WESTERN FRONT.

Taranaki Daily News, 9 May 1918, Page 6

WESTERN FRONT.

THF CANADIAN ARMY. Ottawa, May 7. Canadian Headquarters, reports that the Canadian Army has taken over three more miles of front in the vicinity of Neuville-Vitasse. Meroatel, and BoisleuxSt Mare—Aus.-X.Z. Cable Assoc. (These villages are south of Arras.) ARTILLERY ACTIVITY.' Received May 8, 2.35 pjn. London, May 7. A French communique reports reciprocal activity north and south of the Awe. Minor operations were carried out west of Hangard.—Aust.-N.Z. Cable Assoc.

CAMBRAI REPULSE. REASONS FOR THE SET-BACK, POINTS FROM SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DESPATCH. (New Zealand Times Special Correspondeat) London, March 6. Most people long ago came to the conclusion that the failure of our thrust at Cambrai last November was attibutable to the fact that no one took the tanks very seriously. Sir Douglas Haig's despatch (issued to-night) shows that this popular explanation of our failure must be revised. The British dispositions appear to have been as complete as the circumstances of the moment permitted, and it was not through any want of foresight that we were unable to exploit the early success the t,anks attained. If any very large force had been concentrated behind the Cambrai front, surprise would have been impossible, and. surprise waß the essence of sueceess so far as the tanks were concerned. Moreover, Sir Douglas Haig leads us to understand that he had no great reserves available to draw upon. His armies had been fighting strenuously all through the summer, only part of the lossses had been replaced, and, as he rather pointedly remarked, "many re-cently-arrived drafts still far from being fully trained, were included in the ranks of the armies-" Knowing the limitations of Sir Douglas Haig's resources, it is amazing that the authorities at Home should ever have countenanced the ringing of bells in London simply on t3ie strength of the early successes which the tanks attained. Recognising the risks of the enterprise, Sir Douglas Haig seems to have hesitated to the last about ordering an advance, and he seems to have been influenced in some degree by the necessity of creating a diversion on behalf of our hard-pressed Italian Ally. The Cambrai thrust succeeded in this if it failed in jpme other particular?..

THE SET-BACK. Sir Douglas Haig deals rather gener-. ally with the circumstances leading up to our evacuation of the ground which was won. It is clear that tho Germans effected a local surprise on tne British right, ano. nothing but tho splendid gallantry of our war-worn reserves prevented a serious disaster. Orders which afierwards fell into our hands showed that the Germans were working on a very lTold and ambitious plan, which aimed at nothing leas than the capture and destruction of the British forces in the Cimbrai salient. All they actually achieved was the recovery of a few square miles of country, for even their own guns which they recovered were put out of action before they were left behind-

Nevertheless, there are omissions from tit" despatch in the form at least in wJiich it is presented to the public, which are rather striking and somewhat unsatisfactory. People are complaining of a quite unnecessary lack of candour in the paragraphs enumerating the results of the fighting. Full particulars are given about the number of prisoners and guns which we captured, but nothing is said about the number of British guns and British prisoners taken by the enemy, though it is known that ths former considerably exceeded our own captures. Why there should be this reserve about facts with which the enemy is neeesarily well acquainted is very difficult to determine, unless it be one more illustration of the incurable tendency of the official mind to present only the bright side of the picture. Sir Douglas Haig at least shows no disposition to withhold due credit to the Cnemy when it is deserved. On the contrary, he makes pointed reference to the gallantry of a German officer at Flesquieres, where many of the hits upon our tanks were obtained by a German artilllery officer who remained alone at his battery and served a field gun single-handed until killed at his post. "The great bravery of this officer," Sir Douglas Haig writes, "aroused the admiration of all ranks."

A LESSON FOR OURSELVES. Reading between the lines of the dispatch the only conclusion to be drawn is that the set back we sustained was due to a certain less of moral (to which all troops are liable) on the British right. Sir Douglas Haig's dispositions appear to have been absolutely correct, and even to have been justified by what occurred. He expected the brunt of the enemy's counter-attacks to fall in the north, at Bourlon, and in the east. That is where they actually did fall, and though the Germans came on in wave after wave they failed. But in the south, where the attack was comparatively feeble, it succeeded, and the indications are that the result was as much a surprise to the enemy as to our own men. Sir Douglas Haig tells us that in the Gonnelieu sector the swiftness with which the advance of the enemy's infantry followed the opening of his bombardment appears to have overwhelmed our troops almost before they had realised that the attack hail begun. No steadily advancing barrage gave warning of the approach of the assaulting columns, and the Germans crept forward covered by an early morning mist, and assisted by a great number of low-flying aeroplanes, which rained machine-gun fire into our infantry. Surprises of this kind are always difficult to provide against, and the fact is one which we ought to take to heart at the present moment. For if the Germans are to meet with any real success on the Western front this spring, it is by surprise alone that they can hope to achieve it. It is satisfactory to know that during the last three months we have been showing ourselves alive to this danger, and have taken steps to make our defensive preparations very much more thorough than they ever were before.