The Daily News. FRIDAY, AUGUST 9, 1918 THE VALUE OF STRATEGY.

Taranaki Daily News, 9 August 1918, Page 4

The Daily News. FRIDAY, AUGUST 9, 1918 THE VALUE OF STRATEGY.

In warfare there are two main factors in achieving success, other things being equal, namely, organising ability and strategy. For nearly half a century German militarists have been organising on a grand scale for "The Day," and since that day arrived they have been testing the results on a scale that has been unparalleled in military history. To-day the results are apparent, for the German armies, which have been vehemently proclaimed as invincible, | are daily retreating and suffering great losses. Recently the Kaiser endeavored to hearten up his defeated forces in characteristic fashion. "It is not," he said in his message to the army and navy, "the arrival of Americans, and the numerical superiority of the enemy, that will win victory, but the spirit innate in the German soldiers and sailors." An officiallycreated spirit cannot stand a succession of reverses, and it is only a question of time when the breaking point is reached. The truth, .we. were .told,, is-slowly.

percolating lo the front Hup, and I the Germans are hog-inning to hear I that the despised Americans are beating the, best Prussian troops; also that the. Crown Prince is retiring instead of advancing, and that Prince Ivuppreclil's offensive against the British is being delayed because of this disaster. It is interesting to examine the cause or causes of this disaster. At the outset it is apparent that trouble exists behind the scenes in the German camp—not only trouble, but Readership rivalry between the erstwhile idol Hindenburg and the assertive Ludendorff. • During the past few months the disappearance of Hindenburg's name from all prominence in the direction ofs military operations has been the subject of much speculation, and when the report of his death was cabled the explanation was seemingly given. It turns out, however, that it was only the reputation of Germany's last hope that had passed away, giving place to the more spectacular qualities of Ludendorff. If this is correct, Hin-1 denburg must now feel well satisfied at not being associated with such a serious disaster to the German armies, although an agitation has been engineered by Ludendorff to make Hindenburg the scapegoat as soon as things went wrong. In other words, Ludendorff grasps all the credit when success comes his way, but thrusts the blame on his rival when disaster occurs. It is, perhaps, worthy of note that the Crown Prince has been directly associated with all the worst reverses that have befallen the German forces, and whether it was this "Jonah" who had a hand in Ludendorff's overshadowing Hindenburg will probably be known in the future. The main point deserving of attention is the rivalry between the strategist and the organiser. How Ludendorff, who was Hindenburg's subordinate, became the dominant chief has puzzled many students of the war. Vast operations require expert and bold organising power, as well as a vast capacity for work, while the strategist views the whole position from both sides, anticipates moves and treats the operations as a scientific game of chess. Hence it is obvious that it is next to impossible for a great organiser to be a great strategist, so that unless there is absolute cooperation between the two success is most unlikely to ensue. Ludendorff was, admittedly, an able organiser, and, as the righthand man of Hindenburg, made an excellent combination, but he was ambitious, and devoted his energies and skill to become the brightest constellation in the military sphere. That he succeeded in eclipsing Hindenburg was a grave misfortune, for lie lacked the powers of strategy which could alone bring success. His influence over the Kaiser in favor of the offensive was one of the best service to the Allies, but events have proved that the strategist was right, and Germany to-day is suffering accordingly. What success Ludendorff gained was due, not to his strategy, but to the blunders of his opponents. His failure to take into account an Allied counter-offensive proved his _ lack of high strategy. The Allies have no cause to regret the dominance of Ludendorff, ,for it leaves General Foch in a much better position than he could ever have anticipated with Hindenburg in supreme command. The full effect of the unity in the Allied command will now be noticeable, so that the fifth year of the war opens with every prospect of bringing the struggle to a close.