THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

Taranaki Daily News, 12 March 1917, Page 5

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

I THE MINORITY REPORT. *BESE£TED BY MR. W. P. BOCH, Mi". WAB COUNCIL BLAMEIX ' ' London, March 9. In a lengthy minority report, Mr. Roah Btates that the forcing of the Dardanelles had been considered when Lord Fisher commanded in the Mediterranean. also later, when Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord, and later in 1916 Dy the General Staff. Lord Fisher decided that it was migtftily hazardous, and the General Staff decided against naval or military action. On December 28, 1914, Colonel Hankey circulated a memorandum to the War Council suggesting that Germany sould be struck effectively through. Turkey. In January, 1913, Mr. . Lloyd George issued a memorandum outlining a far-reaching policy against Austria, in co-operation with the Greeks, (Roumanians and Serbians, also thewith- . drawal of substantial forces from France. Admiral Jackson presented Mr. Churchill ■with a memorandum against the possibility of rushing the Dardanelles, showtag that the losse9 involved in even Reaching the Strait. Lord Fisher, Admirals Wilson and Oliver expressed objections to a naval attack, but after the War Council meeting on January 13 commenced working out details for the systematic reduction of the forts by a naval bombardment, and, later, Lord jhsher told Mr. Churchill that he wou'd not attend the War Council as he did not like this Dardanelles affair, where■upon Mr. Asquith wrote to Lord Fisher stating he thought it imperative that lord Fisher should attend half an hour before the meeting on January 28 for the purpose of a discussion. Mr. Asquith, Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher fully discussed the proposal, and, later, at the War Council dramatic incidents occurred. After Mr. Churchill had explained his scheme on the map Lord Fisher left the table. Lord Kitchener followed and asked Lord Fisher what he " Intended to do. Lord Fisher replied that he would not return to the table, and he intended to resign as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener urged Lord Fisher that, as he was the only dissentient, and as Mr. Asquith had decided upon the venture, it was Lord Fisher's duty to remain at the Admiralty. Lord/ Fisher, after further conversation, reluctantly gave" in to Lord Kitchener's en- , treaty and resumed his seat. On May 14, when the War Council decided to persevere with the scheme, Lord Usher thought his great alternative scheme, which had been his main pre : occupation during this period, and to which his mind and energies had been almost exclusively devotee!, was doomed. He said: "I am need by the progressive frustration of my main schemes of naval strategy." The following day he resigned his post. Meanwhile, on March 12, General Sir lan Hamilton had been nominated to the command of the Dardanelles forces, 'anil i was leaving for the Dardanelles' the next day. -He was assisted by no staff preparation or by no preliminary scheme of operations of any kind. It was still assumed that the Navy could force the passage. The War Council on March 19 authorised Mr. Churchill to inform Admiral de Robeck to continue the Dardanelles operations as he thought fit. The War Council did not meet until May 14. Mr. Roch concludes by stating that the War Council concentrated its attention too much on the political ends to be gained by an eastern offensive. The War Council never had detailed staff estimates' of men, munitions and material, or definite plans showing what jiilitary operations were possible. ' The War Council under-estimated, without any real investigation, the strength of the Turkish opposition. The War Coun- ' cil rejected, without sufficient consideration, all previous expert opinions against naval attacks on forts. Mr Churchill failed to present fully to the War Coundl the opinions of his naval advisers, : and also failed to consult the Board of Admiralty. Mr. Roeh is decidedly of opinion that Important political advantages were gained by the first success of the naval Attack, and he strongly urges that similar operations in the future should be thoroughly considered from the point of Trtew of the naval and military staff. • V | NEWSPAPER CRITICISM. London, March 9. Comment on the Dardanelles report is of a most scathing character, though there is a variety of opinion as to apportionjng the blame to individuals. It is generally considered that the report sheds a most disagreeable light on the War Council's discusjons. AttjiniWfc |* OTuarf directed to the lack '- ifc the am-

biguous nature of the status of experts at the discussions. Most of the newspapers blame Mr. Asquith for not insisting on the experts givinjr their \iews fully and frankly. Some are not disposed to accept the censure of Lord Kitchener, pointing out that he might have justified the delay in sending the 29th Division. United Service. Received March 10, 6.55 p.m. London, March 9. • The Dardanelles report has led to an outbreak of bitter newspaper party feeling. . The Evening News demands the impeachment of the "old gang." f The Pall Mall Gazette states that the report reveals a type of organisation which was doomed to defeat even with a fair beginning .and the best fortune. The punishment of such an inept system is inevitable. The Westminster Gazette asks why experts should attend the War Council meetings if not to speak, and how they could keep silent if they differed materially from the views expressed is not understandable. Mr. Asquith's only possible inference was that the experts thought the operations possible. REPORT TO BE DISCUSSED IN HOUSE OF COMMONS.

London, March 9. Mr. Asrjuith will ask tlie Government whether it will prant a day foi the discussion of the Dardanelles report and publish the evidence. It is understood a debate will be permitted, but it i 9 unlikely that the evidence will be published' without careful editing. LORD KITCHENER DEFENDED. London, March !>. The Daily Chronicle regrets the publication of the Dardanelels report in war time, because essential facts -and flir.' rial features have been withheld, ma,, ing seriously for injustice. The Dnily News says that whatever blame attaches to Lord Kitchener, the fact remains that his foresight a -d dominant personality saved Great P<r"t from irretrievable disastei in this v.