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Taranaki Daily News, 18 September 1917, Page 5

| korniloff inquiry, ORDER RESTORED AT FRONT. Berne, Sept. IG. A special commission under the presidency of M. Schazlovsky, procurator of the Army anil Navy, is inquiring into tnc Korniloff affair, M. Sehazlovslcy lias gone_ to headquarters, where General Alexieff has restored order. WAR CABINET FORMED. Petrograd, Sept. 10. After protracted dissension a War Cabinet of five will probably be formed consisting of:— M. Kerensky, (Premier. General Venkhouvsky, Minister of War. Admiral Vindenevsky, Minister of Marine. M. Terestchenko, Foreign Minister M. Vikitini Minister of, Post and Telegraphs.

NEWSPAPERS SUPPRESSED. Petrograd, Sept. 10. The Government has suppressed Maxim Gorky's newspaper and other organs. ALLIES BLAMED BY ITALIAN PRESS Rome, Sept. IG. The Idea Nazionale ai-cmiks the Allies' Russian policy. It declares that the iact that they sent Socialist Ministers to Petrograd contributed in a great part to the present difficulties. RUSSIANS riG'HTI'NG -STUBBORNLY. , London, Sept. J JJ. A wireless Russian official message reports that a stubborn battle is proceed* big on the Pskov tßoad in the region of Zegevold Farm. Our troops are showing Rreat firmness and stability and expelling the enemy. We repulsed" 1 attacks in the direction of Focsani and north-west of Mereechesi. A REPUBLICAN - REGIME. Petrograd. Sept. 10. The Government has proclaimed Russia a republic.

RICA'S FALL. A SHOCK TO RUSSIA. MAKING OR BREAKING. . (By "Criticus" in Dunedin Star). Riga has gone, and the news from the front indicates clearly that Russia is in for a hot time this winter. Yesterday morning came the official Russian announcement that the enemy had crossed the Dwina near Uxkull, and were extending their advantage northward. That scaled the doom of Riga at once, for the town lies in a salient angle formed by the Dwina with the Gulf of Riga, and the Germans, crossing at Uxkull (which lies less than 20 miles to the south-east of Riga), would only have .to march due north to cut off the town, with any troops that might be in it. So the official German claim to the capture of Riga and the official Russian admission that the Riga region I had been abandoned came merely as a matter of course, particularly as the easy crossing by the Germans, their swift advance, and the Russian/ admission that the Russian troops had again retired coi.trary to orders revealed°tha fact that the Russian armies around Riga are displaying the same symptoms of demoralisation that were witnessed in Galicia until Hindenburg knocked the southern armies at least partially into shape. Another Russian official communique last night spoke of the Russian forces still retiring westward of Riga, while at the same time it mentioned that the enemy had penetrated the Russian positions on the Jagel River. This river runs past Riga from the soutlu east and a little to the north of Uxkull. There are two branches, the Great Jagel and the little Jagel, the latter being the branch running immediately past Uxkull, and apparently the branch which tho enemy have forced. The other branch would make a good line for a Russian stand, if the Russian troops were in form for a stand. But it is evident that they are not, and those troops mentioned as retreating west of Riga will have been fortunate if they succeeded in getting away by forced marches to the north-east before they were cut off. It will be no surprise if the enemy claim to have bagged some of them, as the Bay of Riga, projecting a considerable distance inland, would compel them to retreat through tho town.

THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES, The first consequence of the fall of Riga will be the loss by the Russians of tho whole of tho Dwina line down to Dvinsk, including Dvinsk itself. We may hear of the abandonment of that town at any time, and this, again, will necessitate a considerable readjustment of the Russian line to the south. The •invaluable lateral railway line from Dvinsk to Riga down the eastern bank of tho Dwina will also be lost. How far Hindenburg will push his successes beyond that will depend upon his planß, which are known only to himself, and upon a multitude of uncertain factors Vrhich render prediction impossible' The most important of the uncertain factors is the -way in which Russia wjlf react 1 ' to tho danger. The news of the'crossing of the Dwina by the Germans aild fall of Eiga \yould come like a thunderclap at P&trograd, and do more' to knock sense into the ranting, fanatical, andt impractical politicians than anything else could have done. We have seen, what happened on the southern front", and U the northern armies are pulled tpgetli'er in the asme way, and the Petrograd politicians are sobered into something resembling sanity, -we 9hall have reason to fear for, the ultimate Result j' and, indeed, nothing to regret, although Hindenburg will go a considerable distance before he is pulled up, if he strikes for Petrograd. The capture of-'Riga, useful as it will bo to the enemy, will b'o a bagatelle compared with the advantage which we should draw from the thorough rousing of Russia.

AN EARTHQUAKE NECESSARY. After all, wc must recognise that there is little chance of a decisive victory for the Allies in this war unless Russia is ahaken together again. And we must also tecognise that the present welter of anarchy, confusion, and fanaticism may continue for years, and prolong the war indefinitely, unless an end is put to it by an earthquake shock, Political power in Russia has fallen into the hands of a mob of people who are quite incompetent to exercise it, A body, of hitherto oh-

scure and unknown persona suddenly find themselves thrust into the limelight, and with their hands on the reins of power. They find themselves in a position to make or unmake generals or coininanders in-chief, and play a notable part in the destiny of nations. They are naturally, somewhat delighted with the change In their circumstances, and are utterly lacking in the intellectual clarity and moral stability which would enable them to resist the temptations of such a position, and use their, newly-gained powers soberly and wisely. They will cling to power and grasp for more. They will interfere in everything, including a thousand questions of which they have not the slightest understanding, and they will close their eyes obstinately to the disastrous consequences of their conduct until they are forced to open them by some power which they cannot ignore. That is wiiat occurred in France during the earlier days of the French Revolution. Political anarchy lasted for years until the attacks of the allied nations put an end to it. Then the desperate and frightened Convention driven to do something, entrustea dictatorial powers to that Committee of Public Safety which soon became their master and startled the world by their ruthless energy. We must look to Hir-denburg to supply the necessary earthquake in Russia's case. If he is striking for IPetrograd, he will either make or break Russia, and most of us will be willing to take the risk of th« breaking in the hope that he will succeed in rousing Russia, and thus prevent the war from dragging for years.

GENERAL JANUARY ON THE ENEMY'S SIDE. Let us waste no time in idle talk about the enemy being pulled up by. the severity of the Russian winter, similar to that which was indulged in during the Russian debacle of 1915. Only the energy of the Russians themselves can save Russia, and attempts to prove otherwise will be utterly mischievous. General January and February are on the enemy's side in this war. From the beginning Hindenburg has held that winter favors the Germans, as it prevents the Russians from entrenching. It will do more, than that. If the Germans advance upon Petrograd thfy will •have to plunge into a vast region of woods, lakes, rivers, swamps and bogs provided with few and .bad roads. Tiic advent of the autumn rains will presently flood large areas of country and turn the unmcta-lled, roads into rivers of mud, in which transport will sink axle deep. That may hold up the enemy for a time and give the Russians a temporary respite. B.ut Sstocn winter comes it will harden the roads and freeze over rivers, lakes, and swamps. Carts and waggons can bo readily transformed into and the enemy's transport difficulties will !ba practically solved. The frost will not ouly prevent the Russians from entrenching, but by covering, all bpdies of water with a thick covering of ice Will enable the enemy to cross them. For the rest, the German troopg may be bettor equipped, bcter clothed', a.nd better fed in the heart of 'Russia than tho Russian, troops themselves, so far as transport conditions are concerned, aa they will be supplied by quite a number of single and double-tracked railways.