DIPLOMATIC SECRETS COME TO LIGHT.

Taranaki Daily News, 31 October 1917, Page 3

DIPLOMATIC SECRETS COME TO LIGHT.

THE WAYS OF THE HUNS. EXTRAORDINARY DISCLOSURES. London, August 31. Day by day the hidden secrets of diplomacy are coming to light—thanks to Mr. Gerard, M. Venizelos, and others. HER GREATEST ASSET IN THE WAR One of the most significant of the many striking incidents told in the Daily Telegraph by Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador, is that which tells why Germany refused Bryan's peace treaties. "On the earnest request of Secretary Bryan" (says Mr. Gerard) "I endeavored to persuade the German authorities to have Germany become a signatory to the so-called Bryan peace treaties. "After many efforts and long interviews, Von Jagow, the Foreign Minister, finally told me that Germany would not sign these treaties because the greatest asset to Germany in war was her readiness for a sudden assault, that they had no objection to signing a treaty with America, but that they feared they would be immediately asked to sign similar treaties with England, France and Russia.

"If they refused to sign with these countries the refusal would almost be equivalent to a declaration of ««r, and if they did sign, intending in good faith to stand bv the treaty, Germany would be deprived of her greatest asset in war, namely, her readiness for a sudden and overpowering attack." Hence her pounce on Belgium! The French fortresses were too strong for Germany's liking! THE BLOND GIANT CRIES. Mr. William Bayard Hale, who was a correspondent in Berlin when America severed relations, corroborates Mr. Gerard's account of the amazement, surprise, and consternation evinced by high German officials when ttie news came. Mr. Hale writes:—"At noon on Sunday, February 4, I received information that Mr. Gerard had been recalled, and at one o'clock I sent a message to this effect to the Embassy. An hour or two later I saw Secretary Ziramermann, and within a few minutes after ho received the information, i.e., that the rupture was a fact. If ever in my life I have seen an excited and astonished man I saw him in that hour. The brief telegram which he held in his hand was positive and final. But the German Foreign Minister could not credit it. There was a distressing scene for five minutes. The blonde giant was deeply moved, and took no pains to conceal or control his emotion." THE CHANCELLOR IN TEARS. Mr. Hale adds: "In September, 1910. after moving experiences on the Somme battlefield, 1 went to The Hague and cabled an open letter to President 'Wilson, dwelling on the horrors of the war, and imploring him to act for peace. "On returning to Berlin I confessed to the Government what I had done, and I submitted a copy of my cablegram. I was reprimanded, but a few days later the Chancellor said to me, with tears literally running down his cheeks, that he did' not believe the President could resist such an appeal from an eye-witness." Mr. Hale was formerly a Methodist pastor, who w.ent to Berlin as representative of the New York American, AN AWKWARD QUESTION, "A copy of the Philadelphia Public Ledger just to hand by mail contains further corroboration of Germany's foreknowledge of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, to Serbia," says the Times. "Mr. William C. Bullitt, that newspaper's correspondent, had interviews in September last with Count Tisza, then Prime Minister of Hungary, and Herr von Jagow, then German Foreign Secretary, and With each he discussed this question, among other things.

"Mr. Eulitt saw Count Tisza in Budapest on September 3, and he describes their conversation on this point as follows:—

"'When you wrote the Note to Serbia you expected to have war with Serbia, didn't you?' I asked. 'You knew that Serbia would not accept your demands';'

"'I knew that Serbia would have to accept them unless Russia supported her,' Count Tisza replied. 'Every friend of the Monarchy in the world agreed that our treatment of Serbia was more than patient. We had endured injuries from her for years. We had to put an end to them. I hoped that Russia would see the justice of our case and would force Serbia to submit to our demands. I realised that if Russia urged Serbia to refuse our demands she would refuse them, and that Germany and ourselves would have war with Russia and France. I believed that England Would not enter the war. I was soon undeceived.' AND THEY KNEW? "'Of course, it goes without saying that you had talked over your Note to Serbia with the German Foreign Office and that they knew the contents before it was send?' I then questioned. "Count Tisza answered: —'I do not care to answer that question directly. But you can draw your own conclusions. If a person has a very close and strong friend, and if he is about to take a step of the most terrible gravity, does ho or does he not discuss the whole matter with his friend and finally tell his friend what he has decided to do?' "Thereupon Count Tisza smiled, lifted his shoulders, and turned out his palms in the gesture which signifies 'lt goes without saying,' WE WOULD BACK HER UP. "About three weeks later Mr. Bullitt saw Herr von Jagow in Berlin, and after other matters had been discussed, he put the questions:— " 'But when Count Tisza wrote the ultimatum to Serbia what you and he wanted was not land, but control?' "Herr von Jagow replied:—'l did not have a hand in preparing the Note. Down in Budapest they keep spreading the story that we prepared the Note at such a rate that denials are hopeless. I saw the Note for the first time at S o'clock the night before it was presented in Belgrade, where it was presented at 10 o'clock the next morning. That was too late to do anything, about it.' " 'But you must have discussed its contents before,' I interrupted. " 'All wc had done was to assure Austria that we would back her up in an attempt to punish Serbia. She was perfectly right in going in to punish Serbia. That* was inevitable,' replied von Jagow."