ANTICIPATIONS.

Taranaki Daily News, 8 January 1917, Page 6

ANTICIPATIONS.

THE COMING YEAR. TACTICS AND STRATEGY. . PROSPECTS GOOD. (By "Criticus" in Punedin Star). The now year finds the Allies with much cause for satisfaction as regards the general position, but also with some grounds for uneasiness. We have acquired a substantial superiority in strength on all fronts save one, but that front, unfortunately, happens to be the most vital one at present. In Roumania the Russo-Roumanians are being steadily pressed back, and it is evident that their hold on Moldavia is now precarious. Still, while the enemy may from us many strategical advantages in Moldavia, they can never strike a fatal blow at Russia there. Our only other cause for anxiety now is the submarine campaign. But if the reports of sinkings which Ave are now getting are full and reliable, there seems reason to hope that the Admiralty are again obtaining the upper hand of tlie enemy. Another cause for satisfaction is the turn which affairs in Greece have taken. Reports indicate that the removal of the Greek army from Thessaly to the Peloponnesus is proceeding steadily, and, judging by the appeals of the Greek Government, our blockade lias proved a mcst effective weapon of coercion. Apparently the danger to General Sarrail's rear has passed away. On the whote, though the reverses in Roumania have been a severe setback to the Allies, the position gives good ground for confidence. The successes of the enemy in Roumania have been of a purely defensive character. They do not afford them any hope of decisive success, nor, if we go the right way to work, do they spoil our chances of final victory.

COMING TACTICS. Speculation Is rife in the newspapers as t.o the strategy of the coming year. A western offensive on a far vaster seal: than ever before is predicted, and ther; is no reason to doubt that this will b realised. Great things are expected fron the new tactics developed by the Frenol at Verdun. It may be recalled that in the latter offensives thtrc the French have claimed that their total losses have been actually less than the number of prisoners captured. Moreover, it is contended that our hand has not ycf been fully disclosed. That able soldier Lord Sydenham declares: "The Germans have learned that safety can no longer be found in the most elaborate defences.

1 here will be many more guns, amply supplied with shells," in 1917. and if the lessons of the past are turned to full account we can attack on a far larger scale with certainty of success." Of the new tactics little can be said beyond the fact that they consist mainly of swift infantry rushes after the enemy have been demoralised bv an overwhelming'artillery fire, and that these infantry rushes are preceded by lines of highly-trained grenade throwers. Hand grenades and similar weapons are in large measure superseding the- rifle in modern trench warfare. A fact of some promise is that the new French Com-mander-in-Chief (General Nivclle) was the chief originator of the new tactics. There is the fullest, exchange of tactical lessons between the Allies, and the British will also profit s by the experience gained. Moreover, while, as Sir Douglas Haig himself points out. the British had to undertake the Somme offensive witli an army which was still imperfectly trained, that very offensive has given tactical experience and temper to our new levies. After a division had fought for a few weeks on the Somme it was withdrawn, mid a fresh division took its place In this way vast numbers of troops were passed through the fire and gained experience. We shall attack this spring not only with much greater strength in men and guns, but with a tried and well-tempered army. Large numbers of "tanks" will also no doubt assist in the capture of those machinegun positions protected by concrete and j barbed wire, which have given us so | much trouble in the past, while armor for the infantry may not improbably 'play a part, with many other devices. A big offensive should develop as soon as the weather becomes favorable.

THE COMING STRATEGY. Naturally enough, events in Roumania have caused that school the members of which believe that "the victory must be won in the west.'' to lift up their heads again. Colonel Repington is calling out for every available division to be concentrated on (lie western front, including those now in the Balkans. That the direction of the allied strategy do not agree with him is shown by tin- fact that the British front in the Balkans has just been considerably lengthened. Nor doe;, he, of course, give any intelligible reasons for his views beyond the usual kind of phrase-mongering. The western front is a relatively short front, whicl: cannot be turned, and it is also the cnemys strongest front. A short fron! favors the defence. V, hat do we gam by shifting a division from fronts where there is plenty of room to manoeuvre to the short, western front' It will merely enable the enemy to shift anI other division there also, and the net advantage is with thcni. They have the inner line, and can shifl their forces across quicker than we can. and their conimunications with the western front are better than anv. If they are pressed they can shorten their line to the north of Verdun by about ."i0 per cent., while further back still lies the formidable barrier of the Rhine. The advantages .which are to be gained by concentrating -all our forces upon the western front are apparent only to Colonel Hepington and l;is school, and .what they are is never explained.

WHAT MAY HAPPEN. Lcfus suppose that a vast increase in our artillery strength and new tactical methods enable us t.o make, a breach in tlie German line in France. That does not- mean that the enemy would be pursued right back to Bcriin immediately. But it would compel them/to drop the offensive against the Russo-Roumanians, and rush all available reinforcements to the western front to stop the rout. This would let in the Russo-Rommuiians, and, when adequately provided with heavy artillery, would enable them to retake the offensive. And if we can sufficiently weaken the enemy in the east by pressure in the west it may yet be possible to overrun Bulgaria and conquer the Balkans. thus enabling us to turn the enemy's eastern line. But for this the Allies' need a powerful army to co-oper-ate from the south. In any case, the enemy will always give the first consideration to their western line, and. prefer to yield ground in the east. What

with their splendid communications in the west, their ability io shorten their line north of Verdun by 50 per cent., and the immense defensive possibilities of the Rhine, it would be pure folly to sacrifice a. certain method of ultimately crushing the enemy in order tj stake everything upon success on the western front.