A GERMAN OFFENSIVE.

Taranaki Daily News, 1 March 1918, Page 2

A GERMAN OFFENSIVE.

«. .. TO WIN THE WAR. ALLIES MUST HOLD OX TILL AMERICA IS KEADI'. Eighteen months more of war, ant' then certain victory for me Allies! Jin 1 there is a proviso which is very signili cant, and it is this-provided that tht Allied armies can resist thy furious on slaught for which the Germans are noy. preparing', and "hold the fort" unti America's embattled million- are h : France, striking the blow that will en sure triumph for the cause of Libertj and Justice. Such is the deliberate and reasonec opinion expressed by Mr. Frank Simonds editor of The Xew York Tribune, anc author of "The World War," etc. Writing in December last Mr- Simonds said: Rather more than a year ago I expressed the opinion that the war would last at feast four years. 'Hie recent progress of events satisfies me that wi are to ace a struggle at least five year? long, and that no decision is likely during 1918, nor until such time' as the United States can put a million of men on European soil, with proper provision for maintaining this number in the fir-ing-line. The conviction that the war will go at least five years rests upon the change in the situation resulting from t*e complete disappearance of Russia from the battle line. Allied victory :ii four years was conditional upon the mutual efforts of France, Britain, Russia, and Italy, all operating at full power against the Central Powers. L now Kussia has disappeared, Rouroania must disappear, an .1 the war becomes a contest between two grflups of Powers, comparatively equal in numbers, and will remain so until the Unitec'. States ia able to ibreak the deadlock by supplying sufiieient numbers to give her Allies the numerical superiority permanently. The first effect of the Russian defection must be recognised in. the events which have taken place in Northern Italy and in Northern France. The Russian collapse has provided Germany with a strategic reserve which has been lacking to her ever since her failure before Verdun. This strategic reserve has enabled her to take the offensive in Italy and to carry on a conntei offensive before Cnmbrai —both of item more considerable offensive efforts than have been made by the Germans in nearly two yearsGERMAN PURPOSE CLEAR. In my judgment, the Allies may bo compelled to stand on the defensive throughout the whole of next year, while every sign points to. a renewal of the German effort to achieve a decision in advance of the arrival of the main masses of the United States armies It is necessary to understand the German purpose. Ludendorff expressed it very clearly the other day when he said that in modem war—that is, in a contest between whole people--.—a. military decision on the battlefield is unlikely The real \iciory is attained by the wearing out of the will and the spirit of the weaker nation by the stronger. This has happened in Russia. This the Germans hope will happen in Italy They expect that defeat will break the spirit of Italy, that disintegration within the Savoy monarchy will follow the lines of the disintegration, in the Romanoff empire, and that domestic revolution and disorder will bring Italy to a separate peace as they have brought Russia. In such a case it is certain that the next German operation will be directed against the French. A DESPERATE FUSTAL DRIVE. In the course of 1017 Germany has enptured an enormous amount of war material from the Russians, and an equally vast amount from the Italians. She has added greatly to her stocks of munitions and of guns. All these resources will enable her to make a desperate final drive against Franco this winter or next spring, while the Austrian troops will suffice to hold the grains in Italy, to check Sarrail'* army in the Balkans, and probably to supply certain Austrian, German, and Hungarian divisians of picked troops for the Western campaign. The. population of France, Italy, and Great, Britain, including the British white colonies, is about equal to i.hnt of the Central Powers, without Turkey, while the native troops of British and French colonies about offset Turkish numbers. But the Italians can use only a minor percentage of their numbers on their present front, and are unlikely now to consent«to the transfer of Italian troops to France, while the French and the British are handicapped by the necessity of sending many of their troops to save Italy. All things considered, it seems, to me certain that the next campaign will see Germany on the offensive on the Western front, where all military authorities, German and Allied alike, agree the war will be won and lost. THE KAISER'S LAST CHiAXCE. The element of time-remains with the Allies. Not only do the European enemies of Germany possess an equal number of men, but they have behind them the resources and man-power of the United States, which, now that llus sia has disappeared, i--. (lie "rentes!, of all countries in the war. If the >:■ mans fail to aehicw a .lection, if they fail to accentuate the war-weariness in France sufficiently to bring the Freu -'i to a separate peace by their offensive of next spring, they will be in a far worse state than at any moment durin? the war. because they w,ll have used up that strategic reserve supplied by the Russian defection, and they will' have no reserve at the moment when the American army is taking its place, at least a million strong, on the Western battle line. But for the arrival of that army the Allies must, wait, and di-rinsr the period in which they are waiting they will unquestionably have to face the fiercest German attack of the war. Moreover, it seems to me that wise policy would dictate that tin Allies should wait during 1018. and in the main carry on a defensive war, because there is the obvious danger of a complete nrostration of France if France lias to iwdergo another bleeding like .that of Verdun. Germany eanot afford the losses which she would have to bear singly when ther are balanced by losses on the other side divided between the French and the British. This would mean a rate of attrition for her which would be murderous- But since Franco has lost proportionately almost as heavily as Germany, the German can exchange casualties with France safely. AMERICA'S BLOW WILL FALL IN 1919. There should be no mistaking the fact in the .United States that the defection

of Russia has totally changed Hie whojr si! !'.;il ion, ill that U iiarf" .-"ti-]i}>ii«-'(l "Cler-" many witli a strategic reserve that if, has reinvigoratcd the war spirit of Uie nation, ami that with newly acquired resources of guns anil materials captured from the Russians. Germany is now 'able to strike one more blow before we can possibly become an eli'edive fori".' oil tlie Western from. During next summer wo shall have some hundreds of thousands of troopa in France We shall have c certain number of divisions upon the firing line. pv t jj'iihD Imve many more divisions boJ hind the firing line, getting their frajii; ing, but we shall he unable to take over jany considerable portion of the. Germap [assault iii li'iS—precisely as the British were not able to take, over any of the German assault upon Verdun beitween February and July, 1918. j It does not seem to me that these fact? warrant any pessimism, althouga \v° are certain to have a period of depression growing out of the upparciij: inexhaustibility e.f German resources and the inevitable local successes of German orni?, such as the recent Gambia: episode, and the more considerable success ;n Northern Italy. Germnny is compelled again to make tremendous, efforls and to gamble on an immediate decision with new assets to avoid that defeat which is inevitable when American numbers restore the balance destroyed by the Russian defection. The real decisive thrust of the war must cpm.t from the United States, and can come only when the United States h«3 suflieioYit numbers at the front to deliver- a great blow. It took Great Britain two years to (rain its citizen army and get it to France. It will not take us any less A WAR OF SPIRITS We are entering a new phase of the war. The campaign of 1018 will begin with a very clear perception on the part of all general stall's—enemies and Allien alike—that the decision of the war will rest with the nations whose spirit endures most steadfast, and that the real defeat may come not in a Waterloo.or a Sedan, but in a collapse heh<nd the lines-, such as has destroyed the great Russian forces during the present year. It 'is rather a question now whether-'the German spirit or the Anglo-French-Ameri-can spirit is the first to weaken, and it .'; a moral certainty that if our troops arrive in France in time the ulliintc advantage must he with the Allies. Xor does there seem to mo any reason to doubt that the French and' the British can bear what will be the ultiate German assault, made possible by Russia's revolution and the relense of some hunjdreds of thousands of German troops to contitute a new German strategic reserve. Somewhere between half 'a million and three-quarters of< a million troops have been released for the Western fold, and with her usual wisdom Germany is preparing to use this new reserve for one more attack, rather upon the spirit of her enemies than merely upon their trenches.