THE NEW OFFENSIVE.

Taranaki Daily News, 26 March 1917, Page 7

THE NEW OFFENSIVE.

MANOEUVRING FOR THE FIRST BLOW. {Wellington Time 9 Correspondent.)' London, Jan. 25. The position of anyone who writes about the war at the present moment is not an enviable one. Either he knows too much or he knows too little. In the former case he feels constrained to write on any subject but the plans which he knows' to be in contemplation, lest anything he might say should convey a useful hint to the enemy. Perhaps the lot of the man who knows nothing at all is the happier of the two, but even he may blunder on the truth and throw a light on the dark places of the war. Nevertheless German as well as British newspapers are at this moment full of speculation a3 to what is going to happen on the Western front in the course of the next few weeks, and, as is üßual in such circumstances, the jade Rumor is exceedingly, busy. As it happens the stories which are current are less mischievous than they might be, because the plans of the belligerents are •necessarily dependent upon contingencies, which even the military leaders in the field can hardly foresee at present. It may be assumed that when the spring \ offensive opens both sides will strive to get in the first blow, and to reap the advantages whichy the first blow invariably confers. But we can only guess at the enemy's plans in this particular, and there is happily good ground for believing that the Germans are equally ignorant of the Allied intentions, The attempt of the German destroyer flotilla to scuttle out of Zeebiugge is a little noteworthy, because, in view of the heavy guns' mounted on the Belgian coast, it is not quite easy to accept the story that the Germans were afraid of their ships becoming icebound, and so falling* a prey to the British monitors. But the dash of the German destroyers from Zeebrugge is ttie only hint we have received yet of what is working at the back of von Hindenburg's mind. THROUGH GERMAN EYES. The uncertainty of the enemy as to what is going to happen is betrayed in an article written by the military correspondent of the "Frankfurter Zeitung." This article gives away little or no information, but it quite admirably sums up the outlook as it must present itself to the German eyes. The writer is ot opinion that "the taking over of parts of the French front (on the Sonime) by the Army, which is 1 some 2,000,000 ' strong, permits the inference that French forces are to be released. These released forces, strengthened by new formations, will presumably take tlie offensive between the English rignt wing and the Swiss frontier. But the decision as* to whether this offensive will be militarily appropriate we will leave to the French General Staff. This French offensive is being prepared by reconnaissances which in some eases are of quite a vigorous kind, ami by 'retaining' feelers along our front, while we, for the matter of that, proceed in exactly yie same way." The writer in the "Frankfurter Zeifung' draws the natural conclusion '■hat the Russians will co-operate witli the Allied offensive in the West as soon a,i the weather permits of the movement ol the Russian armies, and his comments on the part of our Eastern allies are destined to play, is also well wotth noting: "The situation in the intern* of the country," he writes, "has in the world war of to-day become much mori important for strategy than it was in the lflth century, and so it may he assumed that the behaviour of the Russian supreme command will react upon the general feeling of the country. That, however, by no means signifies a weakening of war leadership; probably it signifies on the contrary a desperate acoentuation of the effort for a tangible sucmss. The Russian offensives, which made their appearance at the New Year at Riga, in the neighborhood of Smorgon, seem however, in spite of the employment of large numbers of troops, to be. still in the nature of big reconnaissances. At the same time the public is comforted by .the promise of a great joint naval offensive with England." FEELING FOR THE WEAK PLACE. This German writer tears the heart ovt of the problem which confronts the military commanders when he speaks of. the "feelers", which are being, and will be, nut out to discover the weak spot in the opposing front. For it is at this weak spot, when it is found, that the really decisive blow will ultimately be struck. It may be some time before it is discovered. It may be expected to develbp gradually as offensives directed against other points along the enemy's front compels the Germans to draw reinforcements from sectors which do not at the moment appear to be in any imminent danger. For this reason it would be altogether a mistake to expect that any brilliant results will immediately attend the Allied offensive in the spring. Just as was the case on the Sommc, there may be many weeks of fierce and apparently unproductive fighting before there are any material results to show. But the confident belief is that before the summer is far advanced a complete break through will be achieved, and then at last we shall see the German hordes being rolled back on to their own frontier. We have heard a great deal in the past about, the defensive lines which the Germans have in reserve, and upon which thousands of workmen have been engaged in perfecting during the two and a half years the war has"been in But short of the natural defensive line of the Rhine itself we may safely assume that none of these defensive positions are comparable in strength to the present fighting line, which it. will be our first business to pierce. There is, of course, a possibility that the Germans may take time by the forelock and shorten their lines in the west in view of their weakening man-power. There is no hint of this at present, unless the movement of the German destroyers from Zeebnisgc niav be so construed. But though a"shortening of the enemy's lines in the West may be probable, it is just as well to bear ii; mind that the enemy's morale would be less shaken by voluntary retiremtfnt lhan it would be by enforced retreat. A EXTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE. ■ Even if the best hopes are realised and the enemy should be driven right back on the line of the Rhine before the campaign'wears to a close, it does not, ol course, follow fcjiat immediate peace would ensue. Mr Lloyd George's speecn it the Gui|dhnll in nipport of the War rmn has been responsible for some mia'■••■.■aiMngion'.'OJl'' this point. Bat Mr.

Lloyd George himself has been misunderstood. He spoke of "Victory in 1917," not of "Peace in 1917." There is a distinction with a difference. We all hope that the coming groat cil'ensive will be decisive in a military sense, but there is no certainty that Germany will immediately hold up her hands. She may elect to hold on for another few months, for if her food supplies hold out through the coming summer the next harvest' in autumn will at least release her from anxiety on the food question at' any rate until the early summer of 1918. The Allied peace terms as laid down in the Note to the United States, though they are not vindictive; are sufficiently stiff to make it certain that the governing classes in Germany will fight on to the very last in the hope that the financial and economic strain 'imposed on the Allies may induce them to moderate their demands. All this, of course, takes no account of the pos-' sibility that internal pressure may force the hands of the authorities in Berlin and compel them to capitulate. But this is a contingency on which it is not safe to place any reliance. The German civil population, like the German army itself, is well disciplined, and it is a rather noteworthy testimony, that as the Ger-' man people have become weakened bv reduced food rations their tendency is to become more amenable rather than i less amenable to the dictates of those in authority.