THE SOMME OPERATIONS.

Taranaki Daily News, 2 January 1917, Page 4

THE SOMME OPERATIONS.

REVIEWED BY GENERAL HAIC, IX AX OFFICIAL DESPATCH. London, December 29.

Con I inning ids despatch, General Mr Douglas Ilaig says he instructed General (lough to press steadily and act a< a pivot whereon our line might swing us the attacks upon his right progrossed northward. lie emphasises three main phases of the battle: firstly, considerable confusion and disorganisation in the enemy's ranks, caused by attacks beginning in July. Secondly, the operations from July 7 to W, ivhich gave us command of the southernmost main piateau between Delvillc Wood and Bazjntin le Petit, with the subsequent prolonged struggle for the mastery, wherein. though progress was slow and difficult, the confidcsii.-e of the men in their ability to nil. ;v«s never .-hakrn. !iy September 1 they had established lighting superiority which has left its mark on the enemy. The third phase was that, wiicrein we pushed down t'uo slopes of the ridge and extended our flanks from Morval to Tiiiepval.

We commenced the attack on the second system of defences on July 14, There was strong evidence that the enemy forces were severely shaken by the repeated Anglo-French successes, but the great strength and depth of the German defences secured them sufficient time to bring up fresh troops. T!'_e vigor and determination wilh which our troops fought to July 14 had awakened the enemy to a fuller realisation of his danger and he hurried up numerous fresh divisions and more guns, but point after point was taken. The great majority of the frequent counter-attacks failed completely with heavy loss. Describing the operations at Pozievfs Sir Douglas Haig says:—The Fourth Army on July 23 advanced on a wide ll'ont from Guillemont to Pozieres and found the- enemy in great strength all along the line, with machine-guns ami forward troops in shell botes well ahead of the main defences. It was evident the enemv bad recovered from the previous confusion. The assault was delivered simultaneously on July 21! by General (lough's army again.-t Pozicr's and h\ the morning of the 2.")1h the whole village had been carried, including the cemetery. Important progress w.s made along the enemy trenches to the north-east, but, by August " it was evident that Guilleniont could not be captured as an isolated enterprise without very heavy losses. Accordingly arrangements were inae'o with the French army for a series of combined attacks in progressive stages, including Guilleniont, T.ewe Wood and Gincliy. Apart from these major operations there was fierce o'v-tinate fighting on either fronts. The llriti-h lines were pushed on wherever |.ossihle by means of local attacks and bombing and

sapping. Our lint l was thus brought to the crest of the l'idgc above Mart')!puich, the i'ozieres windmill, find the high ground north of the village. At a Inter date we readied the defences of \fouquet Farm. The fierce liess of the fish,ting is shown by The fact that one regiment of the Cerman Guards lost 1400 men in fifteen day?. When the weak salient of the Allied line linally disappeared on September it wa« evident that our new armies were not only ahle to rush the enemy* strongest defences, lint also to wear down and break the Cennan power of resistance by steady relentless pressure. The enemy knew the attack was coming. bnt considered his troops already on the spot, aided by apparently impregnable defences, would suffice. Cienera! (lough's army therefore at Thiepval was now advancing by methodical progression, wherein ;»i - cat skill, patience an.l endurance were displayed. This army acted most success!ully as a pivot, to'the remainder of the attack. There was no need to incur heavy cas unities in an attempt to rush the Thiepval defences, though undoubtedly it could 1)» rushed when the time came. As a result of the fighting on September I~> and following days the gain wis considerably greater than any that bad attended our arms in the course of a single operation since tiie commencement of the of!ensive. During a. single day's fighting we broke through two enemy main defensive M'stcms and advanced a depth of a mile on a front of six miles, capturing three large villages. All this was accomplished "with small casualties in comparison with the troops employed. The preparations for further atta-ks were binilered by bad weather, but Morval, Los l.oetiis and fiucdecourt were assaulted 011 Septembei 25 in a belt of country about a thousand yards deep, curving round north of Tiers to a point midway between .Flers and Mflrtinpuich. The whole of the objectives were taken by nightfall, except. f!ued"court. Conibles was (liken on September :'(V in inexpensive fashion, fluedecourt was taken the same day after protecting trenches westward had been captured in interesting fashion. A "tank" .mi the eaily morning started dow r n a portion of the trenches firing machine-guns, and was followed by bombers. The enemy was i,liable to escape use and we held the southern end of the trench At the same kimp our aeroplanes flow the length of the trench firing machine-guns. The enemy waved their hanilkovplncf&. and when' their surrender was reported the infantry accepted the surrender of the garrison, when 370 were made prisoners, apart from a groat number killed. Our casualties were five. The success of the Fourth Army enabled me to assault Thiepva!. Unfortunately unfavorable weather interfered with' the advance in the direction of Le Transloy and Banaume. Constant rain in October and November turned hastily dug trenches into channels of deep'mud. The country roads were broken by counties') shell craters and were almost impassable, making it a serious problem. These conditions multiplied the difficulties of attack to such an extent that it was found impossible to exploit the situation us rapidly aa was necessary for us to reap the full benefits of the advantage! already gained. The delay gave the enemy time to reorganise and rally his troops. The CJcrman resistance was again stubborn, They seized every available opportunity to counter-attack. Trenches changed hands \v>th great rapidity. The condition of the ground made ,t difficult to Knew the supply of bombs and ammunition and consolidate the ground won. The weather improved on November <; with dry, cold and frosty nights and misty mornings. Wnal preparations were made to attack on the Ancre and Beaucourt and Beaumont Hatnel. Rea;

using his danger (lie eneir.y multiplier his guns and introduced additional divis:ons between Urandcouvt and Hebuteme. An attack was made in :i dense fog on November 111, with remarkable success in view of the rapidity of execution end tiie lightness of the cost. Fourteen hundred prisoners were captured at St. Pierre. A single diviison suffered 600 casualties from May to November. The role of the other British atmies to beyond Ypres was necessarily secondary. Their task \m to keep the enemy constantly on the a'ert. It entailed heavy work for the troops and constant vigilance by the commanders, and it was carried out with unfailing spirit unci uusel/i-li, brood-minded de"ction to the general good During the four and a half months from the beginning of July 380 raids were, carried out, wherein the enemy sustained many casualties and hundreds (.1 prisoners were taken. The largest was undertaken on July 18 in the neighbourhood of Arraenticres when the troops penetrated deeply the enemy trenches, greatly damaging his works and inflicting severe losses. During the battle of the Sornijie there was steady deterioration of tljo morals of large numbers of the enemy's troog#. Main- fought with the greatest determination, hut the resistance, of larger number* became Intsly iW'drdly more feeble than early in the battle. The great depth of the defcsecfl ."'nil the frequent reliefs which their resources in. iren enabled the enemy to effect, together with the discipline and training held the machine sufficiently to enable the enemy t.n rally and reorganise the troops after each defeat. When the weathei unfortunately broke there was no doubt that the enemy's power of resistance had very seriously diminished. Thesj results were

rchieved by troops the vast majority whereof had gained their first experience of war in the Sonime battle. We were compelled to use hastily trained, inexperienced troops and officers, or we would have failed our Allies. The difficulties and hardships vere cheerfully overcome, while the endurance, determination r.nd invincible covrage displayed can hardly he imagined by those who have not had personal experience of tha Somme, battle.

It is impossible to part'eubrise units, brigades or divisions without giving information to the enemy. It must suffice to say that troops from every part of the British Isles, from every Dominion and quarter of the Empire, regulars, tc'.ritorials, and men of the new armies, have borne a share and all have done their duty nobly. The enemy's employment of gas and liquid flume necessitated our devising similar instruments. The great fertility of invention was shown by chemists, physiologists, and physicists of the highest rank, who devoted energy to the use of a means of warfare which took the civilised world by surpri.-e The enemy sulVered heavy casualties by our gas attacks.

The gallantry and devotion of the medical service' is shown by tha large number of Royal Army Medicals and Medical Corps'of the Dominions who lave fallen in the field. The health of the troops I? most satis.fsotorw There is almost complete absence of wastage due to disease of a nrevciitabie nature. The responsibility of the f?nmme > battle was entrusted to Ocnerals Rawlinson ri;d Cough, who for five months controlled Operations in one of the greatest struggles that has even taken _ place. Their thorough knowledge n? their profession, their cool, sound judgment in litUcks, and their determination proved 'equal to every call upon them. Sir Douglas Haig explains why the offensive was so long delayed, namely, because of the necessity for great numbers of men and munitions, also owinrf to the fact that a large proportion of the officers and men were far from beiiif fully trained. For these reasons the longer the offensive was delayed the tetter, but it was evident from the German a'ttac kat Verdun and the Austrian offensive mi Ihe Trentino ibat the strain miglit become too great to be borne unless timely relief action were taken. Details are given of th' stupendous preparations, including the accumulation of V.ut stores of all kinds near the front, tli" construction of new railways of different gauges, gun emplacements, trench tramw ays, dug-outs for Ammunition food and water, engineering material, stores, miles of deep communication trenches, also liunmons well borings were sunk and 120 H!cs of watermains laid. Sir Douglas Haig defines the threefold object of the offensive; first, the relief of Verdun; second, to assist tha Allies ill other theatres by stopping further transference of enemy troops from the west; third, to wear down the strength of the enemy; and he claims that all three objectives of the battle were achieved. Any one of those results itself justified the battle of the Somrne. The attainment of all three amply compensates the sacrifices of ourselves and our Allies, bringing us a long vav towards final victory.

-He says the fact that the strength, 'tilth" enemy in November 011 the western front was greater than in July, do-' spite tlui abandonment of the Verdun offensive, justifies the two first claims. Regarding'the third, he admits that any statement must depend in some degree upon estimates. Nevertheless, there is I sufficient evidence to show that undoubtedly the enemy's losses in men and material were considerably higher than those of the Allies, while morally our advantage is greater. Four-fifths of the enemy divisions an the west front were thrown successively into the battle, some twice and some thrice, and undoubtedly towards the end; o! the operations the enemy's power of resistance was very seriously diminished. These results, by troops the vast majority of whom were raised and trained during the war, constitute a feat whereof the history of our nation contains no equal. ITe concludes: The enemy power is not yet broken, nor is it possible to f'timate the period before the objects of tho Allies' lighting will be. attained, but the battle of the Soinme has placed beyond doubt the ability of the Allies to gain those objects. The German army, is the mainstay of tho Central Powers. Fully half nf that army, despite all the advantages of a defensive supported by the strongest fortifications, suffered defeat at the Somme. Neither victors nor vanquished will forget this. «ind though bad weather has given fne enemy a respite there will undoubtedly he many thousands in the enemy ranks who will begin a new campaign with confidence in their ability to resist. Oll» new army entered tho battle with a determination to win and a confidence in their power to do so. Thcv have proved to themselves, to the enemy, and to tho world that this confidence was justified. They have learnt in this fierce struggle many valuable lessons which will holo them in the future,