RUSSIA AND THE BOLSHEVIKI.

Taranaki Daily News, 8 January 1918, Page 3

RUSSIA AND THE BOLSHEVIKI.

I THE SEPARATE PEACE KSUJS. IXTKKK-STIXG ItKVJKW OJ? i'fiji fcsITUA'J'IOX. _ Mr. Robert Crozier Long, to whom the Xew York Evening p 0 st waders are indebted for some oi the most illuminating ami far-sighti-d correspondence from Russia published in any American newspaper since the beginning o. r the wai, has jiHt arrived in thut country. Mr. Long has been in Petroj-TUd sine;' the KevoiuLion of last March as a correspondent, of the Associated Press. He has been an observer and student of Russia at iirsthnnd for twenty years, lie was sent ,to Moscow in ISUS by the late Air. W. T. .Stead to work for better Anglo-Russian r»hitions; lie lias written hooks on Prussian affairs. translated and first introduced to the English-speaking peoples the.writings of Anton Tcherkhoff; saw the revolution of l!)0">-(!. and was at tlie Pais--ian iront to sec the Russo-German battles oi lftH-15. To a reporter of the Evening Post Mr. Lonir point out that, tlie Bolsheviki coup d'etat is not being' quite correctly judged by Americans. "The Polsheviks," he -began, "do . not demand « separate peace. Their obsession is an immediate and general peace; and their triumph will not mean entering into negotiations with Russia's enemies. It means demanding peace from all belligerent Governments, or, as is more likeiv. from all belligerent, proletariats. There is no sepnrate-peace party in Russia. M. Kerensky told me during the Kornilo(T revolt that in Russia there is probably not even a separate-peace individual. THEIR PEACE TOLICY. "When, in Prince LvofT's time—after Miliukoll's fall—the Council of Deputies forced upon the Provisional Government the policy of a speedy peace without annexations and contributions, the,.Bolsheviks and the Moderate Socialists 'Mcnsheviks, Social-Revolutionaries, and Populist Socialists), botli favored this peace policy, Russia, they held, could induce all the Allies to make peace. The Bolsheviks soon afterwards began to complain that first LvofT's Cabinet and later the Kerensky Coalition Cabinets did not press this policy on the Allies with sufficient vigor, and that the Cabinets were not sincere. The Bolsheviks boasted that if their demand 'all power to the Councils of 'Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies,' was realised, they would induce the Powers to make a general peace. That is their dream now. If, as seems ine"itable, they fail, they may threaten to make a separate peace; but not even Lenin or Trotsky has so far publicly championed a separate-peace policy. '"On September 27. the day of the opening nf the Preliminary Parliament, I talked with Trotsky on this subject. He said; 'Russia could not make a senavpeace, because she could not face~the problem of disbanding her Array and reestablishing her finances and economical stability without foreign help.' "The critical attitude of the Allies' Press to the Bolsheviks is thoroughly justified. The mass of Bolsheviks are not conscious traitors or paid German agents; hut they are impracticnl. politically ignorant, men. Some of them, like Lenin and Tehernoff, late Minister of Agriculture (who is nominally a Social Revolutionary), were in close touch wit?* Germany; and some accepted German money, in the belief that any weapon against the autocracy was legitimate. But the Germans could not corrupt the millions of Bolshevik soldiers and civilians. The real source of Bolshevikism is to be found in the backwardness of Russians, and their trend towards political abstractions and supposed first principles of government. These first principles are usually only empty phrases, but they dominate the innumerable sovicti, soviestheniya (councils), komiteti. and other meetings which meet every day. The Moscow Congress and the Petrograd Preliminary Parliament, at both of which I was present, were almost, ontirelv devoted to renunciation of political principles.

TROTSKY A GOOD SPEAKER. "The masters of this method on the two Socialist sides are Leon Trotsky and Tseretelli, who are both orators of fuv> and temperament. The Provisional Parliament began as a conflict between these two. Trotsky is a. first-class speaker, who could inspire a mob without harm in any country which is blessed with solidified parties and programmes; but Russia has neither; and from mere orators like Tseretelli, Trotsky, and, indeed, Kerensky, she cannot get concrete proposals for reconstruction. The titular Bolsheviki leader, Lenin, is a more capable and an even more dangerous man than Trotsky, and he is more in German hands.

"The fall of Kerensky was inevitable. The revolution of this week only registered the fact of his failure, known to every one in Russia before the Moscow Congress in August. The new revolution is not a conflict between the sound system of Kerensky and the chimeras or treason of the Bolsheviki. The Kerensky system was hopeless, and it fell because its time had come. It was bound to fall either at the hands of the Right (the Constitutional-Democrats and other 'lntelligentsiya' with the Moscow industrial group and militarv men of the KornilofT and Lukomsky type), or at the hands of the extreme Left, the Bolsheviki, It fell at the hands of the Left because the Revolution, like the French Revolution, was destined to run its extreme course before a reaction towards common sense could set in. The limit swms to have been reached this week, as there is no party-worth mentioning more extreme than tlie party of Lenin and Trotsky; and the reaction will come as soon as he Bolsheviki have shown in practice their political incompetence. The Korniloff revolt came too soon; but a fresh revolt of similar character seems inevitable and next time it may succeed. "Kerensky's political career really ended last August when Governmental" anarchy and irresolution disgusted all Russia and enforced tlie summoning o'f tlie Moscow Congress. I do not think there is any chance of Kerensky's return to power. Not. he but the bourgeoisie and the industrials are the effective foes of Bolshcvikism. Kerensky is a man of personality, but not a inan of character. He dominates an assembly, but lnts no policy in a council chamber, lie was in Korniloff's plan to crush tlie Bolsheviki; but he withdrew from it, according to a statement made to ino by M. Gobetchiva, now Chief Commissicnary of the Caucasus army, 'owing to lack of nerve.' If ho had taken slight risks he could have crushed the Bolsheviki on half a dozen occasions. I believe that the present defection of the Opssacks is due to the fact that they saw he would never srike. KERENSKY IRRESOLUTE. "At Moscow and again during the Korniloff revolt, Kerepsky repeatedly annousetd tbat-lw wm renfoed

revolts, whether ironi llight or belt, •with lilo.id and iron'; but lie showed always indecision, as did Prince Lvoff in the early stages of revolutionary disorder. It was nor lie hut hi:: assistant. Savinkoff. Acting War Minister and column tidcr of the I'elrograd Military District who organised resistance to KornilofV. In fact. Komi 101 l was ben ion because !ii- soldiers refused to light, and not 1:-cause the Kerensky Cabinet was ready to light ''Kcrensky I have seen often, and I interviewed him three times during the Korniloll' week. He was accused of poking. and there was truth in the accusation; but he is a patriotic man. and he could hold his own under conditions wherein oratory alone dominated. He is totally unabie act. The one capable and practical man who has come to the front is Savinkofl'. Savinkoff is an ex-Terrorist, and under the autocracy "■■as actually organiser of assassination plots. When an exile in Paris, he wrote under the pseudonym 'Ropskin' a novel called 'That Which Was Xot.' which had temendous success; but Tie is primarily a man of action. It was he. not Keren* , tt 'ho temporarily re-established annv discipline by restoring capital punishmcnt at the front—he was then chief commissary. He was a sworn foe of Bolshevikism.

"In the KornilolT week lie told me: 'Xow that. We have finished with Korniloll'. we shall turn against the Bolsheviks.' Thii policy was a sound one. but Korenskv lacked the nerve to support it; and, after being attacked bv the 'lzvesliya,' organ of the Petrograd Council of Deputies, .Savinkoff was forced to resign The !ast story was that he had enlisted as a private. He is a man of middle age, with resolute features, decisive and simple manner of expression, and he may come to the fore again. He said to me that 'victory in the war for Russia is an absolute necessity. The blow to her national self-consciousness which would result from defeat would complete the process of disintegration induced by the revolution.'

'•f do not expect there wiJl be civil wt»r in Russia, or even anything like systematic disorder on a great scale. There are no two clear-cut opposing interests. Kcrensky is unlit to overthrow the Bolsheviks. Newspapers are mistaken in representing Bolshevikism as dominatin" exclusively in Petrograd and in rifpre'senting Moscow to be a centre of moderate (Menslievik) Socialism.

''The position is this: Formerly in both cities the Bolsheviks were in a minority in the Councils of Deputies. Tiie Korniloff revolt led to a panic rush towards t'io Left by all who feared military despotism or a new autocracy; and the Bolsheviks, in a re-election, captured the Petrograd Council. A week or so later they captured the Moscow Council. Moscow is Bolshevik, if less so than Petrograd. In the Pan-Russian Executive Committee of Councils (representing councils all over the Kmpirt?) the Bolsheviks are still in a minority; and in the Council of Peasants' Deputies, which sometimes sits with and collaborates wTch the Pan-Russian Executive Committee, the Bolsheviks make no show Dominant, here ary the relatively reasonable .Social-Revolutionaries, who are essentially a peasant party.

BOLSHEVIKS W NOT DOMINATE,

'•lt follow®, that in all Russia the Bolsheviks do not dominate. But revolutions are decided on the spot; Petro?rsd made tlie revolution of March, Petrograd overthrew Prince Lvoll', and Petrograd alone could overthrow Kerensky. _ Moscow, unless there has been some change since I left, will support Petrograd. By Moscow I mean the workmen and, soldiers represented in the Council—in both cities the Intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie are disgusted with all forms of Socialist domination. I do not see how the fact of a Pan-Russian majority against the Bolsheviks can upset MM. Lenin and Trotsky-~it would upset them if there was organised civil war, but there is not.

"Bolshevik-ism- will probably kill itself. R?. did the system of Prince Lvoff and the system of if. Keronskv. It has not tli" material force behind it to carry out its chief programme item—to appropriate land systematically and immediately: all it can do is to incite the peasapts to agrarian rioting; but such disorder will recoil on its own head. It has not the prestige or experience to influence the Allies towards peace. It cannot collect tuxes—even the relatively sensible Kerensky Cabinet could not 'do that. Possibly power will give it a littlo responsibility ; already there are signs of that. Four months ago its organ, tlie "Pravdn," threatened a massacre of the bourgeoisie, but present reports show that it is being compelled to make a show of keeping order in Petrograd. "The danger is not from Its extremism, which it may grow out of, but from the complete political incompetence of its leaders and rank and file Its tri- ■ nmph will undoubtedly weaken the Allies, a s the arrests and depositions of competent officers on political grounds must injure the Army, even if there is no wholesale Army dissolution. This, however, like other Bolshevik blunders, is merely a continuation of the Kerensky system. After the Korniloff revolt, Kerensky, in order to propitiate these same Bolsheviks, removed hundreds of competent officers. M. Kerensky and the socalled Moderate Socialists were members of (and even leaders of) the Council of Deputies when it set itself to undermine Army discipline by framing the notorious Army order So. 1; they had a majority in tiho Council, and they allowed the Council—as KornilofT riglitiy put it—'to sell Russia's Army for a, mess of rhetorical pottage.' When tTie fruits of their ill-advised measures became ripe in the shape of Army indiscipline and anarchy, they tried to mend matters bv reintroducing capital punishment, and by executing soldiers for doing exactly what they had advised or condoned.

MANY POLITICAL BLUNDERS. "All the Left parties have blundered hopelessly. They blundered through unfitness. Tlie Constitutional-Democrats and other non-Socialists when in power blundered, not through unfitness, but through lack of power. The first revolutionary administration of Prince Lvoff was ideal; its measures were just and progressive, without being anarchial and visionary; but it had no force behind it. Force was in the hands of the Councils, that is of scandalously incompetent and visionary groups. Tlie more reasonable Socialists, notably Tseretelli, rightly resisted the handing over to the Councils of all power, -because they knew that the Councils were not fit to'rule. Now this tragedy has taken place. Probably in the end it will be no misfortune. The weak Kerensky p.vstem had to go; its continued existence rctiued the natural process of decomposif.ion'vhich must precede reconstruction; and now that the decomposition is proceeding at full speed, we may hope for a recovery. .

Iho personalities and the processes by which Recovery will be achieved arc not yet in sight. But they will come. Russia is a young and healthy orirnnisation, temporarily diseased; but the Russians, thougfajthey lack the European instinct for b&v»_great njialitiw^

notably a belief in ideas and a hatred of violence, which most liluropeans lack. I do not believe that Russia will perish; but I believe that things will get worse until they reach the stage at which they become unbearable even to long-suffering Russians; and then the nation will revert towards order and policy. It is doubtful only whether this will oome before the end of the war."