PRICE OF SEA POWER.

Taranaki Daily News, 5 January 1920, Page 5

PRICE OF SEA POWER.

GREAT BRITAIN'S SACRIFICES. Lbndon, October 17. Even to-day it is rather more than probable that neither in the King's dominions nor in the countries of our Allies does a true conception generally exist of the enormous sacrifices of material which were made by the Old Country in keeping open the sea communications for the nations banded together to "squash the Hun" and his abettors. Few parsons, indeed, were aware until the recent publication of the British Admiralty's official return that over one thousand vessels flying the White Ensign—either warships or auxiliaries — were destroyed bv the eneniv between August 4, 1914, and November 11, 1918, when the Armistice wa3 signed. That return shows that the British Fleet suffered losses aggregating 2,646,000 gross tons. In addition to this our merchant navy was deprived of over nine million gross tons, so that all told the part Great Britain took in the war by sea cost her somewhere in the neighborhood of twelve million tons of shipping.

Bearing in mind the fact that the Old Country's record in annual output of shipping stands at approximately two and a quarter million tons, some idea of the injury she sustained in devoting all her maritime resources to the common cause may be obtained. Her aggregate loss of shipping was equivalent to the output of all the shipyards of the United Kingdom over a period of five years, aud "fai" years at that —years when there was no "ca' canny" brake on the workers and no delays due to shortage in men or material. That cal-culation-deals merely with ships, and ignores the human penalty incurred. Upwards of 33,000 officers and men of the Royal Navy died, and the subnlarine campaign resulted in the death of 15,000 merchant seamen. Sea-power was triumphantly vindicated, but the price paid for victory was heavy indeed. During the war we lost in warships and auxiliaries a tonnage exceeding that of the entire Fleet put in commission on August 4, 1914. Happily for us we possessed a considerable "margin of safety," though events proved most conclusively that the number of small craft, and especially destroyers, was far too small, in view of the preparations which Germany had made for a war of attrition by submarine and mine. Throughout the period the enemy was prosecuting this war, naval construction was continued with energy. Warships displacing 2,000,000 tons were built at an expenditure of between £250,000,000 and £300,000,000. ' In that way losses were made good, and we emerged from the struggle stronger in naval fighting power than ever, but relatively weak in mercantile carrying power owing to our inability to keep pace with the losses sustained in this department of seapower.

Some very interesting facts emerge from the official return. When war began Great Britain's naval experts apparently were "set" in the notion that the submarine and the mine would play only a relatively small part in the war at sea, and that the gun would be the dominant factor. So far as the Grand Fleet was concerned, it is true that submarine and mine did it no great harm, but very heavy toll was taken of other sections of the Navy, not, as was expected, by the gun, but by mine and torpedo. Of the thousand and more ships of the Royal Navy destroyed during the war, only eighty-five were lost in "action," the reference being presumably to gun action, though it is not clear by the return that the eighty-five ships do not include vessels .which'were sunk during fights by running foul of mines or crossing the track of torpedoes.

For the most part the vessels which fell to submersible craft were cither of slow speed or were steaming slowly at the time of attack. Every incident of the war has, indeed, emphasised the importance of speed, and especially in countering the submarine. Of modern battleships the enemy only secured one —the Audacious. He destroyed by various means thirteen cruisers, but they were for the most part old and slow; a dozen light cruisers were lost, most of them being of up-to-date and efficient types: but those losses bear an inconsiderable ratio to the number of attacks made upon such vessels, which, in the performance of their duties, were continually exposed. As was also to be expected, large numbers of smaller craft, sloops, destroyers, trawlers and drifters, fell victims to the enemy's campaign, for the very nature of their work kept them continually in danger zones, and often compelled them to become more or less stationary targets for the enemy's submarines, or take the maximum risks where his mines were concerned.