THE WAR HORIZON.

Taranaki Daily News, 5 December 1917, Page 7

THE WAR HORIZON.

GENERAL SURVEY, POSSIBILITIES OF THE WINTER CAMPAIGN. (Wellington Times' Special Correspondent). London, Sept. 20. The autumn leaves are falling, and we are faced Avith the virtual certainty of another winter campaign. Past experience tells us that during the next few weeks the public mind will be very much occupied witit that process of national self-analysis which puts such a severe tost on the spirit of the average citizen. The disposition always is to concentrate attention on our failures rather than on .our successes. Nevertheless, those whose duty it is to keep their fingers on the pulse of public opinion do not detect any suggestion of despondency in I the country's heart 'beat. The roan in the street may xiot be prepared, perhaps, to take quite such an optimistic view of the outlook as is reflected in the very notable interview which General Smuts has accorded to one of the French journals. General Smuts can hardly have expected even the French nation, to whom his remarks were more directly addressed, to accept too literally ihis assertion that the Germans have already been beaten. For it can hardly be challenged that the enemy, thanks in large measure to tho Russian Revolution, and to a lesser degree to the deplorable weather conditions on the Western, front, have done very much better than anyone anticipated. Circumstances have enabled them to evade that crushing military defeat which at the beginning of the year it was confidently believed they would sustain before the summer campaign wore to a close. Germany is weakening visibly, and in that limited sense it may perhaps be maintained that she is beaten. An General Smuts says, ton, her ruling classes show some signs that they begin to recognise the handwriting on the wall. AH ihe talk about the Kaiser renouncing his ambitions where Belgium is concerned may prove so much empty vaporing, BuF these stories are manifestly officially inspired, and no one can deny that a subtle change has come over Germany's attitude towards peace. THE END OF THE CORRIDOR. To what extent this alteration of tone is attributable to the fact that. Germany holds at present much, if not all that she set out to attain, is a question we assuredly should not lose sight of in examining the general war position. And it is not without significance that German soldiers and statesmen alike are insisting to-day that their country's role in the war henceforth must foe a purely defensive one. In this, perhaps, we have an explanation of von Hindenburgs failure to lake advantage of Russia's collapse. Von Hindonburg is essentially a man of the Eastern school, and the temptation to push forward from Higa and commence a spectacular procession on Petrogvad must have been almost irresistible to him. But it would have been bad policy notwithstanding. It might have caused Russia to pull herself together, and it would have imposed a severe strain on Germany's weakening military resources. From the. enemy's point of view an advance on Odessa, would have much more to commend it than an advance on Petrograd. It would not be so spectacular, but it would place Germany in possession of the rich industrial' districts of Southern Russia, would yield her many supplies of which she stands urgently in need to enable her to continue the war, and would render more remote than ever any possible menaca to Constantinople. It is possible that wo may yet hear of activity in this direction, though if operations are undertaken against Odessa the indications are that it will be regarded by the German Higher Command as a defensive rather than offensive* movement. The writer is inclined to think that if tlm Germans attempt any new stroke between now and the opening of the spring offensive in 1918 it will V a stroke directed against our continued possession of Baghdad. The Germans hold tho corridor to the East; but of what use is that corridor if the end of it remains in British hands?

GERMANY'S EASTERN' DREAMS.

All Germany's dreams of dominion in the East are bound up in the possession of Baghdad. Tl|o pan-Germans are certain, therefore, to exercise all their influence to ensure a last desperate effort to recover this lost goal oil the Tigris It may .be that this will constitute Germany's last gamble in the war. The possession of Baghdad would give her something very substantial to 'bargain with when peace negotiations are finally set on foot.

If any real effort is to lie made to force us back on to the Persian Gulf we may be assured that Germany will not be content to entrust, such important work to Turkish arms. Picked German troops would almost certainly be employed, and the difference in the campaigning seasons would afford opportunity of withdrawing troops even from the Western front ,for an undertaking of this character. German hopes in this direction doubtlessly take full account of the difficulties of tho British communications with tho Persian Gulf. But difficulties in this respect should have been graudally lessened by now. We have had ample time to put down railways, and it is inconceivable that our authorities have been blind to the peril that threatens. After all that lias happened in Mesopotamia, one would not envy any British Government which neglected the precautions necessary to ensure our continued possession of the terminus of the BerlinBaghdad railway. And if our lines of communication are a weakness) tlie enemy's own lines of communications, extending over half a continent, l> e infinitely more difficult to maintain. The Arabs are not friendly, and if von Hindenbnrg contemplates a campaign against Baghdad, these raiding parties will be to him a constant source of anxiety. THE WESTERN FRONT. So far as the Western front is concerned, so much depends upon the weather conditions during the next' few weeks that one hesitates to venture even a conjecture as to what is likely to happen. The slow progress enforced owing'to this cause during the last two ' months has been a bitter disappointment to everyone even in this country, and it may be readily Imagined that it has occasioned still greater disappointment in France and in Italy. But every soldier knows the hopelessness of any big movement on,the Flanders front,so long as the ground is in the condition of a morass,., No military commander who has ever breathed could flgiht against conditions »ucU as th«a«, rad Sir Deuslas Bitig

| deserves, if-lie does riot receive,-Hie sympathy of everyone in tho perplexing problem with which lie has been confronted Those who talk about the need of a new Napoleon show an utter failure to grasp the realities of tile situation. A dozen Napoleons rolled into one could not move heavy artillery and launch infantry attacks over ground in which men sink down over their knees in the mud with eVry step they take. Despite the depressing experiences of the past few weeks, all the generals at the front evince an amazing optimism about the outlook. They are in a far better position to judge of the situation than amateur strategists and politicians at Home. They know that Germany is weakening fast, and that, given favorable weather conditions, the enemy's lines in the West cannot be much longer maintained. The danger is that, as on the Somme. we may be robbed cf the full fruits of all that has been accomplished during tho summer by a continuance of wet weather all through the autumn. That would give tho fiermans the opportunity t'hev crave of effecting new dispositions during the winter months.

HUGGER-MUGGERING IN THE MUD. There is a disposition in some quarters to criticise the Allied Generals for not taking greater risks and for being too sparing of their man-power. One distinguished soldier has even gone the length of asserting that a clean break through might have been effected on the Verdun front three or four months ago if the French Command had had sufficient reserves available to press home the attack and complete the defeat of the Crown Prince. The innuendo is, apparently, that Sir Douglas Haig would have done well to have lent more divisions to our Ally. Similar complaints are heard about operations on our own front in Flanders and Northern France. But it is a. bold man who sets himself up as a critic of Sir Douglas Haig, who must know far more of the conditions, and is in possession, moreover, of all the Allied plans. Sir Douglas I-laig warned us many months ago, when he accorded his famous interview to the French journalists, that the earlier operations on tbe Western front would partake of the character which has actually distinguished them ever since he spoke. For many months past we have been testing the enemy's .lines first'here, now there, and wearing down the German strength, These "limited offensives," as they are called, have been unfailingly successful. If they were not pressed home, as some impetuous people thought they might have been, it was becaii.se Sir Douglas 'Haig and General Petain know that the time was not ripe. When the crucial moment floes come our stroke will not lack driving power, and, as one soldier has expressed it, there w!U be "no more hug-ger-muggering in the mud."