pale, and I think he cried

PLEA OF BOLSHEVISM. “Immediately after they had been read I added: ‘Gentlemen, I leave you the text. You have 72 hours in which to reply. Between then and now you can make me detailed observations.’ Then Erzberger became pathetic. Tn the name of pity,’ he said to me, ‘do not wait for these 72 hours. Stop hostilities to-day? Our armies are a prey to anarchy. Bolshevism is threatening them. This Bolshevism may gain Germany and the whole of Central Europe, and even France itself-’ I did not budge, and replied to him: ‘I do not know in what state your armies are. I only know the condition of mine. Not only can I not stop the offensive, but I am giving orders to maintain it with redoubled energy.’ Then Winterfeldt spoke. He had notes before him, and had carefully prepared his statements. ‘lt is essential,’ he said to me, ‘that our staffs should meet and discuss together the details of execution. How can they communicate if hostilities continue? I ask you, for technical reasons, to stop hostilities? I replied to him: ‘These technical discussions will be quite in order in 72 hours. Until then the offensive will continue? They withdrew, and for my part I made a last appeal to the valor and energy of all the Allied armies. All the Commanders-in-Chief replied enthusiastically: ‘Rely on us. We shall not stop a moment? “Passing over the three days that followed, the Germans attempted to drown me by a sea of papers, which Weygand received and transmitted to me. They were great, my collaborators, and they knew their business, and when someone said, when it. was suggested to send Weygand to Poland, that he had never held a chief command, I only replied, ‘Don’t worry—he’ll know what there is to be done? “On the evening of the 10th I reminded them that the date of the signature was the following day. They received a long tplegram from Hindenburg instructing them to sign, but meanwhile revolution had broken out in Berlin, and I asked them whom they now represented. They showed me a cipher telegram from President Ebert, signed r - I don’t know why, ‘606-’ This telegram confirmed their power. I had not much sleep on the night between the 10th and the 11th. I rested from midnight till one. and then the Germans arrived. I made them a concession of 5000 machine 1 guns and some motor lorries. That was 1 all. At 5.15 they signed in large wriIting, which' betrayed their fury. At seven I left for Paris, and at nine I was lin the presence of M. Clemenceau. THE “TIGER’S” ATTITUDE. “He was not specially amiable, and I asked v hat concession I had made to i the Germans. All that is not of great importance. I told him that he would have to fire the guns at 11 o'clock to I announce the end of hostilities. He I wanted it to be done at four in the laftirpMiaj when he was mounting the -- --

platform at the Chamber. I told him that the Allied armies had been warned since night by my order that the last shot would be fired at 11, and that everyone would know it. At this moment M. Barthou, M- Nail, and other leaders came in and supported me. He agreed to have the gun fired r.t 11. I said to him: ‘My work is over, and yours is beginning.’ ” To the. question whether it was not Marshal Foeh’s duty to give advice as to peace conditions, he replied: “I don’t know whether it was my duty, but at any rate I understood it as such, though I'had hardly any rights. I often saw M. Clemeifeeau, and gave him three written notes. The peace that it was proposed to sign—l spoke of it to you at the time—seemed to me a bad one. I summarised it in the words: ‘Neither frontiers nor pledges? For the safety of France the Rhine frontier was essential as a military frontier and not as a political frontier. As to the reparation due to France, I asked for the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine until the complete execution of the treaty, because in my opinion that was the only means of obtaining reparation. In April—on the 7*th. I think—l succeeded in being heard by Ministerial Council. I had vainly asked to be heard by the French peace delegation, and had been refused. “I remember well this Ministerial Council. I came there with M. Jules Cambon and M. Tardieu. As I had put my observations in writing I gave a copy to each Minister, and then spoke, developing my thesis—that if there were to be no guarantees there would be no security. M. Poincare supported me—the only one, I must admit. After that We were asked to withdraw, and on leaving I said to M. Tardieu, in the presence of M. Jules Cambon. ‘There will perhaps, come a day when a High Court will judge us because France will never understand why we allowed failure to come out of victory. On that day I am determined to appear with an easy conscience and with my papers in order?

THE BIG THREE SNUB. “I made one more attempt at the plenary session of May 6,1 when the Allied Powers were handed the treaty that had been concluded overnight. I once again stated my view. No one said a word, and the sitting rose. As we were taking tea in the next room I said to M. Clemenceau: ‘I should like an answer? I saw him talk for a moment with animation with Mr- Wilsoii and Mr. Lloyd George. Then he returned and stated to me: ‘There is no reply? I answered: ‘M. le President, I am wondering whether I should go with you to-morrow to Versailles. I have the gravest question on my conscience in my existence. I repudiate the treaty, and in sitting by you I am determined not to share the responsibility of it? “M. Clemenceau was upset and urged me to come. That evening he sent me M. Jean Dupuy, who spoke with real emotion. Then I argued: ‘The Allied Governments are appearing before the Germans, to impose a treaty on them. Is il possible that they can appear there without the leader of their armies? I have not the right- It would be to weaken them before the enemy.’ At Versailles I was beside M. Klotz, the Finance Minister. When the ceremony was over, I said to him: TVith such a treaty you can go to the Treasury of the German Empire and be paid in monnaie de singe? M. Klotz replied bitterly to me: ‘That is not what lam used to? ‘You get used to it,’ I answered. “Those were the people io whom I had said: ‘Make the peace you want and I will guarantee to impose it? ” In reply to the suggestion that he had not been very generously treated by the chief of the French Government, Marshal Foch replied: ‘I don’t know whether he liked m.*, but he hardly showed it. I remember a War Council that took place in London on March 14th, 1918. I had been made. Commander-in-Chief of the Army of manoeuvre, that was hardly in existence. At this Council I asked the English to collaborate with me in forming this army. Field-Marshal Haig declared, in the name of the British Government, which was represented principally by Mr. Lloyd George, that it was impossible. I wanted to reply vigorously. ‘Hold your tongue,’ said* Clemenceau energetically, to me- ‘lt’s I who speak in the name of the French Government, and I declare that I accept Field-Mar-shal Haig’s reply? A GRIM PROPHECY.*

“The next day, when the council was on the point of separating, I spoke, and this time I was not silenced. I stated that a formidable offensive was preparing, and added: ‘I know the battles of the Allied armies. I have taken part in them on the Marne and in Italy. These should be the various points of liaison; these should be the understandings; these should be the precautions, and so forth. I announce to you that nothing is ready to resist the offensive, and there may be a disaster? I must admit they were moved, and a few days later, at Campiegne and then at Doul- - they remembered me.

“At Doullens were present Lord Milner, Field-Marshal Haig, MM. Poincare, Clemenceau, Loucheur, and General Petain. I was not satisfied. From what I learnt Petain was proposing to retreat on Paris and Haig to the sea. • That meant the door open to the Germans, and defeat- Field-Marshal Haig, supported by Lord Milner, said that a responsible chief and unity of command were essential. I was proposed. ‘We might,’ said M. Clemenceau, ‘give Marshal Foch the command of the armle’ operating round Amiens?’ It was FieldMarshal Haig who opposed this by stating that there was only one sensible solution of the Allied armies on the Western Front. M. Clemenceau gave way, and the decision was made. “At the luncheon that followed M. Clemenceau said to me: ‘Well, you have got the position that you wanted? Then I rather lost patience, and rep’-ed: ‘What, you give me a lost battle and ask me to re-establish the situation. I aec/pt, and you consider that y.m are making me a present! *i. need al! my candor to accept ;n such conditions.’”