THE BALKANS.

Taranaki Daily News, 9 January 1917, Page 5

THE BALKANS.

THE RETREAT IN ROUMANIA. ENEMY LINES ELONGATED. < London, Jan. 7. Vhe Germans advanced slowly upon (?->cheani and pressed back the Russians, the latter apparently sucecssfiillv extricating their, right wing from Falkfnhayn'ft encircling manoeuvres. Colonel Feyler writes that it now stems dear the Sereth l : ne must perforce he abandoned. Stern rearguard actions are likely, with a view to covering tlie evacuation of Oalatz. which is scarcely tenable now that Bcdila has %one. • Ciolonel Feyler anticipates a steady fighting retreat across Moldavia to the fruth line of.defence. This implies the surrender of the whole of Roumania, tut 'also the still further elongation of the German-Bulgar lines of communication and a corresponding drain upon their resources of men.

POSITIONS RECOVERED. London. Jan. 7. Russian official report states:—We sifrprised and captured trenches in the Oitui Valley. We retired north-west of iFo&a&i in an easterly direction. The Roumanians recovered positions at Kapatnnit and in the sain:? area threw back a dense attack. South-west of Focsani we' assumed the offensive and leached the line of Raspitzs. Like. THE GERMAN REPORT London. Man. 7. A German official message states: , We pushed back the Russo-Rouraanians between Oit\jz Valley and Putna Valley. We stormed the summit of Odo- • besti. The Russians attacked on a 25kilomctres front between Focsani and Fudeni and advanced in the direction of Obilesti. English attempts on Bulgarian advanced posts north-east of fiairan failed. POSITION AT SALONIKA In a masterly review of the general war situation, the London Observer two months ago thus deals with the position at Salonika:— No offensive from Salonika can for the moment affect directly, the situation in Roumania, but indirectly the presence at Salonika of an army to which the German Press attributes a strength of from 400.000 to 300.000 men compels ,tbe Bulgafs to leave the best part of their army in the south, and by so much eases Roumanians burden. We are not in the least inclined to criticise Gene:al .Sarrail for failing to make the grand offensive expected of -him by Salonika enthusiasts. The country is mountainous, the roads few and bad, railways are deficient, his army is heterogeneous in composition, the Serbians have no reserves. the Bulgars are strorg and are well entrenched, while behind Sarrail the King of the Hellenes has shown liim- ' self, bv a long series of hostile n.-ts, inimical to the cause of the Albes. Every fresh division sent by the Allies to Salonika has to be completely reequipped on a pack basis before it can become mobile, and this entails the purchase of mules, the construction of pack saddles, and the manufacture of mountain guns. We.have an army at Salonika too strong for defence and too weak for long-range attacks, while even were we to send more divisions, the nature of the country and the roads would render their useful employment difficult, while the facilities of the port •would cause supply to be a serious problem, and frcysh divisions can only come from some principal front, , a solution ■which seems to us inadmissablc. There appears to be scanty knowledge amongst those responsible for the collection of this great army of the relation between numbers and the nature of a theatre of war. while a great supply of ships is needed to supply the wants of the troops, thereby raising freights and prices at home, and the ships themselves -—witness the Gallia—arc liable to lie attacked and sunk by submarines. On the Struma, and more particularly on the Doiran fronts, where our British troops stand, we are faced by a succession of formidable positions, while on the 'Monastir front, where General Sarrail is conducting an offensive, he lias tnanv serious difficulties to contend with", and even if he reaches Monastir the success will remain local. Considering again that the Austro-Germans are In direct railway communication with The Vardar Valley, and can always reinforce Sarrail by sea, we do not anticipate more than that we should H able to hold on our front, if we are ■luckv a force of the enemy equal to Tf we dc not attempt more itVnot in the least from any want of for Roumania, whom we deand intend to aid, by all the means fc oSr power, but solely from force of >, rirraSLunces »nS .11 the prevailing S • - .bath locaLasd gener^ «" -»«%»•**' * < L talil-'i&i *- V > -V ... ... <■■■