RUSSIAN COLLAPSE.

Taranaki Daily News, 7 November 1917, Page 6

RUSSIAN COLLAPSE.

DEPLORABLE KlSsl'mX.

1T« REACTION ON' THE OTHER FRONTS. London, Sept. 6. The fall of Riga affords striking but by no means surprising evidence of the utter demoralisation of the Russian Army People who were possessed of private information regarding the situation with which M. Kerenskv and General Kornilofi' were endeavoring to cope were not unprepared for what has happened. It, was known that while spme semblance of discipline had been restored to one group of the "Russian Army tfie condition of the Army in the north remained deplorable in the extreme. It followed, therefore, that the enemy, had only to deliver a vigorous blew to secure results altogether out of proportion to the military effort involved.

That the blow has been so long delay' ed must lie attributed to political rather than military reason*. Under present conditions the German Higher Command, regards the Russian Army with a contempt which it must be reluctantly admitted is not wholly undeserved. Troops that cannot be relied on are as bad, or rvorse than no troops at all. In all the Russian armies there remains regiments which continue to be staunch and true. But .of wlmt avail is their loyalty if comrades on either side of them turn tail and run away? The loyal regiments' in such circumstances must either die where they stand or must join in the general retreat. All organised military formations are broken up and are converted into a 'demoralised mob of desperate. starving marauders, who do not hesitate to .pillage and burn the of their own countrymen and countrywomen in their flight to safety. The position is deplorable and must have serious consequences on the Allied cause. But it is a position that has to be faced, and that the situation is not hopeless is indicated by the hesitancy the display about following tip the opportunity that presents itself." Berlin is beflagged once more over the fall of Riga: but Berlin is a Ittle nervous lest bv pressing Russia too hard she may revive the latent patriotism of the Russian peasant and provoke that recovery which she is anxious to a,void.

WHAT NEXT f It is natural enough that everyone should be asking in what manner and to what extent the Germans will seek to drive home the advantage they have won. The question is difficult to answer because nil the usual military considerations which would afi'ord guidance in a matter of this kind have gone by the board. When the walls of Jericho go down at the blast of a trumpet it is impossible for anyone to speak with any confidence of tile possibility of the Russians organising new defensive lines anywhere between Riga and Petrograd. It is said with perfect truth that the Germans have much more to fear from the autumnal rains than from tile valor of the Russian soldier. Von Hindenburg's dwindling military resources have also to be considered. If Petrograd remains inviolate Russia will have occasion to thank the Allies in the West for immunity from this disgrace. The Germans are certainly not in a position to spare any large force for an advance on Petrograd. But the lure of the Russian capital will be very great, and without going into any detail it may be said that the "fall of the Russian capital would tarry with it certain military consequences which "would greatly retard Russia's military recovery even next year. 'These military considerations the Germans must be fully cognisant of themselves, but for reasons which the reader will doubtlessly appreciate it is not desirable to touch upon them here except in the most general terms. The temptation to press 011 to Petrograd will be increased, moreover, by the probability that such a march would be in the nature of a procession so far as fighting opposition was concerned. But if a small' <orce were detailed for such service such a ,'oree would he in grave peril of attack 011' its right flank if General Koruilolf is Jiblc to rcstors discipline to a Mitin" ioree adequate for an offensive operation of this kind.

THE POLITICAC PROBLEM. It is unlikely, however', that Germany's decision will ho dictated solely by military considerations Tlv&e, as | already indicated, are rather consider- ■ \ible. If they do nothing eke, the retiring Russian armies may he expected to lay waste the country as they retreat. The spectre of famine already broods over the land, and the German army assuredly could not expect to "live on the country" as it advanced. Sup-, plies would have to he transported over enormous distances, and that also at a time when the German railway systems are admittedly in a had ivay through lack of lubricants. The lines of communication even from Riga to Petrograd would extend something like 3.30 miles—lines of communication which would always be liable t 0 interruption by local Cossack raids. . ; All these considerations might be overruled in view of the moral and military advantages that would accrue from a Gorman occupation of Petrograd. But the political factor is more .serious. An advance 011 the capital might afford just '.lie incentive that is required to bring Uussia to her senses and to an appreciation of the danger that threatens 'her. l'rom the Allied point of view it might even be a very excellent thing. And Germany's hesitancy, even about an advance on Riga. shows clearly'enough that she appreciates the ijesirabiiity from her standpoint of leaving the forces of disruption to work their will without interference from outside. She could probably have forced the passage of the Dvina at any time this year after the drying-up of the ground made military movement possible. But she' held her hand .here just as shte held her hand on other .portions of the Eastern front. Only when tlio Russians made a spasmodic advance in Calicia< —and its spasmodic character was always emphasised in this column —did von 'TTindenhurg strike back. The results were instantaneous. The Russians were cleared out of Galicia, the whole of the Bukovina was won back, and the Germans even penetrated into Bessarabia.

GOING SLOW. There are reasons for thinking that this advance into the industrial districts of Russia might have been pressed further if the Germans had thought it diplomatic to go on. But they paused, and there can hardly he any doubt that a held was called for reasons of policy. But, the Moscow Conference did not turn out so satisfactorily as the Germans hoped, and we see the result at Riga. Even if they stoo where they are the

Germans are now in much more comfortable quarters than (hey would have been it tliev had remained on the western and southern iide cf the almost impassable Tirul marshes. But the expectation is that though Petrograd may not be their objective this year, the Germans wfil still push 011 some little way further, : ' »

rfiga, having fallen, no new defensive line of anything approaching the same strength is available*to the Russians for some considerable distance to the east. If von Hindenburg elects to go forward it is difficult to see how IJyinsk can hold out. The Germans may even endeavor to seize the great naval port of Reval before the Baltic is frozen in. In that case they would almost certainly advance through Livonia tip line of the Pskoff f.akes, on which it would be possible for the Russians to take up strong defensive positions.

All this, of course, is based very much on surmise, but it is surmise founded on the probabilities so far as v.e knoiv t'uein. If the wiser counsels prevail in Berlin, Germany will presumably elect to "yo slow." Jjy adontiiig moderate ambitions, a chance will be given for tl)6 process of disintegration in Russia to go on working. At the same time the strain imposed on von llindenburg's available military resources will be somewhat. lessened. Looking at the problem still from the German point of view, the prospects of a Russian recovery would be diminished In his efforts to restore discipline to the Russian Army, General Korniloff has obtained some, but not all, of the demands he has presented, and unless Russia is threatened with overwhelming disaster and disgrace his task of restoring the situation will continue to be very difficult.

REACTIONS ON OTHER FRONTS. Any attempt to gauge the effects of the rude blow Russia, has sustained with honesty and impartiality would not be complete without some reference to the effects which the fall of Riga and tlie crumbling-up of_the Northern Russian Army may be expected to have in the south. The recovery of the Roumanians has been marvellous, and reflects the utmost credit on the French officers who have set themselves to train and reorganise King Ferdinand's forces after thpir disastrous experience last autumn. But the Roumanians cannot hold up tlie Austrians indefinitely on the western frontier of Moldavia if the Russians are giving way all around them. There is ominous warning of this in the announcement that it may be necessary for the Roumanian Government to move its headquarters to Kherson, on the Dnieper. If the situation in Roumaniit is saved it will be due not to Russian assistance but to the efforts of the Italians against the Carso front.

With the improvemenl in the weather we may also look forward confidently to the resumption of the offensive 011 a big scale 011 the Western front. The weather conditions during August, especially on the Flanders front, were simply deplorable. Anyone who knows anything at all about the conditions does not need to be told that it was literally impossible for Sir Douglas Haig to attempt anything ambitious while these conditions continued. The uncertainty of the outlook in the Ypres arena of the war must make the Germans hesitate about adopting any big plans either against Russia, or against the Roumanians or Odessa in the south. Riga may fall, but the Western theatre of the war still dominates the military position.